The Triumph of Eros:
The Prospects for Community After Freud

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is in response to the argument of The Triumph of the Therapeutic by Philip Rieff. Rieff proposes that an ethos is emerging in Western society characterized by the absence of those communal purposes which bind the members of a society together and bring them to a willingness to subordinate certain of their personal inclinations in the common interest. Rieff, further, holds that "the therapeutic," the character type of the new ethos, and communal purposes are inimical to one another. The present work takes issue with the latter position and maintains that the therapeutic is likely to develop communal purposes around his particular preoccupation with personal well-being. The latter, too, is a shared quest; inescapably so because personal well-being requires relationship with others in order to be experienced.

Rieff proposes "the analytic attitude" of Sigmund Freud as the most viable position to adopt in the absence of communal purposes. The analytic attitude is a disposition of a kind of stoic individualism amidst the absence of communal ties. The present thesis maintains that, precisely on the basis of the work of Freud, life thrives only at the behest of the binding force of Eros, the life instinct. In other words, only in relationship to other life is human life enhanced. Accordingly, Freud's theory of Eros is closely examined and proposed as the basis upon which communal purposes may be regained in modern Western society.

The following are the conclusions reached in this study:

1. An examination of psychoanalytic practice and the concept of

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Eros suggests that it is through recognition by the other that the individual is educated beyond the "mode of pure desire," which pertains from birth.

2. As the person is recognized by and able to recognize the other he learns to accept the otherness or separateness of the object-of-desire, and, thereby, his own separateness as a self. The unrepressed death instinct then enables the self to accept death-in-life, which also involves accepting the right of the other to be different from the self. The fear of such separateness leads to the repression of the death instinct and the maintenance of the mode of pure desire which deals with the other by incorporating him into a possessive union.

3. Identity with a community enables the individual to accept both the separateness from and identity with others. In the mode of pure desire the formation of a group involves the love of the members for each other, along with their hostility toward those outside. Only a group founded on the recognition of the other could come together without aggression toward the outsider. Encounter groups and the human potential movement represent a means for the rediscovery of identity with others as well as the recognition of their separateness. Growth communities, where self-realization might be sought in a context that does justice to the life-long nature of the quest, suggests a vehicle through which the sense of community could emerge in a manner congenial to the inner search of the therapeutic.

4. As a means of transcending the self so that a concern for others outside one's own community can develop, it is suggested that the private world view or personal symbolic of Thomas Luckmann's 'invisible

religion' actually encourages a tolerance for the right of each other to his private vision. Yet it needs to be stressed that each vision symbolizes the larger unity of the self with the world. Thus, the community of Eros, of members joined together by their openness to each other's commitments, and a joint commitment to the union of all life, is suggested as the means by which the therapeutic may recover the sense of communal purpose.

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CHAPTER I

THE THERAPEUTIC

One of the most perceptive and sophisticated works of social analysis that has appeared in the past decade has been Philip Rieff's The Triumph of the Therapeutic. It is a work that, for the ingenuity of its conceptual theme and its intuitive 'rightness," as well as for the felicity of the author's style, puts to shame such popular ventures in the same *genre* as Reich's Greening of America, and Toffler's Future Shock. Rieff's is the work of a scholar of subtlety and thoughtfulness concerning the direction in which modern culture is heading. He does not particularly like what he sees, but in describing the emergence of the "therapeutic" he avoids dangling contemporary man over the apocalypse.

Much has happened in contemporary North American society since Rieff wrote The Triumph of the Therapeutic in 1966. Although the Beatles, the first murmurings of the anti-war movement and the Free Speech Movement at The University of California had arrived, the youth movement, campus protest, the drug phenomenon and the human potential movement (for "older" youth) were yet to come. And yet Rieff's diagnosis seems, if anything, even more pertinent now than the time when he first identified the condition, and 'the therapeutic' stands out in even bolder relief in 1973 than it did in 1966.

It is Rieff's contention that the remission of those controls, both internal and external, by which people subordinate their immediate desires and impulses before those demands that have invariably been thought necessary for people to live together in the complexity of human societies, is taking place on a large enough scale in contemporary society for it to be considered endemic to this society. The reason this process of remission is taking place, says Rieff, is because the communal purposes or unifying myths that gave people a sense of corporate identity which, in turn, made the curtailment of desire akin to an act of love rather than of necessity no longer command the allegiance of increasing numbers in Western society.

What has grown up in place of those controls is a specimen Rieff identifies as "psychological man." He is, "the trained egoist, the private man, who turns away from the arenas of public failure to re-examine himself and his own emotions."[1] The character of psychological man, Rieff terms "the therapeutic," the primary value of which, in the absence of compelling corporate values, is the self and its well-being. Others are important only to the degree that they serve the needs and interests of the self. Indeed, says Rieff: "The therapeutic cannot conceive of an action that is not self-serving, however it may be disguised or transformed."[2] Accordingly, there can be no communal purpose in an ethos characterized by the therapeutic.

If the therapeutic is only to be characterized negatively, that is, as a response to the absence of communal purpose, then there can be no disputing Rieff's assertion. In that case, the therapeutic is merely another name for anomie, for it would seem to be nothing other than a response to the absence of social norms. For Rieff, however, it is a positive response to changing events: the affirmation of the self and its well-being or fulfillment as the highest good. It reflects,

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then, the emergence of self-realization as an ideological goal which is being shared by growing numbers of individuals. Thus far, only a small minority of the population would actually articulate anything as sophisticated as self-realization as an object of commitment. For the rest, perhaps even the majority of the population, the affirmation of personal well-being ~~as their~~ highest good represents a tacit consensus to the effect that most of our activities today are geared toward personal satisfaction, comfort, security, "peace of mind," or the like--and the sooner the better. This is in contrast to the ascetic standards of economic man for whom *self*-reliance, and *personal* achievement were of central importance. The latter were virtues that scorned comfort, and actively eschewed self-indulgence and ease in favor of hard work and self-denial in the present, in the interests of a better future.

The therapeutic is actively, almost religiously, dedicated to his own feeling of well-being, whatever his degree of sophistication in defining it. The style is set by the model of psychotherapy, a now culturally sanctioned activity marked by its unprecedented attention to the feelings and the well-being of the individual. Influenced by such high regard for the well-being of the individual, the entire culture has begun to take on a value-orientation that allows the pursuit of personal well-being to become its definition of the *summum bonum*. But to define the pursuit of personal well-being as the supreme value in a culture according to Rieff, is, in fact, a denial of the possibility of a culture being held together by a sense of communal purpose. Communal purposes for Rieff are those values and goals that hold a society together and guide its members toward a beneficial sense of belonging

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and meaning. To Rieff's mind, communal purposes involve the subordination of certain individual wishes, so that a society may function harmoniously. For its members to consider that their individual needs and wishes constitute their supreme value is to deny any claim that the community has upon them. Thus, in the time of the therapeutic, the community exists only to facilitate the individual's pursuit of his well-being.

But perhaps such a community is valued and commands allegiance because its members are thankful to it for enabling them to find such a degree of personal satisfaction within it. This may be a wholly different conception of the role of the community than was traditionally the case, say before the Declaration of Independence warranted the pursuit of happiness as fundamental to the birthright of human beings. The communal tradition of North American society is its very claim of offering itself as a 'land of opportunity,' a place where the individual who had had to subordinate himself to the definition of communal well-being provided by an aristocracy or a tyranny, regardless of his own interests or well-being, could come to this 'new society' and explicitly pursue his own well-being. So far, the individual has gladly made certain sacrifices such as taxes, military service to protect the society in times of danger, and a general regard for the rights of others in the same society, in return for the opportunities that the society afforded him. For the most part, the North American definition of its purpose as a society has been a highly successful one. It does, in fact, receive from its members a high degree of loyalty, commitment and sacrifice, such that these are generally given so freely as not to appear to the individual as a subordination of himself to the society, but as a natural act

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of gratitude.

From its very beginnings there has been the question as to whether such a society could be a viable one. It was rarely taken for granted. In order for it to remain viable it would always have to offer its members a sense that it *was* the best place and the best way for them to achieve a sense of personal well-being. All human societies make certain demands on their members in return for which they have the feeling of having received more than they relinquished. When any society reaches a point where sufficient numbers of its members begin to doubt that what they are being asked to relinquish is a more than fair exchange that society is in trouble. In a society that is explicitly established to offer its members a higher sense of well-being than they could obtain in any other place and in any other way it is particularly and always important that a great majority of them feel that what they might otherwise freely give in loyalty and gratitude is indeed in response to what they have been already given. To the extent that doubt arises on a large scale in this matter, or else to the extent that it no longer seems that a sense of well-being is being experienced then what is ordinarily given freely may be regarded as an onerous demand. At such times the fabric of the society is gravely endangered, for a society that is founded on the principle of the pursuit of happiness or well-being for its individual members must always exist in a state of delicate balance, since it relies almost exclusively on the freely given response of its members to the society's needs.

A society, of course, is also a state, which has the wherewithal, and often the will, to use force to insure the compliance of those citizens who either repudiate the exchange system of loyalty and impulse-subordination in return for the protection and enhancement of life that the society offers, or who find that the exchange is not an equitable one. At times, when the imbalance of exchange becomes unacceptable, and compliance is not so freely offered, the society is, as we have noted, in trouble. It is precisely then that the force of the state tends to be employed to coerce that compliance. Thus, it might be said that the state exists to protect the values--economic, political, and moral--that are deemed essential to the well-being and preservation of the society. By doing so, moreover, those whose values are felt to be threatened will invariably support the use of force by the state to suppress those who are seen to threaten it. The use of coercion reaches a point of diminishing return, however, where its use, in a democratic society at least, becomes a denial of the very values it is seeking to preserve. Rieff seems oblivious to the relationship between the limits of remissiveness which the coercive arm of the society will allow.

Moreover, a society constituted in the interests of personal well-being for its members will always have to contend with the problem of the expectation that 'more' will be forthcoming, or that what has already been received is taken for granted as one's 'right.' In such instances, individuals may be less disposed to regard what the community demands of them as something to be freely given, out of gratitude and loyalty. Another peril for such a society may occur when a shift begins to take place as to what constitutes the personal well-being of a sizeable portion of its members, say, from material goods--to emotional satisfaction.

It is the latter shift that Rieff has discovered. There is really nothing new in the notion of the therapeutic if it is understood as the pursuit of personal well-being, nor has such a pursuit been inimical to communal purpose in North American society. At issue is the question of whether a society that has succeeded in bringing to large numbers of ordinary people a high degree of material well-being can now begin to offer to its members a sense of inner well-being instead.

Thus, Rieff may be only half right in his diagnosis. Psychological man has indeed arrived, and he makes different demands and has different yearnings than did economic man; he seeks inner rather than outer prosperity. The only thing new about the therapeutic is that the pursuit of personal well-being tends increasingly to pertain to the inner life, to the emotions rather than to the outer life and its material possessions which, for many, have already been attained in sufficient degrees as to convince them that, by themselves, they do not bring the personal well-being they promised. The question that arises out of the emergence of the therapeutic is not whether personal well-being is inherently incompatible with communal purposes, but whether communal purposes may be established around the pursuit of the inner or psychological sense of well-being of psychological man. Regarded from such a perspective, the problem does not *seem* so formidable.

The incompatibility that Rieff sees between communal purposes and personal well-being seems to be a case of which shall predominate, on an all-or-none basis. In fact it may well be that the pursuit of personal well-being *is* the dominant communal purpose or unifying value of that narrow portion of this society and of the world affluent enough to be in a position to think in terms of personal well-being in the first place. The issue, then, might be better posed in terms of the extent to which personal well-being is a value that makes for a sufficient degree of the personal subordination that is vital to social cohesiveness, for it does appear to lead to the atomization of a society, as individuals tend to set their interests ahead of those of others, and of the requirements defined by the society.

Personal well-being as a prime value requires a massive shift in the orientation of values and supplies in the society, but it is not a problem involving the prospect of an inherently incompatible match between the pursuit of personal well-being, on one hand, and communal purposes on the other. The latter, as has been suggested above, is always and inherently a problem in a society constituted around the pursuit of personal well-being, but, however problematic, it has been done, and rather successfully, for about two hundred years. That its continuing success is in perhaps more serious question than ever before--Civil War and Depression notwithstanding--is due to the massive value-switch which is underway. A still small but growing number in the population, having experienced the well-being that material prosperity can bring, are seeking their well-being elsewhere and questioning whether their society can provide it. However, the vast majority continue to seek material well-being and are willing to give to a society that still claims to reward hard work. In addition, the racial minority, having been excluded from the sense of well-being that the society offers its members, are demanding their share both materially and spiritually, yet are showing signs of despair over the rest of

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society's unwillingness to include them in its goal of well-being for all.

Thus, three major segments of the society stand in conflict with one another over what and who are included in the pursuit of personal well-being, thereby militating against the capacity of American society to come to a consensus concerning the means by which it will henceforth seek to implement its traditional purpose of well-being for all. In such a state of conflict serious doubts cannot help but arise concerning the viability of the society and the legitimacy of the demands that it makes on its members. Whenever the question of legitimacy arises in a society constituted on the right to happiness, the delicate balance inherent in such a society between demand and desire is threatened. The question, then, that Rieff interprets as the incompatibility between an ethos of personal well-being and the demands for the containment of personal desires through subscription to communal purposes may, in fact, be more accurately understood as the question of the legitimacy of the demands of a society that is failing to facilitate the aspirations for personal well-being that increasing numbers of its members are defining in ways that relate to psychological rather than material well-being.

It is this argument of Rieff's to which the present work takes exception, in a word, that the quest for well-being as an end in itself is inimical to the commitment to a communal purpose which transcends the desires of the individual. This work will argue, to the contrary, that the pursuit of personal well-being not only can be shared communally but that unless it is pursued in communion with others it cannot be attained at all. It might be said that self-fulfillment or self-actualization would be the way that psychological man might define the goal of his pursuit of personal well-being. It would, therefore, be the thesis of the present work that a person could not experience a genuine sense of well-being, understood in terms of the emotions of psychological man, unless he stands in a relationship of support and encouragement from other people. Ironically, then, it will be argued here that, in fact, with the emergence of psychological man and his concern with his inner sense of well-being there arises not less but more need than before for the support of others.

It was economic man, in fact, who aspired to self-sufficiency; he was, after all, the self-reliant individual of the Protestant ethic, and he was the 'inner directed' man. Rieff himself says of economic man: "he is anti-heroic, shrewd, carefully counting his satisfactions and his dissatisfactions, studying unprofitable commitments as the sins most to be avoided."[3] But in his self-reliance he was very disciplined and well able to contain himself. His most noteworthy capacity, aside from making money, was the ability to postpone immediate gratification in the interests of future goals. As self-reliant as he was he put little stock in the value of what Rieff calls a "positive community" with its guarantee of "some kind of salvation by virtue of his membership and participation in that community."[4] Instead: "That kind of community seemed corrupt to the economic man, with his particular version of an ascetic ideal tested mainly by self-reliance and personal achievement."[5] At least, however, he had his commitment to a rather severe Protestantism and its ethic which he shared with the rest of his society.

Psychological man, however, has, says Rieff, nothing else to affirm except the self.[6] Christianity began to wane in its capacity to command the allegiance of Western man when it became apparent that the earth was a good place to live, and one did not have to await the afterlife for the recompense due to him for the disease, danger, ignorance, and early death that were the lot of most before the science and the industrial age began to make life easier and more comfortable for a greater proportion of the population than ever before. As the effects of science and technology began to reach even to the working class, and to swell the size of the middle class in the late nineteenth century, the hold that Christianity had had on the lives of Westerners for more than a thousand years began to falter. As a consequence, men felt more free to live as they themselves chose, but the cohesive power of meaning and purpose also began to go with the waning of Christianity. With less left to be saved from, and less left to believe in, modern man had less to bind him to his fellows. He increasingly had only himself to concern himself with, and in a society that actively sanctioned--nay encouraged--the pursuit of well-being he was, as his outer comfort and well-being were better and better cared for, left to concern himself primarily with his inner self, his feelings, his "peace of mind."

With no larger concern than himself, psychological man, according to Rieff, has nowhere else to go than further into self-centeredness and self-indulgence. Thus Rieff foresees the emergence of a way of life where people's needs are met adequately by technology, and where communal purposes do not bind people together any longer. Why should it, he asks, when people no longer need each other to survive; technology looks after that, and where life is sufficiently comfortable that they do not look to anything to be saved from? Rieff writes:

> Positive communities were, according to Freud, held together by guilt; they appear attractive only now, in distant retrospect, but the modern individual, faced with the necessity of merging his own life into communal effort, would have found them suffocating. Instead, the modern individual can only use the community as the necessary stage for his effort to enhance himself--if not always, or necessarily, to enrich himself.[7]

But while the therapeutic (or psychological man, Rieff uses the terms synonymously), is not above using the community for his own enhancement, he is not at all disposed to contain himself to meet the demands of the community, especially a community whose power to save him he no longer needs or believes. This development has serious implications for the future of culture which has, hitherto, been founded upon the *quid pro quo* of the individual giving up part of himself in return for the saving power that membership and participation gives him. Where once the community integrated him and made him into its definition of a complete person, he now sees to his own integration and pursues his own image of completeness. Such a person is by definition someone who is not contained with some parts left behind or denied, but one who develops all of himself. Of him Rieff says: "The dialectic of perfection, based on a deprivational mode, is being succeeded by a dialectic of fulfillment based on the appetitive mode."[8]

Such a person may have intimates, but he has no sense of a positive community whose purposes he shares. Yet out of the therapeutic have arisen from time to time various efforts to suggest a saving or transforming way of life as the basis by which psychological man may, after all, commit himself to a positive therapeutic community. A major part of The Triumph of the Therapeutic is spent in taking apart such efforts, by Jung, Reich, and Lawrence respectively, in order to show the

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utter futility of such attempts. He may have picked rather easy targets, however. Jung had utterly no conception of the other or of the community; he only understood the self.[9] Reich and Lawrence, on the other hand, represent extreme expressions of the totally expressive mode of self-fulfillment which could be fitted into a community model only in heaven where there are presumably no conflicts.

Thus, in order to make his case Rieff seems to have taken three of the most clear-cut cases of expressive individualism to show that the therapeutic is incompatible with commitment to a positive community. Probably Rieff had little choice when he wrote. During the early emergence of the therapeutic there were few, if any, examples that pointed to the likelihood that any kind of commitment to a positive community could arise out of a type so dedicated to his own enhancement. With the rise of the "human potential movement," however, there are increasing indications that therapeutic individualism may be giving way before a realization that even personal growth takes place most optimally in the context of a supportive and encouraging community of others equally committed to their own growth. If this can be shown to be the case then it would demonstrate that personal growth is a mutual and not an individual activity. The therapeutic would not signal the end of the positive community, whose purposes the individual commits himself to in return for the salvation or wholeness that the community alone can give him, but merely a new definition of community.

Such a community would operate with the understanding that its role need not be to contain the individual, but to so confirm him that the self that emerges need not repress itself. Instead, the self could grow without limit or danger to others. Yet the self, in this view, does not simply express itself without limit, as the conception of self-actualization seems to imply, but emerges as continuous with the selves of others. The individual ego is not seen as the boundary of the self. The latter has no boundaries; it is continuous and interdependent with others. Nor is such a self merely an organic extension of his community. He is considered to be a responsible and integral person, but because his growth is understood as an ongoing product of his relationships with others and not simply as an expression of his separate individuality, then others participate in and interpenetrate his growth. They are not obstacles to it as they are viewed in the classical liberal conception of the dichotomy between the individual and his community.

The present thesis will be an attempt to argue and develop this view as a response to Rieff's argument that, in effect, the pursuit of self-fulfillment equals self-indulgence, and is, as such, inimical to the willingness to commit the self to the purposes of a positive community. Because, moreover, Rieff makes his argument from Freud, the argument of this work shall also proceed from Freudian premises. For it is precisely concerning what he says about Freud that the present work takes serious issue. For Rieff, Freud is the supreme representative and advocate of a kind of neo-stoic individualism which Rieff identifies as the "analytic attitude," that asks the modern individual to face the end of the positive community with integrity and without illusions. There is such a Freud. He certainly manifested those qualities in his personal life, and they appear as well in his writings. At the same time Freud, perhaps more than any figure in modern intellectual history, took us beyond the burdens of solitary individualism. He showed us that 'I' am *not* the captain of my fate, the master of my soul, but the incorporation of all those others who have been significant in my life. Freud also looked to Eros, the life instinct, by which life is driven to seek out other life in order to maintain itself, as the source of man's greatest hope for his future. He wrote: "And in the development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love (Eros) alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it brings change from egoism to altruism."[10]

Thus, in contending with the position developed by Rieff concerning the relationship between the therapeutic and the possibilities of positive community, this thesis will explore the implications and possibilities of Freud's doctrine of Eros for the well-being of the individual and the prospects for community in the time of the therapeutic. Norman O. Brown wrote: "Freud left his doctrine of Eros as seeking union hanging in metaphysical air, divorced from his deepest analyses of concrete psychological realities."[11] The attempt will be made to remain as consistent with Freud as possible while extending his theory, not out of misplaced reverence, but in order to answer a proposition based on Freud with Freud. There also seems merit in remaining theoretically consistent with a theory that is still remarkable for its internal consistency and thoroughness, not to speak of the light that it continues to shed on the human situation.

The issue of communal purposes will then be examined in the light of a more fully developed Freudian theory of the other and of Eros, the life instinct. Out of this investigation the concept of a "growth community" will be proposed, founded on the notion that the individual best grows and is civilized in relation to the confirming other and perhaps best of all in communities of confirming others. The problem of myth for modern man will also be examined for its role in forming the purposes around which psychological man might gather in renewed community as well as transcend himself and his particular community.

It is also propitious at this time to study Freud anew, particularly in the light of recent work that has been done with him which takes him beyond the sterile confines of psychoanalytic orthodoxy. The work of Norman O. Brown, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Lacan in particular opens access to the humanistic implications of Freud's work, especially when his revised instinct theory is considered dialectically instead of dualistically. There is also much in Freud's theory of the transference for an understanding of the importance of the relationship with the other as the primary agent of the life instinct. However, thus far, the full implications of transference theory have never been adequately integrated into the otherwise solipsistic libido theory. It is hoped that when such implications of the work of Freud have been examined we shall have a theory of human motivation that is even more comprehensive than before because it will then do what Freudian theory has not been able to do without straining both itself and our credulity, that is, through Eros do as much justice to the 'farther reaches of human nature,' to use Maslow's phrase, as it already does to the inveterate narcissism and destructiveness of life under the dominion of the death instinct.

Finally, a word about method is in order. The method that will be used in the present work will be a critical analysis of a major work in social theory, followed by a critical examination and analysis of the problem of the role played by the other person in the writings of Sigmund Freud. The role of the other in Freud is directly related to his concept of Eros, the life instinct. Thus, in examining Eros in Freud the attempt will be made to extend the implications and possibilities of Eros in order to show that the other person is the key to a greater completeness in Freudian personality and social theory. The problem to which the present work addresses itself is a theoretical one with much in the way of social and practical implications. Hence, the method most appropriate to the examination of theoretical work, namely critical analysis of the consistency and inclusiveness of the theory under consideration as an explanatory device will be employed. The test of this particular theory will be its applicability to the problem of the quest for community and the rediscovery of communal purposes in the contemporary world. Thus, the present work will be limited in its inquiry to a critical analysis of Philip Rieff's Triumph of the Therapeutic, an examination of the theory and practice of psychoanalysis as set forth in the writings of Sigmund Freud to determine, largely through his theory of Eros, how it is possible to view the prospects for community and communal purposes from Freud, and, finally, the form that communal purposes might be expected to take in appealing to the interpersonal and social needs of the therapeutic, namely, what is referred to here as the growth community.

Rieff feels that we now live in a time when, "the dissolution of a unitary system of common belief, accompanied as it must be, by a certain disorganization of personality, may have run its course . . . . The central symbolism of personal and corporate experience seems . . . well on its way to being differently organized, with several systems of belief competing for primacy in the task of organizing personality in the West."[12]

The present time has been characterized by the waning of those corporate beliefs and institutions, the subscription to which provides a sense of communal purpose which, in turn, gives people a basis for withholding various inclinations because what is surrendered is returned bettered. "Now our renunciations have failed us; less and less is given back bettered."[13] But as the old culture with its remnants of communal purposes fades, a new one is emerging. It is a unique one, as cultures go, for, Rieff argues, it is characterized by a feature without precedent in human history: it lacks any sense of communal purpose. The type of person that it consequently engenders:

> . . . as our culture fades into the next, resembles the kind once called "spiritual" - because such a man desires to preserve the inherited morality freed from its hard external crust of institutional discipline. Yet a culture survives principally . . . by the power of its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with reasons which sink so deep into the self that they become *commonly* and implicitly understood . . . . These institutions are responsible for conveying the social conditions of their acceptance by men *thus saved from destructive illusions of uniqueness and separateness*. [italics added][14]

Today the spiritualizers have given way to the psychologizers, a breed just as oblivious of the role that institutions play in preserving men, "from destructive illusions of uniqueness and separateness." The psychologizers are distinguished from their spiritual forebears by a single-minded regard for personal well-being as man's *summum bonum*.

Alongside a concern for individual satisfaction before all else stands a pursuit, quickened by both sociology and psychiatry, of "the question whether our culture can be so reconstructed that faith--some compelling symbolic of self-integrating communal purpose--need no longer superintend the organization of personality."[15]

Contemporary psychological man, thus, would place himself outside the limitations imposed upon him by culture. In seeking his own well-being, he finds a culture of renunciations which no longer seem compelling, necessary, or desirable, increasingly inimical to his personal goals. "No longer the Saint, but the instinctual Everyman, twisting his neck uncomfortably inside the starched collar of culture, is the communal ideal, to whom men offer tacit prayers for deliverance from their inherited renunciations. Freud sought only to soften the collar; others, using bits and pieces of his genius, would like to take it off."[16]

The present order would pursue satisfaction for the self as its chief end and reject the straitening demands of communal purposes which by their nature, ask of the individual that he sacrifice part of himself for the good of the community, which, however, does give him much in return. Hitherto, in fact, it was considered that it was of the nature of culture to be therapeutic. It could not be otherwise. Rieff wrote: "Each culture is its own order of moralizing demands, *including remissions that ease the pressures of communal purposes*."[17] He continued: "therapeutic elites before our own were predominantly supportive rather than critical of culture as a moral demand system."[18] But demands were not made of persons for any other than therapeutic reasons. Sexual regulation of a fairly severe order was demanded by the Christian culture, but such regulation was required out of regard for the individual's well-being as much as for the preservation of the culture. Sexual urges were not to be extirpated but spiritualized, thus enhancing the individual's state of grace.

But the mark of the emerging culture is the opinion that there is nothing therapeutic about deprivation for the individual, regardless of what might be the case for the culture. Were the culture to persist in exacting its demands for deprivation, in fact, it would doubtless be deemed oppressive. "What is revolutionary in modern culture refers to releases from inherited doctrines of therapeutic deprivation; from a predicate of renunciatory control, enjoining releases from impulse release, projecting controls unsteadily based upon an infinite variety of wants raised to the status of needs."[19]

In seeking impulse release in the pursuit of desires, now experienced as needs and as such indispensable, all corporate identities and normative institutions whose very presence still bespeaks the need for restraint are regarded with suspicion where the attempt is not actually made to destroy them. Rieff even goes so far as to suggest that psychological man's enmity toward the restraints of culture may signal actual "human autonomy from the compulsions of culture."[20]

> With such a victory, culture, as previously understood, need suffer no further defeats. It is conceivable that millenial distinctions between inner and outer experience, private and public life, will become trivial. The individual heart need have no reasons of its own that the corporate head cannot understand and exploit for some augmentation of the individual's well-being . . . men will have ceased to seek any salvation other than amplitude in living itself. Faith can then grow respectable again, as one

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> entertainable and passing personal experience among others, to enhance the interest of living freed from communal purpose. . . . To paraphrase Marx and Engels, all morality, be it ascetic or hedonistic, loses its force with a therapeutic outlook.[21]

A principle of control, notwithstanding, is bound to emerge in order to stabilize the new culture, and Rieff suggested that it may be rooted in, "self-knowledge again made social." But he suggested, as an aside containing a somewhat ominous ring, that through psychiatric management, "men will come to know one another in ways that could facilitate total socialization without a symbolic of communal purpose."[22] Obviously repulsed by such a prospect, Rieff further suggested that self-concealment, one of the finest marks of civility, is also a characteristic of the 'divine and therefore essentially unknowable individual,' whose time has ended. He is being replaced by a man who holds fewer and fewer secrets because he has fewer pretensions. He only aspires to a life of convenience and self-gratification, however meanly lived.

Rieff stands, in part at least, in the tradition of deTocqueville and Weber, even of Nietschze to a degree. Psychological man in the era of the therapeutic is a fitting product of liberty, equality and bureaucracy. The pursuit of fame, grandeur and achievement retreat in the face of affluence, comfort, and convenience for the already unaspiring masses, held together by no bonds of community, only by an impersonal membership in the state, and their affiliation with occupational organizations, meanwhile subjected to corporate influences, in all of which the individual is dwarfed into insignificance and impotence by the numbers and distances involved.

But Rieff adds appreciably to the argument of the nineteenth century cultural elitists mourning the advent of the age of the common man. Rieff is content to set aside the problem that collectivity without community poses, to deal instead with the problems posed by the pursuit of well-being without community. "Religious man was born to be saved; psychological man is born to be pleased."[23] The hospital replaces the church and the psychotherapist becomes a secular spiritual guide, teaching men how to be rid of discomfort rather than redeemed by it. This trend becomes problematic to the future of culture, because the pursuit of personal pleasure before all else is simply irreducibly inimical to the limits that it has always been thought necessary to impose on members of human societies.

Culture has always involved a tacit willingness on the part of the vast majority in a society to withhold gratification for certain desires in order not to threaten other members in the society unduly. This avoids provoking them, and provides the satisfactions that a well-ordered, safe and creative culture can offer. An increasingly unrestrained pursuit of the pleasure principle raises the question in a very serious way as to how many of the blessings of culture can come to man without the sacrifices that it has hitherto exacted as a price for its benefits. But it also raises the ever present question: how much freedom are the members of a culture willing or able to tolerate from others before certain impulses let loose by that freedom threaten them sufficiently so that they begin to act aggressively or repressively in their own defense, that is to say in defense of their feeling of security, not even, strictly speaking, in defense of their physical survival?

Rieff seems to feel that the main problem posed by the emergence of psychological man is merely that life will not be as interesting, as extreme, as full of hope or despair, as heroic and therefore tragic as it once was, but that it will be characterized instead by the pursuit of mundane and rather bland pleasures by people prevented from giving chase after soaring visions by their distaste for the inconveniences and personal sacrifices involved. Just as long as men's stomachs are kept full and their lives sufficiently occupied and adequately diverted by agreeable entertainments, the resultant feeling of well-being, however trifling its sources, will keep men at peace with one another. But it will be the peace of sleep. There will, he suggests, be no problems with government as long as it provides its citizens with, "that consoling plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really consists."[24]

Problems associated with democracy, questions of authority, and participation will be of no moment, as long as the social order is preserved and an economy of abundance is maintained.[25] In order to please this new Adam who will, in the freedom of the emerging order, not be satisfied with old moral constraints, it may be necessary to give him permission to use "immoral" materials because they are therapeutically effective. It is, however, precisely in the release of traditional constraints in the moral sphere, especially regarding the open display of sexual and particularly verbally aggressive behavior, that the phenomenon of the "backlash" against the therapeutic ethos begins to show itself. These involve threats to the social order that are not questions of survival, but which invalidate people's efforts by negating the virtues and sacrifices which they have believed to be essential to *their* definition of well-being before they have had a chance to reap the rewards of their efforts and sacrifices.[26] Thus the kindly culture which attempts, in Rieff's words, "to see to it that no ego is hurt," may have inched further away from being realized than he could have expected when he wrote. The release of controls apparently involves more that is regarded as dangerous to the values of the majority than Rieff foresaw, writing as he did at a time when youth were unlikely revolutionaries, and comfort seemed manifestly the goal of all, when even the racial struggle was characterized, for Northern Americans at any rate, by the civility of the initiators of the Civil Rights Movement.

How much freedom is permitted to others also comes up against the issue of social justice in a powerful and perplexing way. It is not just permissive behavior that is feared by many, it is also the demands of those who do not receive a just share of the benefits of the society. Increasingly in American society the demands of the racial minorities for social justice are resisted and resented, apparently because they threaten the values and the security of especially the lower-middle class whom they seem to threaten the most, both economically and socially. In this instance, we see the inherent conflicts and limits that arise under an ethos governed by the pursuit of personal well-being. It becomes the well-being of the satisfied yet fearful majority that takes precedence over that of the discontented and demanding minority, however deprived or oppressed, and however interested in their own well-being. Rieff seems not aware of the problems posed by these sorts of conflicts and tensions; he only sees the problem of rampant remission of controls on all fronts.

Whatever the vicissitudes of the emerging culture, Rieff has mixed feelings indeed about it. He notes, with a hopefulness that is heavy with irony: "Perhaps the elimination of the tragic sense--which is tantamount to the elimination of irreconcilable moral principles--is no tragedy. Civilization could be, for the first time in history, the expression of human contents rather than the consolatory control of discontents."[27] But Rieff is much more at home in the more sober world of Freud, with his trenchant, uncompromising stoicism, and his disdain for illusions of any kind, especially kindly ones. We live, indeed, in a time bereft of communal purposes. It is futile, then, as Jung would, to construct communal purposes out of old, discredited ones, merely by locating their source within the psyche instead of beyond, in a living cosmos that is too vast to have anything to do with man. But because communal purposes no longer are sufficiently credible to contain man's behavior, without all too often producing neuroticism, does not mean that man will be better off without restraints, or at least with the illusion of their absence. For, as Rieff constantly reiterates, even when he seems most pessimistic, cultural controls are inherent in human living, precisely in order to make human freedom possible. Thus, Rieff favors Freud's strong medicine of disillusionment as a prescription for the cultural malaise however out of touch it is with the self-indulgent inclinations of the therapeutic temperament which, ironically, Freud himself set in motion.

Thus, it is the analytic attitude of Freud to which Rieff contrasts the therapeutic:

> The analytic attitude expresses a trained capacity for entertaining tentative opinions about the inner dictates of conscience,

> reserving the right to disobey the law insofar as it originates outside the individual, in the name of a gospel of freer impulse. *Not that impulse alone is to be trusted. It is merely to be respected,* and a limit recognized of the ability of any culture to transform the aggressiveness of impulse by an alchemy of commitment, into the authority of law. Freud maintained a sober vision of man in the middle, a go-between, aware of the fact that he had little strength of his own, forever mediating between culture and instinct in an effort to gain some room for manoeuvre between these hostile powers. Maturity, according to Freud, lay in the trained capacity to keep negotiations from breaking down.[28]

In a time of the weakening of communal purposes, psychoanalysis seeks to provide the individual with sufficient strength to live with integrity without the consolations that commitment to communal purposes gives, at the same time enduring their, at times, inescapable frustrations. It is a stoic doctrine indeed, for it offers no consolations, no illusions to support the necessity of maintaining impulse-controls, while insisting that the preservation of a humane culture demands them at the same time as the organism itself equally demands their release. It demands, in short, self-knowledge without illusions. It is for a time: "When so little can be taken for granted, and when the meaningfulness of social existence no longer grants an inner life at peace with itself (so that) every man must become something of a genius about himself."[29]

Man had been thrown back on his own psychological resources in the failure of his inherited moral systems. His other resources had been sufficiently socialized both to withstand and to remain impervious to the pressures created by the cultural failure. Thus, Freud's work, "was an attempt to strengthen our inner resources against what he considered obsolete cultural systems of inhibitions."[30] Modern man's increasing expectations of happiness could simply not be gratified by his moral systems. His religion was only equipped to console him in his misery; it had little or nothing to say about happiness. Neither, however, did Freud promise happiness; only less misery. Nor would he offer us new beliefs for consolation, only the strength to endure living with unbelief.

Psychological man, then, emerged in response, "to the divisiveness and destruction without and to the chaos within."[31] He accepts the purposelessness of life, as long as he can be maintained in a sense of well-being. With the advent of a new mode of being, based on feeling good, the goal of perfection based on deprivation is being succeeded by the goal of fulfillment based on what Rieff calls the appetitive mode, or better yet, as "need" gratification. As such, the analytic attitude concerns itself with "the private wants of private men." No doctrine, however therapeutic, is taken seriously in itself; the doctrine is never the last word, its therapeutic potential always takes priority and will shift doctrines as its goal finds more attractive doctrines. Thus, "all options ought to be kept alive because, theoretically, all are equally advisable--or inadvisable, in given personal circumstances."[32]

For psychological man a new version of community had to be constructed, "one that did not generate conscience and internal control but desire and the safe play of impulse."[33] The self is in no way to be opposed or denied, but expressed more fully in all its varieties and potentialities. In a more social and less self-centered time communities were positive and guaranteed some kind of salvation for the individual simply because he was a member and a participant. Self-reliant economic man found such consolation to be corrupting and distracting; he preferred the neutrality of the market as his kind of community. But psychological man gathers only his family around him, and lives the rest of his life in negative communities. Lacking any semblance of a doctrine of salvation, even his island communities become infested by the negative community and themselves become as manipulated as the impersonal world beyond, rather than offering human solace from the world outside.

Thus, although psychological man expects more of his well-being from his family, and from the sentiment of love, these increasingly fail to satisfy him, either because nothing could possibly satisfy longings so concentrated in such a small arena, or because he persists in thinking there must still be "more." Any community, then, becomes for psychological man only used as a vehicle for his determination to enhance himself, and to the extent that the community, be it his family or even another person fails, he moves on, for he has loyalty to no one save himself. Though he may occasionally berate himself, to himself he remains unfailingly kind, "to the private parts of it as well as to the public ones, to the once inferior as well as to the formerly superior [for] . . . . In the age of psychologizing, clarity about oneself supersedes devotion to an ideal as the model of right conduct."[34] The credo of psychological man is, says Rieff, peculiarly American, even if the Americophobe Freud has become her teacher; it is: "survive, resign yourself to living within your moral means, suffer no gratuitous failures in a futile search for ethical heights that no longer exist if they ever did. Freud proclaims the superior wisdom of choosing second best."[35]

Psychological man, therefore, maintaining primary loyalty to himself, is in no danger of investing himself overly in other persons or institutions. All are instrumental toward his highest good, and since his society is coming quickly to serve, nay to induce self-interest, the very terms self-realization and self-actualization have become noble and healthy goals. Nothing seems more obviously foolish than the self-defeating. "The therapeutic cannot conceive of an action that is not self-serving, however it may be disguised or transformed [thus] . . . . This self, improved, is the ultimate concern of modern culture."[36]

The therapeutic is unique in history in viewing his well-being as a function of the degree to which he is not imposed upon by the community, any obligation to which being increasingly defined as an imposition, or an instance of oppression. Instead he seeks to pursue his well-being unimpeded, and if possible unassisted, for that removes any likelihood of obligations emerging. Hitherto, in human societies the well-being or health of the individual was thought to be dependent totally upon membership in a community. "The healthy man is in fact the good citizen."[37] Moreover, it was thought to be the community that cured. The therapeutic is, in a sense, the offspring of Rousseau whose social theory of democratic individualism responded to the emerging conditions in post-feudal Europe by interpreting, "the community as a burden from which the individual had to free himself if he was to achieve a sense of well-being."[38] DeTocqueville, on the other hand, saw clearly that equality drives the thoughts and concerns of each man toward himself. Times of inequality encourage public spiritedness because it is only by changing society, or, more likely, by making an impact on society that the individual can transform himself and his relationships. In a democracy deTocqueville was concerned that men would increasingly feel that they owed nothing to any other man, only to themselves, hence democracy would break the 'chain of all members of the community' that is vital for the health of a community, indeed for there to be any sense of community in the first place.

But where it once was thought that security cured, and security came through membership in an "organic" community, it is now the case, says Rieff, that no positive community exists wherein the individual can link himself therapeutically. Such positive communities offer the basis for what Rieff calls "commitment therapies." Thus: "By positive communities are meant those that offer some sort of salvation to the individual through participant membership."[39] But a culture loses its therapeutic capacity on the individual if it can no longer convince him of the worth and significance of its communal purposes. Psychoanalysis offers a therapy precisely for the individual in a time when either there are no positive communities to turn to, where his community offers no credible communal purposes, or else where the price that the community exacts for its by now questionable rewards is too great on the individual, to the point where the community is actually anti-therapeutic. At best, says Rieff, analytic therapy creates negative communities which "survive almost automatically by a self-sustaining technology, [and which] do not offer a type of collective salvation, and in which the therapeutic experience is not transformative but informative."[40] Rieff adds that commitment therapies can only work in positive communities. By informative, moreover, he means strengthening ego-controls over inner conflicts, a kind of holding operation, rather one supposes, than so transforming the individual that conflict itself between the inner and the outer subsides. For Freud there was no alternative to strengthening the ego, for there were, so far as he could see, no positive communities to which to refer the individual for transformation. Transformation, then, would refer to closing the gap between the inner and outer through the medium of a community to which the individual freely and eagerly gives assent in such a way that he willingly dispenses with impulses that conflict with the purposes and values of the community. Indeed analytic therapy assists the individual in freeing himself from the burdensome vestigial commitments to a community that no longer inspires allegiance, by interpreting the sacred of that community as sickness rather than grace.

But while Freud could see no possible point in seeking to cure or to transorm, both of these calling for a positive community to offer the individual, Jung and Adler did persist in the attempt to transform and to offer their viewpoints as therapies of commitment. Jung offered a view of the whole man renewed by a sense of participation through his collective unconscious in the entire history of the human race, while Adler offered a sense of responsibility through "social feeling" toward the entire human community. For Jung the neuroses were but misguided transformative symbols, ultimately God-symbols, which needed only be placed back on course, so to speak. For Adler, on the other hand, the way beyond the sense of isolation, exacerbated by the self-defeating pursuit of mastery over others, led back to a sense of relatedness through a feeling of warmth and oneness with others.

Jung's attempt to found a renewed therapy of commitment was rooted in showing that the ancient symbols of transformation will have the power to transform as of old. Modern man was missing their power because, Faustian that he is, he persists in looking outside himself for their saving power instead of inside himself, to what Jung called the collective unconscious, the inherited disposition of human beings to respond in characteristically appropriate ways to characteristic crises. This does not answer the problem of the absence of positive community in the modern world; it merely confirms it and tries to provide, within the self, a substitute. The individual already has it all, and has no need of the community, or even of other people. "Jung," says Rieff, "is recommending an essentially private religiosity without institutional or communal membership for the individual in need of integrated symbolism."[41] Thus, Jung's "believer" belongs to no church but an invisible one, for it is not to a common fellowship that he is drawn but to common meanings, with, however, no necessity that these meanings even be shared. As such the great transforming symbols are used for purely therapeutic reasons. Jung's, then, is the ultimate apotheosis of the well-being of the individual.

For Wilhelm Reich, on the other hand, the inner man can only be liberated when social conditions are rectified: "Short of a condition of freedom, the social process transforms the original biological needs into character; the latter creates the social structure in the form of ideologies . . . character structure creates social structure."[42] But the reverse is equally true, and Reich, the first "Freudo-Marxist," emphasized the latter. Revolution must proceed on the psychological or therapeutic level. "An inner change of attitude could destroy the most powerful institution."[43] Only by abolishing individual repression could social repression be overcome.

But repression does not merely begin with oppression. "It began automatically, first in 'terror with the deep experience of the self.'

To experience the power of desires was enough to create a profound fear of satisfying them."[44] Rendered fearful by his own impulses, primitive man backed away from his own "natural decency." Political history commenced when some people learned how to use repression for their own power over others. Yet both master and slave remain afraid of their own impulses. Reich sought to free both by baptizing the impulses rather than by relieving man's fears, as Freud preferred.

But Reich sought cosmic liberation as well. The sexual energy of the individual has its cosmic counterpart in "orgone energy," which, still not content, Reich finally identified with God. Thus Reich created the ultimate remissive faith--salvation through the total expression of the impulses, led by the sexual. It is, after all, only the effort to block the impulses that leads to destructiveness, said Reich. Left alone to express themselves the impulses are unfailingly life-enhancing. By committing himself wholly to his own liberation the individual takes a step toward the liberation of society and oneness with the cosmos. Thus the individual is transformed, but not by the community, rather by the therapeutic.

Of D. H. Lawrence, Rieff wrote: "The contents of Lawrence's two main doctrinal works are rather unevenly divided between analyses of the effects of overrationalizing our lives and the advocacy of a religious mood which is specifically irrational and erotic."[45] It is Lawrence's project to encourage the externalization of the feelings and impulses, because it is their internalization through rationalization that leaves man bottled up inside himself to sicken and die, and in doing so cast the pall of death upon the whole world. Only by letting his stifled impulses out into the fresh air of the world outside him can man regain his health, his love of life and bequeath both love and life to the world. "Ultimately," says Rieff, "Lawrence believed, each self in its distinctiveness has one purpose only: to come into the 'fulness of its being,'"[46]

Nonetheless, Lawrence saw beyond the individual to man's continuity with the universe. To facilitate that relationship Lawrence thought that man should begin his life with the experience of "a biologically warm family." Only this, and "not the freedom of self-searching, could preserve, 'the human being all his life fresh and alive, a true individual.'"[47] Thus, Lawrence seeks to link self-fulfillment with the capacity for and the act of love. Through the act of love Lawrence replaces, suggests Rieff, God the Father with God the Holy Spirit. As with Jung and Reich, Lawrence fails to solve the problem of how to have a moral and spiritual reformation without a church. Thus are all commitment therapies in the absence of positive communities bound to fail.

Every culture, says Rieff, has two main functions:

> (1) to organize the moral demands men make upon themselves into a system of symbols that make men intelligible and trustworthy to each other, thereby rendering the world intelligible and trustworthy; (2) to organize the expressive remissions by which men release themselves, in some degree, from the strain of conforming to the controlling symbolic, internalized variant readings of culture that constitute individual character. The process by which a culture changes at its profoundest level may be traced in the shifting balance of controls and releases which constitute a system of moral demands.[48]

The tension between modalities of control and release is inherent in the composition of every culture of which we are aware, Rieff maintains. Moreover, cultures maintain durability to the extent to which they are able to, "build releasing devices into the major controls."[49] The significance of psychotherapy in our culture lies in its efforts to develop such devices. Tension is always present between controls and releases, however cleverly the releases are devised, and to whatever degree they remain subordinate to controls. A cultural revolution takes place at the point where releases or remissions begin to assume ascendancy over controls. When a culture reaches the breaking point it is because it cannot maintain its customary demands: "it demands less, permits more."[50] Large sections of the population regress to increasingly destructive modes of behavior.

When a transition is taking place to a new moral order, symbolic forms and their institutional objectification change their weights with respect to their capacities to inspire allegiance. Rieff notes that: "in all cultures before our own, competing symbols took the form of languages of faith."[51] What distinguishes our culture from previous ones is its allegiance to science, which is not revelatory but analytic. The modern psychotherapies use science and the analytic mode, but increasingly apply it in the moralizing mode of the language of faith, which in the case of the therapies tends to be releasing rather than controlling in its symbolism. As Rieff points out, the psychotherapies end up trying, "to produce an interdictory effect, with counter-interdictory analytic modes,"[52] all the while under the claim an aspiration to moral neutrality.

The next culture will require, says Rieff, "(1) a new institutionalized inequality of demand and remission; (2) an ideal character type designated . . . as the 'therapeutic.'"[53] The embodiment of this cultural ideal will be a man of leisure and not a workingman, "the better to secure his sense of well-being." Until the present time every culture had been marked by the dominance of the modality of control over that of release. Where the latter assumes greater hold until it is no longer able to support the moral demands of the culture that culture is in trouble. "Such freedoms were signatures on the death warrant of previous cultures."[54]

The Western Christian culture with its particular balance of controls and remissions is, according to Rieff, all but over. The modern remissive symbolisms have not yet been able, however, to organize their largely erotic illusions into communal purposes. Nor can doctrines of release develop into communal purposes, "unless they are subtly transformed and institutionally elaborated."[55] Where remissive modes formerly were relatively rare intervals signalling the disintegration of a culture, they may now have to be treated as a permanent characteristic of a world where it looks as though man's myriad needs can be satisfied.

The therapeutic must, however, be free of identification with the purposes of any community, says Rieff. "Compassionate communities, as distinct from welfare states, exist only where there is a rich symbolic life, shared, and demanding of the self a hard line limiting the range of desires."[56] These conditions are manifestly lacking in the time of the therapeutic, as is a cultural elite whose responsibility it is to give expression to a language of faith or shared symbols, and self-limiting moral demands.

All those who would act in the role of such a cultural elite, or as spiritual preceptors, must spend their energies, not merely in rejecting the prevailing cultural superego, Rieff says, but in concentrating on an affirmative vision, "of new stability, a promise of some settling pattern or supposed plan."[57] Rieff further maintains that the present moral revolution is proceeding by default, led, less by the id and its vital energy, than by the bankruptcy and impotence of the superego and its capacity to contain the energy of the id.

Presently, psychotherapy is well on its way, in "reconciliation with contemporary remissive religiosity" toward establishing itself, willy-nilly, as "a post-religious science of moral management."[58] Freud's revolutionary effort was to facilitate expressive releases from abortive controls that had become oppressive in order to re-establish the moral demands of culture at a more vital locus of imbalance between controls and releases. His was a conservative revolution however, which loosed forces that went far beyond his intentions or wishes.

Thus far, none of the therapeutic doctrines offers a plausible therapy of commitment to communal purposes, Rieff concludes, only a commitment to the therapeutic purpose of self-realization and personal well-being. There is no room for communal purposes in such a culture, indeed no desire for them. Thus, we move toward a cultural style unprecedented in human annals, one involving, "a sharp and probably irreparable break in the continuity of Western culture."[59] He concludes:

> That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end, announces a fundamental change of focus in the entire cast of our culture--toward a human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in terms of the old style of despair and hope.[60]

Summary

For Rieff the contemporary era is increasingly characterized by an ethos and a character type which he calls 'the therapeutic,' in which the individual and his feeling of well-being have become the *summum bonum*. Such a turn of events represents a radical departure from the traditional assumption that the integration of the individual into the requirements of society takes priority over the well-being of the individual. Men are no longer held together by shared or communal purposes: values and goals that hold a society together and guide its members toward a beneficial sense of belonging and meaning. The therapeutic, Rieff argues, is inimical to a sense of communal purposes because his quest for personal well-being takes precedence over any pressure to subordinate his desires before the well-being of society.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1] P. Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 2.

[2] P. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of faith after Freud (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 61.

[3] Rieff, Moralist, op. cit., p. 381.

[4] Rieff, Triumph, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

[5] Ibid., p. 53.

[6] Ibid., pp. 53, 61, 62.

[7] Ibid., p. 53.

[8] Ibid., pp. 48-50.

[9] Cf., ibid., pp. 114, 134; cf., also M. Friedmann, To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary images of man (New York: Delta Books Press, 1967).

[10] S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1960), p. 44.

[11] Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The psychoanalytical meaning of history (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 45; Norman O. Brown, Love's Body (New York: Random House, 1966); P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay on interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Anthony Wilden, The Language of the Self: Containing the function of language in psychoanalysis, trans. Jacques Lacan (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968).

[12] Rieff, Triumph, op. cit., p. 2

[13] Ibid., p. 5.

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

[15] Ibid., p. 5.

[16] Ibid., p. 8.

[17] Ibid., p. 15

[18] Ibid., p. 15.

[19] Rieff, op. cit., p. 17.

[20] Ibid., p. 21

[21] Ibid., p. 22.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 25.

[24] Ibid., p. 26.

[25] Cf., M. Parenti, "Creeping Fascism," Society, 9, no. 8, 1972, 4-8, for a discussion of the comfort and convenience of the fascist state for the majority of its citizenry.

[26] Cf., R. N. Bellah, "No Direction Home: Religious aspects of the American Crisis," *The Dudleian Lecture*, Harvard Divinity School, 1970, esp. p. 13 f. for a discussion of the effects of "liberated" behavior on the security needs of others not so "liberated."

[27] Ibid., p. 27.

[28] Ibid., p. 31.

[29] Ibid., p. 32.

[30] Ibid., p. 38.

[31] Ibid., p. 40.

[32] Ibid., p. 50.

[33] Ibid., p. 52.

[34] Ibid., pp. 55, 56.

[35] Ibid., p. 58.

[36] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[37] Ibid., p. 68.

[38] Ibid., p. 69.

[39] Ibid., p. 71.

[40] Ibid., p. 73.

[41] Ibid., p. 134.

[42] Bellah, op. cit., p. 149.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 152.

[45] Ibid., p. 194.

[46] Ibid., p. 217.

[47] Ibid., p. 219.

[48] Ibid., p. 233.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 234.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., p. 235.

[53] Ibid., p. 236.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., p. 237.

[56] Ibid., p. 245.

[57] Ibid., p. 259.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid., p. 261.

[60] Ibid.

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CHAPTER II

COMMUNITY AND THE THERAPEUTIC

No other contemporary social theorist has so clearly delineated the moral and cultural crisis of our time as has Rieff in The Triumph of the Therapeutic. It is such an effective clarification of the issues because Rieff firmly establishes his discussion upon the question of the fundamental moral and therapeutic basis of culture. By defining the issues as well as he has, Rieff makes a major statement concerning what is needed in this time of cultural and moral hiatus for the emergence of a viable culture. We are being sobered into a realization once again of the problems that come in the wake of rapid increases in cultural freedom of expression. The Age of Aquarius no longer seems so close. Perhaps as a consequence of a chastened realism, the discussion begun so brilliantly by Rieff can be taken up again. Certainly there has been amazingly little in the way of response to the issues of the remission of moral demands, the absence of positive community, and pursuit of personal well-being to the exclusion of purposes beyond self, since Rieff first delineated them. But thanks to Rieff we are now in an excellent position to question whether the new culture is to be based on the foreswearance of communal purposes or upon the search for a new kind of positive community that offers personal well-being to the therapeutic.

Rieff never really raises the question of whether individual well-being is even possible apart from the support, correction and encouragement that comes of membership in a positive community. He notes that:

"The next culture may be viable without being valid."[1] Is it not possible that no culture without a sense of communal purposes that take the person beyond can be either viable or valid? The absence of those bonds that bring people together because they share common beliefs and values can scarcely help but weaken the inclination of individuals to support and concern themselves with each other. But if human beings are, as we suspect, dependent precisely upon the concern and support of their fellows for their own sense of well-being, then a society that is lacking in that support will be unable to provide for the basic emotional needs of its members. The therapeutic, *more* than any other cultural type might be expected to possess and be acutely aware of his need for communal support. That he does not have the latter, if Rieff's diagnosis is correct, is itself a factor in the contemporary cultural crisis that Rieff either conveniently chooses to ignore, or else is prevented from perceiving by his polemical bias.

The fact that the pursuit of personal well-being is no longer merely open to the affluent, but increasingly an expectation at all class levels, could not but split a society and vitiate previously commonly held social bonds. When the poor accepted their lot in life, the same values of social order and just distribution could be shared throughout the society. As soon, however, as the poor began to realize that their lot was not divinely ordained, they no longer were apt to hold the same values as the affluent. Their pursuit of well-being, which required continuing, nay greater, self-conscious solidarity, called for differential means of access to life opportunities, and, thus, a somewhat different social order and scheme of values than that held by those who

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already had clearer access. However, with easier access to the commodities associated with personal well-being, the working class in North American society has increasingly relinquished its sense of class solidarity and adopted instead the values associated with middle-class individualism.

As one who is more attuned to his inner state and the vicissitudes of his emotions, it would be expected that the therapeutic would more and more incline himself toward others, even if only instrumentally, that is to support his pursuit of his emotional well-being. The emergence in recent years of encounter groups and "the human potential movement" on so large a scale as to amount to a cultural movement in itself, would seem to testify to the increasing realization on the part of psychological man that the support of others, even if only in passing, is necessary for his well-being. Of course Rieff does not insist that the therapeutic does not need and value others, he merely suggests that the therapeutic is not linked with others by common purposes that transcend individual selves. The therapeutic seeks no higher end than himself, or even from his fellows nothing more than their presence and support through friendship. In the meantime, however, his fellow therapeutic is preoccupied with his own well-being. What is to take him sufficiently beyond himself to concern himself with the other? Perhaps the therapeutic is able to concern himself with the other as friend, but unbound to the other as stranger in the absence of common ties in beliefs and values; it is difficult to say how such others could be a source of support in any way.

But life in contemporary society is socially complex even by comparison with societies that have preceded it. The remoteness of contemporary man from the centers of power and the sources of recognition are such that it is precisely his needs for recognition and meaningful action--in Freud's more pithy phrase, love and work--that are not forthcoming from the corporate world where he invests much of his life and his sense of worth. The result is that his family and intimates (those of the latter that he manages to retain in such a mobile society) are expected to provide for him the emotional needs that are not met elsewhere. The concentrated intensity of these expectations can only impose increasing strains on his (probably few) close relationships, and primarily on his family, thereby exacerbating his personal problem. This suggests that intimate relationships alone are not equipped, even for the therapeutic, to meet his basic emotional needs.

The contemporary age above all is influenced by aggregates of people and relatively little by individuals. Until the therapeutic comes to terms with corporate realities he will not find the social support he needs for the well-being which is his highest value. But relating to corporate realities involves being linked by common values, beliefs and obligations with the other who is, in the absence of any bonds of intimacy, a stranger. These involve communal purposes, and suggest that they are as essential for the health of the individual in contemporary society as they have ever been. Psychotherapy can never serve the need for well-being of people on a large scale, even through group methods. The therapeutic as the basis for a new set of communal purposes would seem to pose no greater problem than Christianity did with its pursuit of personal salvation, which is, after all not totally

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foreign to the pursuit of personal well-being or self-realization.

Rieff contends the opposite of the above:

> With their secondary needs automatically satisfied, men may no longer need to have something in common, as an end, to love . . . . The strange new lesson we have begun to learn in our time is how not to pay the high personal costs of social organization. The revolution continues in a remissive direction, beyond that rationalism Max Weber called 'disenchantment,' toward the dissolution of old systems of moral demand, with their requirements of almost total social cooperation in order to survive hard reality in a world characterized by scarcity. The present swing in a direction of release may not be orbital but more extended--historically more permanent, based on the automaticity and ease with which an infinity of created needs can now be satisfied.
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> Remissive motifs other than sexual have dominated earlier phases of the psychohistorical process, expressing the ideological breakings of great communities, but always at the same time preparing the ground for fresh internalization of control. But the modern cultural revolution has built into itself a unique prophylaxis: it is deliberately *not in the name of any new order of communal purpose that it is taking place*. On the contrary, this revolution is being fought for a *permanent* disestablishment of any deeply internalized moral demands in a world which can guarantee a plenitude produced without reference to the rigid maintenance of any particular interdictory (and counter-interdictory) system. [italics added][2]

Rieff particularly shows in the above passage his impression that the therapeutic is the dominant character type of a remissive culture that is sweeping all before it. At best, it should be pointed out, the therapeutic yet represents an influential minority of the earth's population, almost totally confined to the North American, Western European, and Japanese middle class. It is, but for Japan, a uniquely Western post-scarcity development which, in its self-indulgence, shows increasing disregard for the rampant poverty and misery that continues to dominate in the rest of the world, as witness the widening, not closing, gap between the world's rich and poor nations. The indifference of the therapeutic to his human responsibilities world-wide (unless they seem to threaten his material interests), especially when placed in the

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context of his minority position, merely underlines the extent to which he is ruled by his own canon of personal well-being before all.

Thus, there is no gainsaying Rieff's argument that psychological man seeks his *own* well-being before all else, and that he repudiates all doctrines that stand in the way of the task to which he is dedicated. But there is still worth in considering the possibility that the primary reason that the therapeutic lacks a sense of communal purpose is simply that no communal purposes have emerged that are able to express adequately his pursuit of self and its well-being--and not necessarily that the pursuit of personal well-being and communal purposes are intrinsically inimical to one another. Rieff, of course, maintains that they are, because the former as an ultimate goal is unwilling to limit itself to the purposes and obligations demanded by the community; the therapeutic demands the abrogation of all constraining demands upon the self. Rieff notes, emphatically: "Not only our Western system but *every* system of integrative moral demand, the generative principle of culture, expressed itself in positive deprivations--in a character ideal that functioned to commit the individual to the group. *Culture was thus the establishment and organization of restrictive motives*,"[3] (italics added) but, he adds: "The dialectic of perfection based on a deprivational mode, is being succeeded by a dialectic of fulfillment, based on the appetitive mode."[4] Clearly, in Rieff's model, there is no room for mutual adjustment. Each pursuit contradicts the other. The appetitive mode is inimical to moral demands imposed by a community as the price for membership, and moral demands are a source of repugnance to the appetitive mode which regards all impositions as contrary to its "needs." Not only, however, are they incompatible, but beyond an economy of scarcity communal purposes may, says Rieff, be no longer necessary.

The rising predominance of the appetitive mode in the post-scarcity Western world undermines those values rooted in the deprivational mode and thus leaves any society where such a transition is occurring without the old communal purposes. In the absence of the latter, the fulfillment and well-being of the self then becomes, by default, the supreme value. Societies not so blessed have far fewer problems inspiring communal purposes, witness China.

Rieff, by such an affirmation, demonstrates how closely wedded he is to the classical liberal assumption, not only of the fundamental conflict between the desires of the individual and the demands of society, but apparently of the separateness of the individual from society in the sense that his well-being does not really depend upon others. Social cooperation is regarded by Rieff as only an expedient of survival, a function of material survival. He talks about "social cooperation" being no longer needed "in order to survive reality in a world characterized by scarcity."[5] Ironically, it is just such a view of man and his relation to others that is even more in question, thanks to Freud, than is the classical liberal world view that Rieff implicitly espouses.

According to classical liberalism men form societies by contracting individually to come together for a greater degree of security and protection than can be afforded in the unstable and insecure state of nature where men feel perennially threatened by what may happen to them, lacking any formal means of arbitration, equalization or justice. In maintaining that the individual's pursuit of his own well-being is inimical to his subordination of himself to communal purposes, Rieff is following the classical liberal view of society which holds that the individual is the fundamental reality in society, and he surrenders certain desires in return for the security and protection that life in a civil society alone can give him. But if he is able to find satisfaction for his material and personal needs, by himself, the need for his subordination to the purposes and moral demands of the community are reduced.

By the nineteenth century the assumptions of the liberal world view had become exceedingly pessimistic and ridden with anxiety and alarm. Wolin wrote:

> Against this backdrop of economic scarcity, contending classes, crowded space, and the limited possibilities of ameliorative action, anxious man emerges as the creation of liberalism . . . . It was anxiety which drove liberal man to unrelenting activity--anxiety from struggling to eke out existence in the face of a hostile nature, anxiety from the precarious state of possessions in a society where the masses were often desperately hungry, and, equally strong, anxiety stemming from the appetites instilled by society.[6]

It is upon such assumptions as the above that a system of values and moral demands rooted in assumptions of scarcity and insecurity emerges. Rieff's understanding too is formed of a belief in the incompatibility between individual pursuits and communal purposes. Left to his own devices, Rieff's individual appears as the very embodiment, in twentieth century affluent form, of the individual who in the nineteenth century was anxious and insecure. It is not really that he is dangerous or anti-social that requires the existence of civil society to be formed to protect others from him; on the contrary, *he* needs the security and civility of society to provide him with enough assurance and confidence

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to dare to live a bolder, more adventuresome life. Psychological man is liberal man provided with those material and personal assurances met technologically. It is not his rapacity or violence, nor indeed the excesses of any libertinism, that are to be feared, instead it is his banality and his devotion to self-indulgence that Rieff finds repugnant. He wrote: "In our recovered innocence, to be entertained would become the highest good and boredom the most common evil."[7] The age of the therapeutic is a time, "when members must stimulate themselves to feverish activity in order to demonstrate how alive they are . . . vacillating between dead purposes and deadly devices to escape boredom."[8]

In the absence of a positive community the individual should, like his forebear, economic man, strive toward self-sufficiency and withstand the blandishments of those who offer the false comforts of a commitment therapy, what must in our day involve a pseudo-positive community. Instead, unable to find those communal sources of personal transformation, which are the only valid objects of commitment, he is best off with the illusionless sobrieties of the analytic attitude, strengthening his ego-controls over his inner conflicts, as Rieff puts it. As such, he may not be as happy or secure as he would be in the womb of a saving community, but he will be reasonably equal to the demands and the realities of the modern world.

Although Rieff mourns the end of communal purposes, he expresses no hope for their return. He is in the tradition of deTocqueville and Weber in seeing the time of communal purposes uniting people as ended and the emergence of an entirely new phase in human culture, similar in many respects to Weber's time of 'disenchantment.' Indeed, disenchantment and the analytic attitude appear to be very similar. Rieff is not saying anything appreciably different from Weber who says that, "principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation [which] means that the world is disenchanted."[9] Here is Rieff in the same vein: "The modern therapeutic idea is to empty those meanings that link the individual to dying worlds by assents of faith for which his analytic reason tells him he is not truly responsible. In this way, by acts of interpretation, the sacred becomes symptom. Sacred images are, then, the visible form, not of grace but of sickness."[10]

Man once did find his wholeness in the community. "Ultimately," he says, "it is the community that cures . . . . Behind shaman and priest, philosopher and physician, stands the great community as the ultimate corrective of personal disorders."[11] Speaking of the individualism of modern democracy, Rieff asked: "Within such privacies, can a man feel well? The standard answer has been that he cannot. Such a life was 'corrupt,' defined by that term Socrates used in speaking to Crito, in analogy for organic corruption. The parts of an organism cannot be healthy if the whole was corrupt, and the whole cannot but be corrupt if the parts were not integrated positively into a whole."[12]

Anyone holding the above view of classical social theory would regard a collapse of communal purposes as boding ill indeed for the members of such a society. If, as Aristotle says, man is a social animal by nature, when the very element that most satisfies his nature loses its power to bind man would be expected to suffer social disease. A social animal could not be expected to remain healthy without his most necessary form of nourishment, any more than he could remain physically healthy in the absence of protein in his diet. While such analogies can be misleading and inexact if taken too literally, if we have learned anything from the social sciences it is that in the absence of support from and contact with others, man's life is seriously impaired. Indeed, for Freud, it is precisely the libidinal ties that develop between the child and his parents that continue to demand satisfaction throughout the life of the individual and find that satisfaction to the extent that he obtains membership in and support from a group or a community. Says Freud:

> We will try our fortune, then, with the supposition that love relationships (or, to use a more neutral expression, emotional ties) also constitute the essence of the group mind. . . . Our hypothesis finds support in the first instance from two passing thoughts. First, that a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which holds together everything in the world? Secondly, that if an individual gives up his distinctiveness in a group and lets its other members influence him by suggestion, it gives one the impression that he does it because he feels the need of being in harmony with them rather than in opposition to them--so that perhaps after all he does it '*ihnen zu Liebe.*'[13]

If the above is true, then for the sake of his well-being and his effectiveness as a person, man is dependent on a viable social environment. His emotional well-being is adversely affected by the absence or withdrawal of such support on the levels of both primary and secondary group support. A viable community with its consensus of values, purposes and moral demands was classically believed to enable man to function in the wider society outside that of his immediate circle of family and friends. When the values and purposes of a society either lose their credibility or their relevance, then the binding force which enables its members to feel a sense of oneness that

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brings people together who would otherwise be strangers, weakens. Then the person becomes a stranger once more, one toward whom there are felt to be no obligations or ties.

Zimbardo's concept of de-individuation seems relevant here. De-individuation refers to those marks which identify a person in his interaction with others: "the greater the number of bits of information required to locate the person, the greater the degree of de-individuation."[14] Zimbardo quoted Ziller who first proposed the concept to the effect that: "individuation is desirable within a supportive social climate, but deindividuation is sought as a defense against a threatening environment."[15] When de-individuation is present it permits: "the overt expression of antisocial behavior, characterized as selfish, greedy, power-seeking, hostile, lustful, and destructive. However, they also allow a range of 'positive' behaviors which we normally do not express overtly, such as intense feelings of happiness or sorrow, and open love for others. Thus emotions and impulses usually under cognitive control are more likely to be expressed when the input conditions minimize self-observation and evaluation, as well as concern over evaluation by others."[16]

In a society where its members are less and less able to be identified with respect to each other their sense of both obligation toward others and responsibility for their own actions would be expected to diminish, and their behavior to be marked by those characteristics found to be functions of de-individuation. When people feel apprehension about the stranger or about other people in general they cannot but feel vulnerable. Man's response to his sense of vulnerability is invariably to act either defensively or aggressively against those who threaten him. Under conditions of weakened social responsibility where the individual is disposed, in Zimbardo's terms, to feel anonymous and isolated, he is more likely to respond to provocation and frustration impulsively and antisocially, whether in the form of withdrawal or of aggression. Either response leads to a further weakening of the social fabric and makes it increasingly more difficult for people to rely on others to respond in a civil way.

The advantage for human beings of living in communities and societies is that it enables them to live an increasingly more abundant and secure life than they could in families, clans and tribes, as of old. Anything, therefore, that renders man unwilling to place trust in those that he does not know intimately, through ties of blood or friendship, places him in a very unstable, and vulnerable position. If society becomes less satisfying, and more dangerous, where he cannot rely on the trustworthiness of the stranger, then the individual's feeling of well-being will suffer, and no matter how automatic the benefits of technology are, he will question whether the benefits of society are worth the sacrifices that it demands.

Rieff does not discuss the dangers to culture of the absence of communal purposes. He apparently assumes that societies operate as automatically as technology does in meeting man's fundamental needs for security and stability. But it is precisely communal purposes that make possible the sharing of values, goals and obligations with strangers that make larger societies into the way that man chooses to live with his fellows, rather than remaining in the greater intimacy of clans and tribes. Moreover, it is such implicit sharing that makes technology itself possible. Without communal purposes it is doubtful whether large numbers of people could continue to live in close proximity. The stress of life under such conditions where the response of the stranger is not only one of indifference, but increasingly of defensiveness and unpredictability, would, in time, become unbearable.

Rieff does not quite despair of the future of a society without communal purposes; but it will, he says, present man with an utterly new cultural situation, albeit with its own balance between controls and remissions. Matters would have been better if psychological man had chosen to live according to the stoic individualism of the analytic attitude with its internal values of duty and responsibility in the absence of communally inspired values. Thus, Rieff's hope for man's future would lie in strong egos rather than in transforming communities.[17] For Rieff, and he thinks for Freud too, man enters society, as in the liberal doctrine of the social contract, primarily out of convenience rather than necessity. Man is, thus, first of all, an individual and only by choice a member of a community. Yet Rieff acknowledges Freud's insistence upon man's instinctive sociability and need for community,[18] even while he argues elsewhere that the entire thrust of Freud's work is his preparation of modern man for a world that lacks the consoling and transforming power of sacred and communal purposes.[19] Freud's inconsistency at this point, and Rieff's too, appear to be products of their unquestioned liberal assumptions concerning the relationship of the individual to society. Society makes demands upon the individual, demands which, moreover, are experienced as being very onerous, in

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Freud's term, giving rise to inescapable 'discontents' Rieff noted:

> By the largely romantic coupling of renunciation with good conduct, he perceived a permanent antithesis of individual and society. It is the cost of sacrificing individual happiness to the moral tyranny of society that provides the subject of Freud's psychology. Society's ideas of the good become an object for the psychiatrist's examination.[20]

There is for Freud and Rieff no intermediary between the individual and society. As such it is society and not an intermediate and more intimate body like the community that makes demands upon the individual. The individual's relationship, therefore is to a distant, impersonal leviathan: society. The latter can only be humanized to the extent that it is ruled by a personalized 'father-figure' in the form of a monarch or a charismatic leader, whether he be dictator or democratic official. Rieff suggested that:

> The function, if not of every leader, at least of both modern dictators and modern monarchs, supports the Freudian contention. Whether or not a monarch or a mass leader has great executive ability or power, modern politics suggest his primary function may well be psychological; he acts as a center around which otherwise disturbed lives can be organized . . . .
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> In the established sociological conception the charismatic father-leader is inevitably displaced by bureaucratic organization. In contrast, Freud asserted that the father-leader is never replaced permanently by the follower "sons." To be effective, organization must in some sense incarnate the founding father. Nowadays this view is gaining in credibility. It is possible that the liberal interregnum has ended and another age has begun: the age of the hypnotic persecuting father, a figure not at all incompatible with a mammoth bureaucracy which operates simply as an extension of his ego. Both fascism and Stalinism showed some of this quality.[21]

It is, however, the absence of the intimacy of the intermediate association or community to provide the individual with the warmth of support emotionally that he needs to function effectively in the larger society. Lacking anything like this in society he looks to a father-figure to personalize his relationship to the society and to help him develop bonds that are otherwise lacking between himself and others in the society. In the absence of either communal purposes or a leader who elicits a protective or demanding father-image the individual stands in an impersonal relationship with his society. Small wonder its demands are perceived as increasingly onerous if not actually oppressive. It is in the context of this issue that Freud confronts the problem of society's demands on the individual in the modern world where fewer and fewer communities and associations stand between the individual and society. Here is how Freud saw it:

> Perhaps we may begin by explaining that the element of civilization enters on the scene with the first attempt to regulate . . . social relationships. If the attempt were not made, the relationships would be subject to the arbitrary will of the individual: that is to say, the physically stronger man would decide them in the sense of his own interests and instinctual impulses. Nothing would be changed in this if this stronger man should in his turn meet someone even stronger than he. Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as 'brute force.' This replacement of the power of the individual by the power of a community constitutes the decisive step of civilization. The essence of it lies in the fact that the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knew no such restrictions. The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice--that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor of an individual.[22]

Civilization, then, in Freud's view, was not established for the sake of the enhancement of the life of the individual. It has not a positive function pre-eminently, but rather it is established in order to protect the bulk of men against the predatory inclinations of some individuals. Thus, its establishment, Hobbes, Locke, and the classical liberals thought, is a security against the uncertainty, the arbitrariness of life in nature where the rule of the stronger is likely to prevail. There is from the start a clear discrepancy of interests between the individual and the community. The individual, who is primary and autonomous, seeks only his own interest and pleasure. Only the contract with the community, and the coercive power which stands behind the community inhibits the individual from the free expression of his impulses. The notion of the community as fundamentally a source of support for the individual is lacking in both Freud and in classical liberalism, except insofar as the community provides him with security. Primarily the community's function is coercive of the individual so that it takes away with one hand unlimited freedom and gives back with the other security from that freedom from others, particularly those who are stronger.

Man also found that, in the face of his weakness over-against nature, he could, by uniting with others, overcome the power of nature and subdue it to his own ends. Freud's own version of the liberal social contract was his scientific myth as he called it, of the Primal Horde, wherein, against the arbitrary power of the father, the sons discover that "a combination can be stronger than a single individual."[23] Furthermore:

> The communal life of human beings had, therefore, a two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object--the woman--and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of herself which had been separated from her--her child. Eros and Ananke (Love and Necessity) have become the parents of human civilization too. The first result of civilization was that even a fairly large number of people were now able to live together in a community.[24]

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Freud differed here from classical liberalism in that for him love as well as interest is one of the pillars of civilization. Men choose to live together because they are drawn to one another by libidinal ties, even if they are 'aim-inhibited.' They obtain a degree of personal satisfaction that is over and above the utilitarian and survival demands of working together against nature, the common foe. But love for Freud does not only bind men together. Left to run its own uninhibited course, it inclines men to be self-indulgent, possessive and utterly privatistic. Civilization, therefore, decrees that limits must be placed upon sexual expression because of the exclusiveness of sexual attraction which is detrimental to the civilizing task and its overall benefits. In order for man to be sufficiently attracted to his fellows he could not be allowed to find unimpeded sexual satisfaction on his own. Thus frustrated in direct expression, he would seek expression, however muted and inhibited, through brotherly love. Accordingly, sexual discontent is necessary for the best interests of human society.

For Freud, too, it is the sexual bond that keeps people isolated in their families. Only, therefore, by denying full sexual satisfaction will men be drawn outside the narrow, parochial and ultimately destructive limitations of the family. Thus, while the attraction of people for each other does form a major function in the creation and maintenance of human society, even that love is an outcome of social coercion. Left to their own devices man would do little more than make love and war. Society, in the meantime, is largely a matter of mutual interest not natural choice.

So great is the sacrifice, in fact, that the free individual makes to society of his sexual impulses, that Freud finds the reason for it to be insufficient, until man's aggressiveness is taken into account. It is this impulse more than any other, "which disturbs our relations with our neighbor and which forces civilization into such a high degree [of energy]. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests."[25] It is in this proneness toward aggression that Freud finds the real motive power behind the otherwise wholly unreasonable command to "love thy neighbor as thyself." Men are enjoined to love their neighbor that they may not hate or even kill him, for such is their natural disposition.

Since man is made up, in Freud's view, of two more or less equal portions of a drive toward life and a drive toward death any obligation to love others must give equal weight to the aggressive impulse or else that desired impulse will turn back on the person himself. Thus, human society is obliged to structure itself in ways that keep love within the limits of kinship and one's own community, turning aggressiveness toward the outsider. "It is," Freud wrote, "always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness."[26]

It is in order to gain the security brought about by containing and sublimating man's aggressiveness that he willingly inhibits his sexual impulses, thus denying himself his greatest source of instinctual satisfaction. In Freud's succinct words: "Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security."[27]

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Even so, he noted, there never was a time when the majority of men enjoyed complete instinctual freedom; only a few ever did, while the vast majority cowered under their ruthless domination. Thus, for Freud, as for his liberal forebears of the social contract, Hobbes and Locke, the life of nature, though nominally free, is in reality one of arbitrariness and insecurity for the majority of men. But it is above all from man's *innate* destructiveness that he must be protected:

> Civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this has to happen we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this. These collections of men are to be libidinally bound to one another. Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together. *But man's natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, opposes this programme of civilization.*[28] [italics added]
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> His aggressiveness would, in all likelihood result in his own destruction, despite the libidinal bonds of Eros, if Eros had not proved equal to the challenge by internalizing human aggression and directing it, towards its own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.[29]

Conscience, the guardian of civilization against the excesses of both the aggressive and sexual impulses, arose originally, "through the suppression of an aggressive impulse, and . . . is subsequently reinforced by fresh suppressions of the same kind."[30] This suppression of aggression which takes the form of guilt in the person's experience combines with the erotic instinct which brings people together in close-knit groups. Each individual is, in turn, a product of the interaction between the urge toward his own happiness, an egoistic impulse, and the urge toward union with others in the community, an altruistic impulse. Freud is quick to see what tyrants have always known, namely that: "It almost seems as if the creation of a great human community would be most successful if no attention had to be paid to the happiness of the individual."[31]

The individual, therefore, has his own struggle between his own happiness and his attraction toward union with the community, to stand alongside the overall civilized struggle of the individual and cultural development. The struggle between the individual and society in terms of the sharing of loyalties is not really an instinctual one, but rather a dispute concerning the economics of the libido, that is to say, how much energy is to go where. Some kind of accommodation can be arrived at with that conflict. But before it can be sought, it will first of all be necessary for civilization itself to do something about alleviating the uncompromising and guilt-producing demands of its own superego. Those very demands in the burden they impose on individuals take away substantially from the possibility of human happiness. As such, they make it harder for the individual to seek his own happiness in the pursuit of union with others, where the community of others has to do with those impossible ethical demands to love the neighbor which detract from his happiness in the first place.

The cultural superego, said Freud:

> . . . issues a command and does not ask whether it is possible for people to obey it. On the contrary, it assumes that a man's

> ego is psychologically capable of anything that is required of it, that his ego has unlimited mastery over his id. This is a mistake, and even in what are known as normal people the id cannot be controlled beyond certain limits. If more is demanded of a man, a revolt will be produced in him or a neurosis, or he will be made unhappy.[32]

Freud, thus, asked of civilization that it lower its demands upon the individual toward something more within his reach of attainment as well as something less inimical to his happiness. The damage and unhappiness wrought by the impossible demand to love the neighbor led Freud to exclaim: "What a potent obstacle to civilization aggressiveness must be, if the defense against it can cause as much unhappiness as aggressiveness itself!"[33] Thus, in the face of the dilemma and discontent in which civilization places man, Freud will offer no consolation, no illusions, no real hopes, only the limited wish that it would lower its demands upon the individual and that perhaps, having done so, the happiness of the individual would be somewhat increased so that, in Freud's famous closing words, "the other of the two 'Heavenly Powers' eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can say with what success and with what result?"[34]

Freud's classic statement concerning the fundamental antagonism between the individual and society has been described in some detail, first of all because Rieff so closely identifies himself with Freud's position, and secondly, because, as unsparing as it is, Freud's position attributes more importance to the power of Eros, which has to do with the urge toward community, than Rieff's use of Freud would seem to suggest.

There is no gainsaying Rieff's perception of Freud. He was

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indeed convinced that the best and perhaps only thing that civilization could do for the individual was to lower its demands, not so that the individual could express his instincts more freely, but in order that there be simply less pressure on him to do the impossible, namely to love his neighbor as an abstract demand apart from any libidinal disposition of his own. But for Freud, loving the neighbor as a social demand was an entirely different matter from being attracted toward others for one's own satisfaction. The former proceeds from the demanding and punitive superego, while the latter proceeds from the id, though mediated through the reality demands of the ego. Neither involves a clarion call to personal or social transformation. Less, not more, is asked of the individual, although less is asked so that he will suffer fewer discontents at the hands of civilization, and thus presumably be a somewhat happier and less aggressive person.

If, however, the commandment to love the neighbor makes an impossible demand of the individual, does this not suggest that the problem may lie in the liberal problem of too much society and not enough community? This is a difficult problem to disentangle out of Freud because, liberal that he is, he has no conception of the relationship of the individual to any other social body (with the single exception of the family) than to the vast and impersonal body of society. There is for Freud no close community to which to relate and identify the individual. This may well reflect Freud's own situation as a cosmopolitan Jew, raised outside both the Ghetto and the synagogue, and, at the same time, vigorously excluded from the society of anti-Semitic Vienna. It may also reflect the animus of the nineteenth century scientific liberal intellectual in repudiating the religiously sanctioned aristocratic and class-rooted bases of those communities of church, position, occupation, that enlightened circles in Freud's time were seeking to overcome. Rieff described such a view of community as an oppressive thing from which the individual sought to free himself in order to have a sense of well-being; it is the Rousseauian conception of community.

But however liberating such a view of community might have been for the otherwise suppressed individual, it created a state of affairs where there was no social body to mediate between the individual and society, which was represented by the state, the modern substitute for the church. When such a vast and impersonal body made demands and exacted standards of the individual, in the absence of the more intimate and personal mediation of a community, such demands could only be experienced extrinsically. The only degree of personalization present in the demands of the society came in the form of the ruler who, as the symbol of the state was, as Freud recognized a father-figure, and as such an embodiment of the demanding superego. The more intimate community, where one's membership as a person was able to be recognized had, in its supportive dimension, more of the aspect of the womb-like mother-figure. As such, the community elicits its support from the individual more freely, and might thus be said to be more of a manifestation of Eros, which attracts rather than demands. Moreover, by its closeness to the individual, it is more ready to "forgive" the individual his lapses, and to alleviate its expectations of him. At the same time, as a body of intimates, the individual is more apt to subordinate his will to theirs, and thus to meet their standards with less emotional strain than toward the impersonal, demanding society. Strangely, Freud seemed quite aware of the power of a personalized group or community to elicit support ten years previous to the writing of Civilization and its Discontents, when he wrote Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. It is surprising that Freud was unable to see one as a possible amelioration of the demands of the other.

Indeed, for Robert Nisbet the gradual replacement of the predominance of the small local community by the large centralized bodies of political and economic power is *the* social problem of modern times. Nisbet wrote:

> During the Middle Ages, when centralized authority did not exist, local units tended to be strong and to enlist the loyalties of their members. The downfall of medieval communities came about in very large part as the result of centralization both of political authority and economy during the Renaissance and the Reformation. The basic problem of community in the Western world is therefore to be seen in terms of what happened historically to the structure of power and function in the larger society. It is very difficult to maintain the eminence of the small, local units when the loyalties and actions of individuals are consolidated in the great power units represented by the nation states in the modern world.[35]

The preoccupation of the twentieth century with moral and social problems has been, according to Nisbet, a product of the distractions that have led to the current concern with security and community. He maintained:

> They lie in the realm of the small personal relationships of society--the relationships that mediate directly between man and his larger world of economic, moral and political and religious values. Our problem is concerned with all of these values and their greater or lesser acceptability to the individual. It is this that makes our problem also social. It is social in the exact sense that it pertains to the small areas of membership and association in which human values are made meaningful and compelling to human beings.[36]

To the extent, then, that primary group relationships in family, church, and community are undermined or replaced, those values that call for the subordination of individual desires before social obligations can scarcely become anything but oppressive. The forces that urge such values, after all, are distant and impersonal, originating as they do from secondary and institutionalized sources. This is because values are primarily internalized as the result of personal or primary relationships. The emergence of this process in which the community has been undermined and the isolated individual, on one hand, and the state, on the other, strengthened is a direct product, said Nisbet, of political liberalism: "Man alone was deemed to be inherently self-sufficing, equipped by nature with both the instinct and reason that could make him autonomous."[37] The individual was regarded accordingly as independent of the influence of historically developed social organizations. If, then, man were self-sufficient, and his communities and groups merely secondary to his essential nature and qualities, "it was inevitable," said Nisbet, "that the strategy of freedom should have been based upon objectives of release and the emancipation of man from his fettering institutions."[38]

A creative society became virtually defined as one in which individuals were "emancipated" from their ties to social relationships. A free society was one defined in terms of freedom, morally and socially, from all kinds of authority and institutions. Concern for the well-being of the individual therefore must go, virtually by default, from the community back to the individual himself. Nisbet quoted George P. Adams:

> It is not strange that the self-discovery and self-consciousness of the individual should have steadily mounted higher as the environment of individuals more and more takes on the form of an impersonal, causal, and mechanical structure. For the mobility and freedom of the individual can be won only as he becomes detached from his world; his world becomes separated from him only when organized and defined in objective and impersonal terms.[39]

The objectification and externalization of authority has vitiated the entire role of authority itself within modern society. Far from enhancing and freeing the individual, however, the loss of primary group authority, which has stemmed from the loss of function of primary group relationships in the larger society, has tended to debilitate him morally and socially. Nisbet said:

> We have learned that man is not self-sufficing in social isolation, that his nature cannot be deduced simply from elements innate in the germ plasm, and that between man and such groups as the family, local group, and interest associations there is an indispensable connection. No concept of individuality is adequate that does not take into consideration the many ties which normally bind the individual to others from birth to death.
>
> Individuality cannot be understood except as the product of normatively oriented interaction with other persons . . . . The normative order in society is fundamental to all understanding of human nature. We do not see, think, react, or become stimulated except in terms of the socially inherited norms of human culture.
>
> But the normative order is itself inseparable from the associative order. Culture does not exist autonomously; it is always set in the context of social relationships.[40]

It is surprising that Rieff, himself not a psychologist but a sociologist did not deal with the community as a smaller social body than the society, but apparently only as a society united however by certain common values and purposes. The value of the community as a body which is small enough to be able to recognize the individual as well as to give him a place where he can express himself and act meaningfully was not considered by Rieff. When he discussed community it was the larger community with its values and guiding myths which give meaning

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and direction to the individual's life. It is precisely, however, the mediating function of the community that is essential for the well-being of the individual member. Within such a body the individual is provided with not only meaningful purposes but the basic needs of recognition and effective action, what Freud called love and work, the prime qualities of the healthy person. It was Freud who first stressed and showed modern man the extent to which emotional needs originating in childhood demand satisfaction even in one's relationship to the state. All loyalties for Freud, in fact, revolve around a leader who evokes the protective image of the original father. Nor is such allegiance merely a function of particular childish deficiencies that would not be so pressing had the child's needs been met in the first place. The identification of the individual with the leader of his particular group has genetic origins, for it harks back to primitive man's experience as a member of the Primal Horde. "The leader of the group," said Freud, "is still the dreaded primal father; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority . . . . The primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in the place of the ego ideal."[41]

But in a time when the world has been 'disenchanted' it is difficult for either gods or men to retain the aura of the primal father, though according to Freud the father-image should still cling to any group leader. Still it is hard for the rational ego to justify such feelings, although such figures as Eisenhower, DeGaulle, Churchill, and Kennedy in the Western world have continued to evoke such images with immediacy and great power. Generally, however, with the increasing complexity of modern society, seemingly beyond the capacity of one man even to symbolize much less to master sufficiently to seem to be an all-knowing all-powerful father, we are today left with fewer and fewer satisfying symbols or myths that we can stretch our credulity sufficiently to identify with, believe in or trust. Thus, as difficult as it has been to make of the state an object of allegiance that is able to substitute for the feudal community of pre-modern times as a source of identification and emotional support, it is even more difficult now that modern man has been sufficiently disenchanted and desacralized so that symbols and myths are eschewed at least on the conscious level. Communal purposes, then, may be failing in their power to hold in the modern world because contemporary society may be too complex and impersonal to serve as an effective vehicle to transmit the symbols and myths which are the foundation of communal purposes. Were the contemporary Western world able to concede that the state by itself is an inadequate body for relating to the individual at the level of his personal needs and yearnings and encourage the smaller more intimate community to mediate once again the demands and requirements of society to the individual, then communal purposes and the support of the individual by the community might not seem such a foreign possibility in the time of the therapeutic.

Such purposes are absent in the contemporary world because we lack institutions of a communal nature that can serve as effective mediators of man's social needs. Furthermore, such intimate corporate entities as would more effectively serve the wishes of psychological man for love and work are basic to the understanding of Freud himself in his conception of how both the individual and society may be easier on one another. Freud's doctrine of Eros may be the most important and least developed or understood conception in his entire body of work. Though he left the doctrine, in Brown's words, "hanging in metaphysical air," he referred to Eros over and over again as the great unifier, and the hope for the amelioration of man and society. Moreover, Eros is the basis for all healing in the practice of psychoanalysis. In fact it is the irony of the Freudian system that, although it is consistently solipsistic in theory it is completely interpersonal in practice. It is only through the other in the person of the analyst that the individual as patient is able to come out of his self-contained world of introjects and become a person in his own right. In his monumental work, Freud and Philosophy (1970), Paul Ricoeur pointed out:

> . . . the desire of the other is directly implied in the emergence of Eros; it is always with another that the living substance fights against death, against its own death, whereas when it acts separately it pursues death through the circuitous paths of adaptation to the natural and cultural environment. Freud does not look for the drive for life in some will to live inscribed in each living substance: in the living substance *by itself* he finds only death.[42]

Freud's represents perhaps the most thorough examination of the underside of human motivation ever made, even by the theologians of original sin, St. Paul, St. Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards. He made his discoveries through the unprecedentedly detailed examination of the lives and frustrated desires of victims of anxiety and neurosis, people who may be said to have been sufficiently threatened by their experiences to have withdrawn as much into themselves as they could manage for the only safety and security they could find. A theory almost exclusively conceptualized from the experiences of those suffering from an extreme degree of emotional impairment and difficulty in establishing confident relationships with others must be expected to show the signs of its origins and reflect those extremes. In an oft-quoted statement to Ludwig Binswanger, Freud declared, "Man has always known that he was spirit; it was for me to show him that he is instinct also."[43] Freud has succeeded inestimably in showing us the degree to which we are indeed motivated by instinct, but in so doing he presented us with an incompleted system, as incomplete in its own way as the one it was designed to supplement. The result of the system Freud did give us may be described as a description of man under thralldom to death that is, as Brown has indicated, remarkably comparable to Luther's description of man under the dominion of Satan, whom Luther describes as the Prince of this world. If, as Ricoeur has suggested, it is correct to say that, "in the living substance *by itself* [Freud] finds only death,"[44] then may we not say that Freud's theory of human motivation represents, in its emphasis on the self-containment of the neurotic individual, an unparalleled description of life held in thralldom to the death instinct. If that is indeed the case, then any attempt to build upon Freud's work as Rieff has done in his attempt to apply it in the area of social theory, must be realized to be using a theory that portrays man in a particularly onesided dimension. It may well be that man is as thoroughly in thrall to death as Freudian theory declares. But if this is so, then any conclusions that derive from it must be expected to be exceedingly bleak. For in the theory as thus far developed there are certainly few grounds for any confidence in the capacity for human transformation. At best man's instincts for his own pleasure and his need for aggression so that he may not destroy himself may be sublimated or channelled into socially acceptable paths. Even in faith there can be none but an illusory confidence for religion too can but sublimate man's instincts, it cannot transcend them. Thus, rooted in the image of Freud that Rieff portrayed, it is difficult to see how any other conclusions than those Rieff reached would be possible. Once the world has been disenchanted, with Freud playing his part, there are no other choices facing modern man than the therapeutic on one hand, and the analytic attitude on the other.

But there is another Freud than the one Rieff portrayed in such a noble mold. There is a Freud of Eros, the life instinct, as well as a Freud of the death instinct. Although he is never able to develop the full implications of the doctrine of Eros, and as Brown said, it is left, "divorced from (Freud's) deepest analyses of concrete psychological realities,"[45] it is the key to any success that accrues from analytic practice. Ricoeur maintained that, "whereas the Freudian topography is solipsistic, the analytic situation is directly intersubjective . . . . As the decisive episode of the transference teaches us, insight or the process of becoming conscious not only entails another consciousness, the analyst's, but contains a phase of struggle reminiscent of the struggle for recognition."[46]

It is in the analytic situation that the patient is enabled, nay forced, to abandon his self-contained world of identifications, introjects, and internalizations, wherein he has maintained his deathward isolation by incorporating what he desires and needs of the world into himself, and come to terms with the implacable fact that another person stands before him who refuses to be anything other than himself. It is through this other that the crippled and ineffective ego is healed and brought into the dominion of Eros and out of the isolation that can only lead to the victory of the death instinct.

Eros is not only found in Freudian practice to the neglect of it in the theory of motivation itself. In developing the concept of Eros after he found it necessary to go 'beyond the pleasure principle,' he constantly referred to Eros by such terms as, "that which binds all living things together," "the preserver of all things," "the preserver of life"; he also identifies Eros with, "the Eros of the poets and philosophers which binds all living things together," and, "that which seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living substance."[47] Eros is also the power "which holds together everything in the world."[48] He noted elsewhere that: "In no other case does Eros so clearly betray the core of his being, his purpose of making one out of more than one." "I may now add," he said, "that civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals and after that families, then races, peoples and nations into one great unity, the unity of mankind."[49] Aside, however, from such provocative utterances as these Freud said nothing of substance concerning Eros and the way that it might fit into the otherwise solipsistic instinct theory. Perhaps, indeed, his silence on the substantive role of Eros reflects nothing less than his embarrassment at not being able to integrate the instinct which unmistakably draws the individual out of himself toward the other for his satisfaction rather than allowing him to remain in the isolation that is the mark of Eros' adversary.

It might be objected that there is nothing to contradict the overall theory in the doctrine of Eros because the other that the individual is drawn to for the enhancement of life still experiences its satisfaction sexually, that is to say in organismic pleasure. This objection might be sustained if it were not for the fact of the transference in which it is the other as one who heals while remaining other and in so doing resists incorporation into the solipsistic world of the death-enthralled ego. At any rate there is enough that is suggestive of the fact that Eros plays a role in human life that requires the person, for the sake of his well-being, indeed for the sustenance of his life to remain in intimate and supportive contact with others. If this is the case it suggests that the analytic attitude may not simply reflect an exclusive devotion to stoic individualism. It further suggests that Freud also places his hope for man's future in the work of Eros, the satisfaction that is experienced when the self is in contact with and feels the support of others. Nor is there the suggestion that single relationships with other individuals are regarded by Freud as sufficient for the well-being of man. Freud's hope lies in the future of civilization, and for this he urges that the ascendancy of Eros is necessary, whereby life is brought into unity with other life, from "single individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind."[50]

Freud saw no future for modern man in the illusory comforts that religion might provide. He dared to hope that we will outgrow that need. But he was optimistic enough concerning the possibilities given to man by his reason to hope that, without religion, man will be even more free and capable to bring about the ancient vision of, "the brotherhood of man and the reduction of human suffering."[51] Earlier in the same work, in fact, Freud is bold enough to express the belief that:

> . . . by withdrawing his expectations from the other world and concentrating all his liberated energies on this earthly life he will probably attain to a state of things in which life will be tolerable for all and no one will be oppressed by culture any more.[52]

Thus, it is the contention of the present writer that Rieff is premature in enlisting the support of Freud for a prognosis of modern society that sees any prospect at all that is either viable or valid without the life-enhancing work of Eros. For Freud, Eros is necessary for the maintenance of life, and Eros is manifested in every level of human living. Let us then examine the doctrine of Eros in Freud to see if it is possible to spell out its implications for an understanding of the way in which men relate to one another, and how they may most healthily live together. In so doing we would expect to find that community is essential to personal well-being, never so much so as in the time of psychological man.

Summary

Rieff's argument that the therapeutic will henceforth live in a world without the binding, supporting and directing power of communal purposes raises the question of the degree to which human life *can* be viable without the active support of and sense of identity with a community of others. Rieff himself does not address this issue, even though he is not happy with the prospects that it suggests for the future of culture. His failure to consider this question appears to be a function of his classical liberal assumption that the individual, who is the prior entity, enters the community for reasons of security and safety. To the extent that such needs can be met elsewhere, and in other ways, as for instance by technology, his commitment to the purposes of a community are no longer viewed as being essential for his well-being.

Rieff shared such liberal assumptions with Freud. Moreover, both Rieff and Freud tended to look beyond the more intimate bonds of community to the abstract and impersonal society which, not surprisingly, is unable to supply the individual with a vital sense of support and meaning. Were contemporary society able to decentralize itself into more intimate communal units there might be a better prospect for the re-emergence of a capacity for commitment to some kinds of communal purposes. Freud's concept of Eros suggests that community is a necessity of human well-being, and will be examined as to its implications in this regard.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1] R. N. Bellah, "No Direction Home; Religious Aspects of the American Crisis," The Dudleian Lecture, Harvard Divinity School, 1970, esp. p. 13 f. for a discussion of the effects of "liberated" behavior on the security needs of others not so "liberated," p. 25.

[2] Ibid., pp. 239-40. [3] Ibid., p. 49.

[4] Ibid., pp. 49-50. [5] Ibid., p. 239.

[6] S. S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuing and innovation in Western political thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 324.

[7] Ibid., p. 5. [8] Ibid., p. 11.

[9] H. H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 139.

[10] P. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of faith after Freud (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 77.

[11] Ibid., p. 68. [12] Ibid., p. 70.

[13] S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1960), p. 31.

[14] P. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order vs. Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos," working draft for Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1969, p. 12.

[15] Ibid. [16] Ibid., p. 13.

[17] Rieff, op. cit., pp. 73 ff.

[18] P. Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 245.

[19] Rieff, Triumph, op. cit., pp. 73 ff.

[20] Rieff, Moralist, op. cit., p. 277.

[21] Ibid., p. 258.

[22] S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930) trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton and Co., 1962), p. 42.

[23] Ibid., p. 47.

[24] Freud, op. cit., p. 43.

[25] Ibid., p. 59.

[26] Ibid., p. 61.

[27] Ibid., p. 62.

[28] Ibid., p. 69.

[29] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[30] Ibid., p. 77.

[31] Ibid., p. 87.

[32] Ibid., p. 90.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 92.

[35] R. N. Nisbet, *Tradition and Revolt: Historical and sociological essays* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 129-30.

[36] Ibid., p. 132.

[37] Ibid., p. 137.

[38] Ibid., p. 138.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., pp. 139-40.

[41] Freud (1921), op. cit., p. 76.

[42] P. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An essay on interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 291.

[43] Quoted in Rieff, *Moralist*, op. cit., p. 161.

[44] Ricoeur, loc. cit.

[45] N. O. Brown, *Life Against Death: The psychoanalytical meaning of history* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 45.

[46] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 474.

[47] S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), trans. James Strachey (London: Hogart Press, 1950), pp. 68,71,73,84.

[48] Freud (1921), op. cit., p. 31.

[49] Freud (1930), op. cit., pp. 55,69.

[50] Ibid., p. 69.

[51] S. Freud, *The Future on an Illusion* (1927), trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957), p. 97.

[52] Ibid., p. 89.

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CHAPTER III

THE DESIRE FOR THE OTHER

According to Freud, each living human organism begins as a body of energy that is charged with excitation whenever it is in a state of tension, which it experiences as discomfort. Thus excited, it moves toward whatever in the world beyond itself is found to return the tissue to a state free of tension, experienced as equilibrium or comfort. When the organismic deficiency is eliminated the energy that has been charged to obtain satisfaction is discharged and the organism experiences the reduction of that tension as pleasure. This state of raw and indiscriminating energy moving willy-nilly toward objects of satisfaction would not be able to survive by itself. Only with the aid of another who assists the organism in finding those objects that will satisfy its needs and, thus, give it pleasure can some sense of regularity, of pattern, enter the life of the organism that otherwise lives in a state of pure but quite indiscriminating desire. Of the id, a term which (apart from the gratuitous mystique of the Latin word for *it*) very aptly expresses the non-personal nature of the instincts, Freud noted that it "has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle."[1]

By itself the infant would not be able to take the most rudimentary steps to insure its own survival or to organize its chaos of desires. The most it can do is suck when a nipple is placed by its mouth. From

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the very first, then, the human infant is dependent upon the other in order for it to survive and become a person. It is out of the imposed regularity of its nourishing and caring contacts with its parents that the infant begins to develop its own organ of regulation and survival, what Freud called the ego (another regretably exotic translation; "I" or "me" would have been simpler, more Freudian, and more accurate). In a certain sense, the ego is simply other people, who have been made a part of the person. For Freud, however, the ego is more formally defined as,

> . . . that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world acting through the Pcpt.-Cs. in a sense it is an extension of the surface differentiation. Moreover, the ego has the task of bringing the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure-principle which reigns supreme in the id. In the ego perception plays the part which in the id devolves upon instinct. The ego represents what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to the id which contains the passions . . . .
>
> The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider seeks to do so with its own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The illustration may be carried further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego constantly carries into action the wishes of the id as if they were its own.[2]

The ego separates out from the biological id by virtue of the person's contact with the environment. As such, the ego will emerge at the body's points of contact with the external world, i.e., the surface of the body. Thus, Freud said: "The ego is first and foremost a body-ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface."[3] But it remains the other who ministers to the infant's body in such a way as to present to the infant the way he must learn to regulate himself if he is to feel secure in his world. In what Freud described as the cathecting of the id onto certain objects of satisfaction, the ego is given the task of either obtaining those objects, in part or in whole, or in repressing them because they appear to be threatening to the survival and well-being of the organism. In the act of seeking to obtain such objects the process of identification begins. As soon as the ego even imagines the object which it is seeking, the id is provided with the beginnings of satisfaction, which in turn provides the basis by which identification eventually takes place. If the desires of the id for an object are immediately gratified then there is no necessity for identification to take place. Conversely: "When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues a modification in his ego which can only be described as a reinstatement of the object within the ego."[4] Freud, in fact, suggested that such identification may be the only condition under which the id will give up its desired objects. In view of this likelihood Freud then stated, "that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains a record of past object choices."[5] In other words, the ego is the internalization of those objects or persons that frustrate the wishes of the subject in his desires. As pure desire meets the other who remains other insofar as he does not immediately gratify the desire, then, desire must come to terms with the other that stands over against it. It invariably does so by incorporating the other into itself. Such precipitates, to use Freud's term, go into the formation of the ego. Thus, if the ego resembles the desired objects, then the erotic impulses of the id are given the satisfaction of finding the source of its gratification within itself. It is, to that extent, self-contained.

The id may be said to fall in love with its own ego because of its cultivated resemblance to the objects or its desire. The ego becomes those persons it cannot possess, but by incorporating them it convinces the undiscerning id that it does possess them.

By internalizing the desired objects of the id, the ego gains control over the id. "When the ego assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, 'Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me.'"[6] This change from object-libido to narcissistic-libido involves an abandonment of sexual aims and is, therefore, part of a process of desexualization. As such, Freud suggested, it is a kind of sublimation. Moreover, this, said Freud, is probably the underlying mechanism behind all sublimation. Thus, a sexual desire which cannot be gratified becomes an object of ego-identification in which form, having already sufficiently satisfied the id, it can go on further to satisfy itself by pleasing others through channelling the original desire into culturally-approved activities.

The satisfaction that the other provides for the emerging self must always be rooted in organismic satisfaction. This is another way of saying that, as a being whose original disposition is "pure desire" encounters the other, he persists in seeking to fulfill his desire. If the other yields completely then the state of pure desire is put temporarily to rest and pleasure is experienced. To the extent that the other does not yield he is incorporated into the self so that the desire may to that extent be gratified. Such incorporation, however, represents a certain failure of desire, what Freud called desexualization. Unless the other frustrates pure desire no ego is formed, there remains only id. Thus does the reality-principle develop in place of the pleasure-principle, and thus does a person develop where there was once only an organism.

According to Freud's definition of the development of the ego, the only mode by which the other can be dealt with is through incorporation or identification. Thus, the other, who is so essential to the development of the person from the undifferentiated state of pure desire only retains his significance in the Freudian view to the extent that he is incorporated into the self so that the self, in the form of ego, may be self-sufficient, in Freud's terminology, so that object-libido may become narcissistic-libido, and love need go no further than the boundaries of the ego. Thus does the person for Freud remain utterly self-contained, even in the face of the fact that the other is essential to his survival, well-being and personhood itself.

Freud never felt the need to go beyond the solipsism of his theory of the development of the person, perhaps because most human beings come to terms with the other person through incorporation rather than through satisfaction. Yet the problem of the solipsism that libido theory creates as well as the inconsistencies of concepts within libido theory would not be resolved merely by repudiating it out of hand as the neo-Freudians have been wont to do. Libido theory reflects as accurately as any theoretic device yet put forth, the problem of what Ricoeur called the dimension of the archaic in man, his peculiar bondage to his childhood. Ricoeur suggested that the inadequacies of the theory could be surmounted by building upon Freud's insight into man's archaism and

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going beyond it toward a teleology to supplement the archaeology. For man, Ricoeur said, is the being who looks as much forward as he does backward.

As Ricoeur pointed out, we should not cast aside the light Freud shed on the archaeology of man's psyche, nor even be in a hurry to build upon it before looking at it thoroughly and not without something approaching awe.

> The genius of Freudianism is to have unmasked the strategy of the pleasure-principle, the archaic form of the human, under its rationalizations, its idealizations, its sublimation. Here the function of analysis is to reduce apparent novelty by showing that it is actually a revival of the old: substitute satisfaction, restoration of the lost archaic object, derivatives from early fantasies--these are but various names to designate the restoration of the old in the features of the new. It is obviously in the critique of religion that this archaeological character of Freudianism culminates. Under the heading of "the return of the repressed" Freud discerned what might be called an archaism of culture, thus extending the dream archaism into the sublime reaches of the mind. The later works, The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents, and Moses and Monotheism, strongly emphasize the regressive tendency of the history of mankind. *Far from becoming less pronounced, the archaeological character of Freudianism has grown progressively stronger.*[7] [italics added]

There is, Ricoeur went on to suggest, already an implicit teleology in Freud's work, notwithstanding his regard for man's archaeology. It remains for us to mine the treasure already there, and not as the neo-Freudians did, either take too much away or add too much, which in either case left them with far less than they began with in the first place. Freud's attention to man's archaeology, his bondage to his childhood and his imprisonment by his body, are, in Ricoeur's words, "an extraordinary contribution to the critique of 'existence under the law,' begun by St. Paul, continued by Luther and Kierkegaard, and taken up again in a different manner by Nietschze."[8] Ricoeur then went on to point out that:

> Freud's contribution here consists in his discovery of a fundamental structure of ethical life, namely a first stratum of morality that has the function both of preparing the way for autonomy and of retarding it, of blocking it off at an archaic stage. The inner tyrant plays the role of premorality and antimorality. It is the ethical moment in its dimension of noncreative sedimentation; it is tradition, so far as tradition founds and obstructs moral invention. Each of us is brought into his humanity by this agency of the ideal, but at the same time is drawn back to his own childhood which is seen as a situation that can never be surpassed.[9]

According to Ricoeur it is precisely at the point of the theory of identification that what he calls the progressive and structuring aspect of what is otherwise the archaism of the superego is to be found. It is with the father complex, and its resultant precipitate, the superego that the person is continually forced on one hand to abandon the security of infancy, and on the other to build the very ideals that drive him beyond infancy upon dependence, fear, avoidance of punishment, and the desire for consolation. Thus is morality rooted in an internalized external threat, and even our idealizations are but extensions of our narcissism. The ego, therefore, is itself inauthentic, and bound up with what he calls the false and abortive Cogito. Furthermore, the more Freud examined the superego the more he found in it degrees of severity, cruelty and destruction, which further emphasize its archaizing traits. Finally Freud makes "the cruelty of the superego into a representative of the death instinct, interpreted as the impulse of destruction."[10] This led Ricoeur to conclude:

> The death instinct is not simply one out of many archaic figures, but rather *the archaic index* of all the instincts and of the pleasure principle itself. We should not forget that the death instinct was introduced to begin with in order to account for a peculiar situation in therapy--the resistance to being cured, the

> impulse to repeat the original traumatic situation instead of raising it to the rank of memory. The function of repetition is thus seen to be more primitive than the function of destruction in the death instinct. Or rather, destruction is one of the ways adopted by a living substance in order to restore an earlier, inorganic state of things . . . . The tendency of life to destroy itself appears so primeval that Freud ventures to write that 'masochism (self-destructiveness) is older than sadism (destruction of the other) and that all the instincts aim at restoring an earlier state of things by provoking a process akin to the automatism of repetition: embryology is nothing but a compulsion to repeat. By thus affirming the 'conservative nature of the instincts,' Freud places death within life, the return of the inorganic within the very furtherance of the organic. Thus the hypotheses of Beyond the Pleasure Principle were not simply 'heuristic notions,' but a profound insight into the nature of things.[11]

Ricoeur then suggests that the repetition or regression which is the characteristic of the action of the death instinct have, in his words, a mutual harmony and a close affinity with all the other forms of archaism exposed by Freud. Whether in the dream life, in identification, the formation of the superego, all the manifestations of narcissism, or the repetition compulsion itself, even in sublimation, we are continually and finally bringing about death, ironically with the very aim of clinging to life. Thus Ricoeur concluded: "If one interrelates all these modalities of archaism, there is formed the complex figure of a destiny in reverse, a destiny that draws one backward; never before had a doctrine so coherently revealed the disquieting consistency of this complex situation."[12]

Freud has made us profoundly aware of "the nonautonomy of knowledge" and the rootedness of the latter in existence, which for Ricoeur is summed up as desire and effort. "Thereby is discovered not only the unsurpassable nature of life, but the interference of desire with the intentionality, upon which desire inflicts an invincible obscurity, an ineluctable partiality."[13] Thus life and the unconscious pertain to the absolutely involuntary order of things, as evidence that freedom is restricted. But the limits imposed by unattended desire yield to hermeneutical attention when dreams, fantasies and myths are used as "the indirect discourse of that mute darkness."

It is therefore consciousness which provides the key to the person's emerging capacity to transcend his archaeology through reflective interpretation or self-consciousness, thus bringing those pure desires which pull the person into his past, ultimately toward his death to light so that they may be acted upon, either by expression, sublimation or conscious repudiation. Accordingly, what Ricoeur called the "restlessness of life" is not at first defined as desire and impulse, but as concoincidence with one's self; this restlessness already contains within itself "the negativity that makes it other and which, in making it to be other, makes it be self."[14] In other words, self-consciousness emerges out of self-contradiction, or the duplication of consciousness, one part of the self at odds with the yearnings of the other part which is a desire. Desire, then is only known in its over-againstness which is experienced when desire meets an obstacle, invariably in the form of the other. It is when the other then becomes internalized that self-consciousness is able to emerge, for self-consciousness is desire encountering an internal resistance, that is, of the internalized other. This process is both coincidental with Freud's understanding of identification as the consequence of abandoned object-choices becoming narcissistic choices, yet of the fact that the other is intrinsic to life and growth. Thus, as Ricoeur said: "Desire is revealed as *human* desire only when it

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is desire for the desire of another consciousness."[15] It is the contact of the person with the other that gives rise to human, i.e., self-conscious desire.

The object of the desire of the emerging self in its consciousness of itself is itself, said Ricoeur; however, "it will reach itself only through its relation with another desire, another self-consciousness."[16] What begins as the blind desire of the organism for things starts to disengage itself from mere things and looks for itself in the other. That is the meaning of identification in terms of what Freud called the abandonment of object-cathexes for narcissistic-cathexes. "Ultimately, such desire is man's desire to be recognized by man, a desire made explicit only after it has anticipated itself."[17] The self emerges as desire, then, only as an encounter with another desire, that is to say another self which it internalizes and thus is able to regard itself. According to Hegel, from whose Phenomenology of the Spirit Ricoeur sought to complete Freud, the concept of self-consciousness is that "'of infinitude realizing itself in and through consciousness,'" which is to say, in Ricoeur's words, the "opposition in which each consciousness seeks itself in the other and 'does what it does only so far as the other does the same' is an infinite movement, in the sense that each term goes beyond its own limits and becomes the other."[18] It is finally through this struggle with the other for recognition that the self is revealed, but precisely as "never being what it is--and therefore as being infinite."[19] Thus the self, through its meeting with the other enters into and participates in the other, and in a series of others and thus is never merely itself in any wholly autonomous or static sense. The self is always in movement and can never, in a certain sense be identified. Instead it may be seen only in the totality of its encounters with others.

It might be thought at first glance that a 'phenomenology of the spirit' would stand in complete antithesis to Freud's thorough-going archaeology, even when it is able to interpret a process such as identification in a way that is consistent with Freud's theory. Spirit stands at the opposite pole from archaism by virtue of its constant emergence out of later forms: "it is a movement that always destroys its starting point and is secured only at the end. The unconscious, on the other hand, means that intelligibility always proceeds from earlier figures. In general terms, spirit is the realm of the terminal; the unconscious the realm of the primordial. To put the antithesis most concisely . . . spirit is history and the unconscious is fate--the early fate of childhood, the early fate of symbolisms, pregiven and repeated without end . . . "[20]

But to stop here, said Ricoeur, would only leave us with a facile eclecticism or syncretism where Hegel's phenomenology of spirit would be added on to psychoanalysis. Thus Ricoeur seeks to demonstrate that Hegel and Freud each contain the problematic of the other. "To see Freud's problematic in Hegel is to see that emergence or positing of desire is central to the 'spiritual' process of the reduplication or consciousness and that the satisfaction of desire is inherent in the recognition of self-consciousness."[21] This means that the desire for recognition which follows that of the desire for the object is not merely an addition to the latter, "but is rather its unfolding and explication."[22] Within the

Hegelian phenomenology the "pure ego" is strikingly comparable to Freud's pleasure-principle. The pure ego is the naive self-consciousness that assumes it has gained itself in the overcoming or consuming of the object. Ricoeur quoted Hegel: "Self-consciousness is *desire*. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it affirms this nothingness to be *for itself* the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in objective form."[23]

Yet such cancellation of the object in desire turns out not to abolish it, for the pure ego needs the object in order to desire its cancellation. "Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to the object to abolish it, because of that relation it rather produces it again as well as the desire."[24] It produces it again by identifying with it, and the pleasure-principle becomes the reality principle. Thus in both Hegel and Freud "self-consciousness discovers the other: the independence and the resistance of the object to desire cannot be overcome and satisfaction can only be obtained through the favor of an other which is another person."[25] Or, in Hegel's words: "'Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.'"[26] Ricoeur concluded:

> One must not forget that recognition--the spiritual phenomenon par excellence--is struggle. Struggle for recognition, certainly, and not a struggle for life, but recognition through struggle. This struggle means that the terrible reality of desire is transported into the sphere of spirit in the form of violence. No doubt the passion to achieve recognition goes beyond the animal struggle for self-preservation or domination; the concept of recognition is preeminently a noneconomic concept: the struggle for recognition is not a struggle for life; it is a struggle to tear from the other an avowal, an attestation, a proof that I am an autonomous self-consciousness. But this struggle for recognition is a struggle in life against life--by life.[27]

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It is always then in risk, in the abandonment of one's vulnerability in the meeting with the other, the struggle which one could lose, out of which life and desire thrive, as each consciousness stands in opposition to the other than itself. On the other hand, servitude clings to immediate life, and says no to the risk involved in struggle, exchanging the fear of death for the security of the slave. Thus in both Freud and Hegel the act of staying within the self and consuming the other leads to bondage and eventually death, whereas the act of risking one's own life in the struggle for recognition by the other is apt to result in life's mastery and enhancement. "It is life that becomes the other, in and through which the self ceaselessly achieves itself."[28]

Although psychoanalysis is structurally solipsistic, in practice it is intersubjective, to the point where the latter does not merely resemble Hegel's dialectic of the reduplicated consciousness; it is closer than that:

> The entire analytic relation (in fact) can be reinterpreted as a dialectic of consciousness, rising from life to self-consciousness, from the satisfaction of desire to the recognition of the other consciousness. As the decisive episode of the transference teaches us, insight or the process of becoming conscious not only entails another consciousness, the analyst's but contains a phase of struggle reminiscent of the struggle for recognition.[29]

The struggle for recognition that takes place during the analytic transference is precisely the encounter or struggle of naive desire with the implacable otherness of the analyst who remains himself and will not be absorbed into the desire of the patient that he repeat the latter's past objects of desire whose very failures to remain other than the patient's "pure ego" have prevented him from becoming truly himself, rather than, in Lacan's phrase, a *stade du miroir*.[30] Instead he has remained in an undefined position where his desire which is to abolish the other to satisfy himself has either been too readily satisfied so that the other has never clearly been allowed to emerge, or so totally frustrated that the other has merely dominated rather than struggled with him. The result in either case is the failure for the self to emerge into its *own* consciousness.

In the transference situation the problem that makes it so crucial to the outcome of analysis is that the patient is unable to differentiate between the analyst as other and his own incorporated others. His others have been incorporated to satisfy the pure ego. He expects, in like manner, to be able to incorporate the analyst in order to master the new situation in terms of the archaic. But the analyst remains steadfastly other than the patient who is, thereupon, forced to struggle with him; out of that struggle, which is the *conditio sine qua non* for the emergence of a self in its consciousness of itself, through encountering an implacable other he may become a self.

For all of Freud's solipsism of libidinal desire, therefore, a desire "is never a mere vital impulse, for it is from the beginning set within an intersubjective situation."[31] The emergence of the self through all its dramas occurs on a plane that leads from "satisfaction" to "recognition." The Oedipus drama, the most central one of all, owes its crucial dynamic and resolution to the child's realization that his straightforward desire for possession of his mother is not attainable. It comes up against the implacable otherness of the father, and therein must struggle with that other in his refusal to be negated, which is the wish of the pure ego.

The implicit teleology in Freud is beginning to link up with his archaeology. Let us posit that the person is pulled back into archaism, toward death, to the extent that he has not been able to gain recognition from the parental other through that struggle with his implacability. He is unable under such circumstances to become a self, but remains, thereupon, predominantly in the mode of the tyranny of the archaic other, or the incorporated other, that other which places the self in the state of what Hegel described as "unhappy consciousness," which is complete self-division. Such an other is not the product of a genuine struggle but of domination and incorporation, having, in Hegel's terms, exhanged the fear of death for the security of slavery. It is also life held in bondage to the tyranny of the cruel, destructive superego, that "pure culture of the death instinct" described by Freud.

Yet Ricoeur does not, any more than Freud, make any distinction concerning the quality of the other the struggle with whom determines whether the person will be inclined to live predominantly in the mode of the archaic or of the spirit, the former implying a negating or threatening other who, in the subject's defensiveness, is incorporated, the latter implying an other who implicitly already recognizes the subject sufficiently to enter into struggle with him. For Ricoeur, the dialectic of desire means simply that, in the very nature of things, the fact that one desire meets another desire involves a struggle for recognition that results in self-consciousness. But recognition does not always ensue from such a meeting of desires. In some situations the dialectic of desire results in recognition; this issue would lead to healthy growth through the mutual acknowledgement of the otherness of the recognizing other. In other cases, however, the dialectic of desire does not end in recognition, but in incorporation of the other by the nascent self. This must be considered to be the outcome of an abortive struggle for recognition. Its consequence is that instead of being able to recognize the otherness of the one whom he encounters the nascent self remains in the state of what Hegel called pure ego but which we, to avoid semantic confusion, prefer to call "pure desire," and, instead, incorporates the other, as pure desire is wont to do. In Freudian terms, what began as object-cathexis becomes, out of frustration, narcissistic-cathexis. The other refuses, not only to recognize the otherness of the infant, but to yield or open himself to the infant. The resort to incorporation of the other would be termed the abortion of the self, for it results in the state of self-division which Hegel called "unhappy consciousness." The ego, then, is, "a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes,"[32] or what Lacan called the outcome of the "mirror stage, in which the child discovers himself by identifying with the image of the other." Thus, as Lacan described, when the ego says "I" it in reality is referring to the "Others" whom it has incorporated in what he calls the realm of the Imaginary.

As Lacan's American translator and interpreter, Anthony Wilden, says:

> For Lacan the ego is an armorplate, a shell, a fortress, a 'false self.' It is an essentially paranoid contruct founded on a competitive either/or relationship of opposition and identity between self and other. The concept of identity--in psychology and in life--is, of course, a paradox, a double bind: self-identity

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> supposedly refers to the autonomy of the self, but identity necessarily implies an identity or identification *with* . . . or *against*.[33]

Ricoeur's synthesis of Freud's archaism and Hegel's teleology opens the door so that the other may emerge in all its seriousness as necessary to the development of the person as a self. But before the other can be so regarded, attention must be paid to the way in which the other meets or struggles with the nascent self, in its state of pure desire. It is not the mere fact that pure desire meets the obstacle of another desire that creates the possibility of a self conscious of itself, but what kind of other that is met. Only then can it be determined whether it is likely to be what we shall refer to as a "self" when recognition occurs, or an "ego" when recognition is not forthcoming and the other is incorporated. It is this realization of the quality of the other's response and the nature of the struggle for recognition that takes place that makes of the dialectic between archaism and spirit truly determinative and gives the self-other encounter its crucial importance for the growth of the person into selfhood. A struggle will always take place, but for a self to emerge the other must *recognize* its other, otherwise the result will be the "abortive self" which is the ego operating over-against the pure desire of the organism in a state of unhappy consciousness, of pure self-division between pure desire and the incorporated other.

Within the psychoanalytic relationship the transference may be said to be a model for the re-creation of the self. It is the steadfastness of the analyst in remaining the other in the face of the patient's pure desire that leads to the patient's struggle for recognition out of which a self may finally be born. The recognition that the analyst accords the patient while yet refusing to accede to his desire forces the patient to recognize that it is indeed an other whom he is encountering and not another introject for his "false self," or ego. In the state of recognition an equality of consciousnesses takes the place of the "master-slave" relationship of the unhappy consciousness. Ricoeur said of this outcome:

> One of the signs that the analysis is ended is precisely the attainment of the equality of the two consciousnesses, when the truth in the analyst has become the truth of the sick consciousness. Then the patient is no longer alienated, no longer another: he has become a self, he has become himself.[34]

Although psychoanalysis has within its conception of identification the basis for understanding the relationship of consciousness to consciousness its metapsychology with its exclusive attention to the archaic is, "unable to account for that process in its original essence, theoretically elaborates only its side effects on the instinctual plane [consequently] it is the regressive aspects of identification that are constantly mentioned or interpreted economically."[35] Thus, the relinquishment of an object, which, in one case, may be a mark of maturity and the education of pure desire in the face of reality, is invariably interpreted instead as an act of regression, i.e., from object-cathexis to narcissistic-cathexis. This leads Ricoeur to conclude that, "what psychoanalysis recognizes under the name of identification is simply the shadow, projected onto the plane of an economics of instincts, of a process of consciousness, to consciousness, and that this process has to be understood through another type of interpretation."[36]

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By way of suggesting another type of interpretation, he asked: "But is the loss of the object always and fundamentally a regressive process and a return to narcissism? Does it not indicate, on the contrary, an educative transformation of human desire, a transformation related to the process of reduplication of consciousness not in an accidental but in a fundamental and founding manner?"[37] The concept of libido, Ricoeur said, stands in the way of an interpretation of identification that puts the dialectic of self-consciousness at the heart of desire. "Desire . . . is from the outset an intersubjective situation; hence the process of identification is not something added on from without but is rather the dialectic of desire itself."[38] Ricoeur suggested that in Freud's seminal essay "Mourning and Melancholia" we find the beginning of a genuine dialectic of desire with negation at its center. He suggests further that [illegible] might be well to consider the death instinct as being related to negativity by means of which desire is educated and humanized. Finally he wonders whether or not there may be a "profound unity between the death instinct, the mourning of desire, and the transition to symbols."[39]

Ricoeur made no sustained attempt to answer his own provocative question. The meeting of the desire of the self to the desire of the other leads to the education or modification of desire. As such, the latter may be described as an abandonment of the desired-object as an object-of-possession. It is a letting-go of the desired other, letting him be himself, thereby risking the loss of the object and the isolation of the self. Anxiety or mourning is the likely result of such relinquishment. Only by letting the desired other remain other than or distant

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from the self, however, can the self choose the desired other and actively seek to be like him. Relinquishment of desire, then, is the obverse of the gratification of desire, where the object that is desired is totally possessed by incorporation. When the desired other is relinquished it can be selectively imitated from a distance, rather than totally incorporated. This is the difference between the formation of an ego, which is based on incorporation, and the formation of a self, which is based on selective imitation in a process that only distance and freedom allows. Possession or incorporation takes over the entire person willy-nilly, and deprives the subject of his self. The distance that allows the selection of perceived qualities leads to the creation of a self.

Ricoeur suggested an oscillation between dialectics and Freudian economics in which "a dialectic oriented toward the gradual emergence of self-consciousness interacts with an economics that explains the 'placements' and 'displacements' of desire through which this difficult emergence is effected."[40] He readily concedes that the dialectic of consciousness to consciousness is far from being the dominant theme of psychoanalysis and in fact stands in opposition to the overall thrust of its metapsychology, its economics, and its topography, in other words to the entire theoretical structure. Since the economics of libido theory [illegible] only able to interpret the consciousness to consciousness struggle in terms of the vicissitudes of the instincts which themselves are moved only by the pleasure principle and its later modification, the economics are irremediably solipsistic; yet, "neither psychoanalysis as therapy nor any of the situations it reflects upon is solipsistic."[41] Thus psychoanalysis integrates itself into a dialectical understanding of desire as the means of attaining recognition only by operating in opposition to the economics of libido theory.

The dialectics and the economics of desire may not stand in as much opposition to one another as Ricoeur is convinced they do. The economics, may, in fact, be understood as merely one solution to the dialectic of desire meeting desire: a defensive one. Properly understood, the economics of desire reflect, not merely an unfortunate limitation in the Freudian metapsychology which renders it solipsistic, but, in fact, the very solipsism of life held in bondage to fear, hence to childhood and the archaic. On the other hand, the dialectic of desire, inasmuch as it results in the recognition of the self, reflects a life to the extent that it is lived confidently, hence open to the future, and to the other. In Freudian terms, the other would be allowed to remain cathected as an object rather than narcissistically cathected.

Where the parental other deals with the nascent self of the infant with pure desire rather than with an inclination to recognize his otherness, as master to slave, in Hegel's terminology, the subject, thereby negated in his otherness, is rendered less able to enter the struggle for recognition on any other than defensive and threatened terms. In the sense of his own nothingness that the absence of recognition bequeathes him, he can only fill himself, thereby giving himself strength and substance, by incorporating the other, since he is strengthened in no other way by the other. The subject seeks, in the face of non-recognition of his otherness, to make himself self-sufficient by taking the other into himself, thus abandoning intersubjectivity as a mode of responding to the other. He thereby remains in the mode of pure desire, negating the otherness that confronts him by incorporating it or identifying with it. Thus he does all things in the ways described by Freud in terms of the economics of desire or libido theory. Moreover, the objects which he incorporates take their places within him as precisely other than himself, leaving him to that extent alienated from himself. Because their character has been essentially disconfirmatory and negating, they impose themselves on him and enter him with the same voices. The result is the world which Freud describes, of the tyrannical, punitive and destructive superego, as well as of a conception of the subject as limited to a discrete supply of resources or energy which must therefore be jealously guarded. In other words, the concept of libido reflects, notwithstanding its well known limitations, the world of the neurotic personality with unparalleled accuracy.

The fault in Freud's libido theory lies in his attempt to use it to describe the motives of all men, neurotic and normal. Thus, the theory is only able to do justice to the archaic in all men and not to the teleological, to the extent that it motivates all men, otherwise the death instinct would prevail in human life far sooner than it does. Certainly Freud was not unaware of the fact that men are motivated by spirit as well as by instinct, but he is only able to allude to the work of spirit, and to effect it in his practice; he has no coherent place for it in his theory.

Precisely because the role of spirit, of man's openness to the other, is present by allusion in the theory and whole-heartedly in the practice, it is incumbent upon us to develop these openings in Freud's work. For, although Freud described man's life under the sovereignty of death with a thoroughness and power found in the work of no other person since perhaps Luther, the death instinct for Freud does not reign supreme, but must itself contend with "that other of the two 'Heavenly Powers,' eternal Eros,"[42] and our lives are the outcomes of that struggle in all of us.

Just as the economics of desire reflect the way a subject pulls back into a self-contained existence to protect itself from an unyielding world which will not bestow recognition, so the dialectic of desire points the way toward the terminal which is the action of the spirit, into what Hegel called the infinite movement that is the mark of the struggle of one consciousness with another for recognition. Furthermore, as life is the result of a struggle between Eros and the death instinct, so the economics and the dialectic of desire interact with each other within the breast of each person. Indeed the dualism between Eros and death is directly comparable to the dialectic between the archaism of the economics and the teleology of the spirit.

The legitimacy of the above interpretation of Freud rests upon what we are able to do, without undue violence, with Freud's conception of Eros. It has already been noted above (p. 73) that, although Freud did not fully develop his concept of Eros within his overall theory of motivation, he attached considerable importance to it. When he first introduced the notion of Eros Freud said:

> I will add only a word to suggest that the efforts of Eros to combine organic substances into ever larger unities probably provide a substitute for this 'instinct towards perfection' whose existence we cannot admit.[43]

Freud, however, seemed quite at a loss when it comes to the full implications of what he himself is bold enough to say concerning the work of Eros. For if Eros is as important as Freud maintained it to be, and if it is indeed the great unifier of living things, not just within the individual, but between individuals, and even between larger collectivities, then it would seem to be the vehicle within the Freudian system that offers a way beyond the solipsistic existence into which libido theory otherwise forces the understanding of human motivation. Indeed, as the substitute for the sexual instinct in the revised instinct theory, Eros is the drive which urges the subject toward object-choices. Until, furthermore, the gratification of the relationship which Eros makes possible with the object or other is frustrated or denied that relationship remains with the object as other than the subject. It is only when frustration or denial takes place that the object relation becomes a narcissistic relation.[44] In fact, Freud himself said as much:

> By thus obtaining possession of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual trends.[45]

Freud, however, saw Eros and the death instinct constantly engaged in interaction and in fusion, but, because the death instinct is always involved in this process, the work of Eros is always restricted to the bounds imposed which involve regression and the tyranny of the superego. Perhaps, then, the reason that we do not find in Freud a genuinely liberating sign of the activity of Eros is that, although he has, in the superego, an almost pure example of the death instinct at work,[46] he has nowhere any such untarnished example of the work of Eros.[47] Nor would he be expected to have had at his command any clinical examples of the activity of Eros in any form that was free of ambivalence; otherwise they would not be seeking a cure for their neurosis. Thus, Eros for Freud reminds us of nothing so much as the 'unknown god' of St. Paul's apocryphal speech to the Athenians. Indeed, as the real unifying force of life, Eros directly performs for Freud the role of the spirit, or of God for that matter, with the difference, however, that Eros does not really operate in a particularly mysterious way. Eros is simply the attraction of life for life, and, as such, the means whereby the maintenance of life is sought and enjoyed; in Freud's own words: "the clamor of life proceeds for the most part from Eros."[48]

Ricoeur interprets Eros and its significance for Freud in the following manner. After reminding us that Eros is put forth in the revised instinct theory in place of and superseding libido[49] he says:

> The sexual instincts are 'the true life instincts.' They operate *against* the purpose of the other instincts which lead, by reason of their function, to death; and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them and the other instincts, an opposition whose importance was long ago recognized by the theory of the neuroses . . . .
>
> The replacement of the libido by Eros points to a very specific purpose of the new instinct theory. If the living substance goes to death by an inner movement, what fights against death is not something internal to life, but the conjugation of two moral substances. Freud calls this conjugation Eros; the desire of the other is directly implied in the emergence of Eros; it is always with an other that the living substance fights against death, against its own death, whereas when it acts separately it pursues death through the circuitous paths of adaptation to the natural and cultural environment. Freud does not look for the drive for life in some will to live inscribed in each living substance; in the living substance by itself he finds only death.[50]

Both the problem and the opening past the problem are suggested in the above passage. The problem is the solipsism of the economic theory, and the opening is offered by Eros which takes the person beyond himself.

According to the economic theory, the instinctual satisfaction, which must be sexual in origin (thereby limiting the choice of others to those who are in a position to provide such satisfaction, specifically the mother), is only desexualized, thereby making possible the attraction to others who do not satisfy the subject instinctually, by being incorporated into the id which precipitates out as the ego. Yet if Ricoeur is correct in his interpretation of Freud and death is opposed only in conjugation with another life, whereas in the isolated life one only finds death, then it can no longer be said that there is no place for the other in Freud. The theory is not as solipsistic as it generally appears. In fact the other assumes ontological if not soteriological significance. The only problem that remains is the still stubborn fact that Eros is not fitted into the clinical interpretation of the dynamics of the human personality. Apart from its practical role, however unrecognized, in the analytic technique, it plays, thus far, only a philosophical role in the Freudian metapsychology. In short, Eros is a part of the metapsychology, but it is not yet a part of the Freudian psychology.

The death instinct, on the other hand, is an intrinsic part of the psychology. Apart from its most obvious clinical manifestation, in the superego which Freud has described as "a pure culture of the death instinct,"[51] it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that virtually the entire Freudian psychology is a description of life in bondage to the death instinct. Aside from the work of Eros, the activities of life consist, for Freud, of the invariable attempt to reduce the organism's level of tension, to strive toward a quiescent state. This is nothing other than the goal of the death instinct.

Freud reminded us:

> . . . we have conceived the principle which governs all mental processes as a special case of Fechner's *tendency to stability*, and consequently have ascribed to the mental apparatus the aim of extinguishing, or at least of maintaining at as low a level as possible, the quantities of excitation flowing into it. For this tendency that has been presumed by us Barbara Low has suggested the name Nirvana-principle, which we accept. But we have unquestionably identified the pleasure-pain-principle with this Nirvana-principle. From this it would follow that every 'pain' coincides with a heightening, every pleasure with a lowering, of the stimulus-tension existing in the mind; the Nirvana-principle (and the pleasure-principle which is assumed to be identical with it) would be entirely in the service of the death-instincts (the aim of which is to lead our throbbing existence into the stability of an inorganic state) and would have the function of warning us against the claims of the life-instinct, of the libido which tries to disturb the course life endeavours to take.[52]

Freud did confess that it is not all as simple as he at first made out. There can be both pleasurable tension and the painful lessening of tension. Furthermore, the pleasure-principle and its modification, the reality-principle, have, through vicissitudes unknown to Freud, become separated from the Nirvana-principle as the expression of the death instinct, and express instead the claims of the libido, or Eros. With this separation of the instincts into one that strives for quiescence and stabilization, and one that strives for pleasure and the excitation of fresh tensions, the death instinct and Eros respectively, the life process goes on in a constant interaction. However he may try to give the two equal weight, Freud is disposed to interpret human actions first in terms of the conservative tendency of the organism to reduce stimulation, and then to add that Eros, in its inclination to seek other life, disturbs this conservative tendency of the rest of the organism. Freud wrote elsewhere:

> If it is true that life is governed by Fechner's principle of constant equilibrium, it consists of a continuous descent towards death; but the falling of the level is delayed and fresh tensions are introduced by the claims of Eros, of the sexual instincts, as expressed in instinctual needs.[53]

It appears, then, that Freud is saying that the dominant and prior disposition of the living substance is conservative, and seeks to return to the inanimate state, but that, for an undetermined reason, life discovers that pleasure and a satisfaction of its own is found in the 'throbbing existence' of the organic state with its constant bombardment by external stimuli. There is no understanding such satisfactions from within the rationale of life in thrall to the death instinct and its preference for stability, but if Eros is understood as the discovery that what is *outside* the organism brings satisfactions that are denied in the peace of the inorganic state, then we have the basis for a conceptual device that is intrinsic to the Freudian metapsychology for escaping the solipsism which is otherwise so appropriate for the understanding of the neurotic personality and its quest for security, stability and safety, all characteristics of the Nirvana-principle. Since, however, Eros rarely if ever appears in 'pure culture' but only in interaction and fusion with the death instinct, if we would find a place for it that does it a degree of justice that is presently withheld from it, then it behooves us to examine in greater detail the death instinct itself and the reaction of Eros to it. Only then will we be in a position to understand the role of Eros and its 'principle of inconstancy' that not only stands in contradiction to the strivings of the death instinct but offers us a way beyond the thus far closed model of human personality that Freud leaves us with.

Summary

The relation to the other in Freud occurs to the extent that the other is incorporated into the process of identification; object-cathexis becomes, through the denial of desire, narcissistic-cathexis. As such the theory is solipsistic, and the individual remains self-contained. There is no place for the other to remain itself, outside, yet in relation to the subject--except in the analytic relationship itself, which remains unintegrated in the overall theory of human personality. Yet it is the analytic relationship which points the way to the realization of the inescapable intersubjectivity of the Freudian system, its theoretical formulation notwithstanding. It is only as the other remains, as the analyst does, in otherness, yet in relation to the subject that selfhood develops. Only the abortiveness of such a 'struggle for recognition' leads the subject to resort to the incorporation of the other through the process of identification and the formation of the ego, which may be described in Lacan's words as a "false self," or an abortive self. The Freudian system as we presently have it, describes the abortive self only, but in the analytic relationship it points the way toward the necessity of the other in the formation of a self or a healthy person. The metapsychology of Eros points the way to the integration of the role of the other into the Freudian *psychology*.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1] S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), trans. W. J. H. Sprott (New York: Norton and Co., 1933), p. 104.

[2] S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogart Press, 1950), pp. 29-30.

[3] Ibid., p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 36.

[5] Ibid., p. 36.

[6] Ibid., p. 37.

[7] P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay on interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 446-47.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., p. 449.

[10] Ibid., p. 451.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 452.

[13] Ibid., p. 458.

[14] Ibid., p. 465.

[15] Ibid., p. 466.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 467.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., p. 468.

[21] Ibid., p. 469.

[22] Ibid., p. 470.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., p. 471.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 472.

[29] Ibid., p. 474.

[30] Anthony Wilden, The Language of the Self: Containing the Function of Language in Psychoanalysis, by Jacques Lacan (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968).

[31] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 474.

[32] Freud, 1923, op. cit., p. 36.

[33] Anthony Wilden, "Libido as Language," Psychology Today, 5, 12 (May, 1972), 85.

[34] Ricoeur, loc. cit.

[35] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 479.

[36] Ibid., p. 480. [37] Ibid., p. 481.

[38] Ibid. [39] Ibid., p. 482.

[40] Ibid., p. 483. [41] Ibid.

[42] S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930) trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton and Co., 1962), p. 92.

[43] S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), trans. James Strachey (London: Hogart Press, 1950).

[44] S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923) trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogart Press, 1950), p. 36 ff.

[45] Ibid., p. 65.

[46] Freud, 1920, p. 77.

[47] But, cf., Freud, 1933, op. cit., p. 182.

[48] Freud, 1923, op. cit., p. 66.

[49] "In this way the libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets and philosophers which binds all living things together." (Freud, 1920, op. cit., p. 68).

[50] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 291.

[51] Freud, 1920, op. cit., p. 77.

[52] S. Freud, "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924), Collected Papers, 2, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), 256.

[53] Freud, 1923, op. cit., p. 66.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEATH INSTINCT AND THE WILL-TO-LIVE

Freud was initially led to formulate the hypothesis of a death instinct through his attempt to understand the driving force behind the compulsion on the part of victims of neurosis and other psychic traumas to repeat the traumatic events that led to their neurosis in the first place. Since such events would be manifestly painful, it was obvious to Freud that he was dealing with actions the motives of which were 'beyond the pleasure-principle.' Freud said of this puzzling phenomenon: "the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been repressed."[1] Freud also reported perplexing and unpleasurable instances without number of cases where the patient seemed compelled to return over and over again to "unwanted situations and painful emotions . . . they continue the more to feel themselves scorned to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and treat them coldly; they discover appropriate objects for their jealousy."[2] He took note too of events in the lives of normal people where: "The impression they give is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some extraneous power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile experiences."[3] After considering a number of similar situations in both neurotic and normal individuals Freud is led to conclude: "If we take into account observations such as these, based upon behavior in the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure-principle."[4]

This compulsion to repeat takes place, according to Freud, primarily in response to a sudden breach in the organism's protective shield against the potential threats in the external world. Thus, it may be said to be due to something inherent in organic life, and therefore characteristic of the instincts in general to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; it is a kind of organic elasticity, or to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.

"This view of instincts strikes us as strange because we have become used to see in them a factor impelling towards change and development, whereas we are now asked to recognize in them the precise contrary--an expression of the conservative nature of living substance."[5] If the instincts are conservative by nature and seek the return to an earlier state then: "It follows that the phenomenon of organic development must be attributed to external disturbing and diverting influences. The elementary living thing would from its beginning have no wish to change; if conditions remained the same, it would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of life."[6] Here we seem to have confirmation of Ricoeur's assertion that for Freud the living substance always is with another in fighting against death, whereas by itself it finds only death. For Freud, however, the external impingements upon

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the organism do not really divert it from its final goal, the return to the inorganic state, but merely give it a circuitous and diverting path to its ancient goal: "Everything living dies for internal reasons--becomes inorganic again, [and] the goal of life is death."[7]

In an earlier passage Freud suggests that, in order to protect itself against the tensions induced by these external encroachments, the living organism creates a protective shield around it:

> . . . its outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some degree inorganic and thenceward functions as a special envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli. In consequence, the energies of the external world are able to pass into the next underlying layers, which have remained living, with only a fragment of their original intensity; and these layers can devote themselves, behind the protective shield, to the reception of amounts of stimulus which have been allowed through it. By its death, the outer layer has saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate--unless that is to say, stimuli reach it which are so strong that they break through the protective shield. *Protection* against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than *reception* of stimuli.[8]

The above passage, however speculative on Freud's part it may be, confirms the suspicion that life indeed has a priority over death, since the organism goes to such lengths to preserve its life and the stimuli that it can contend with that it gives only part of itself over to death, but only in order to protect the life of the larger part. To the extent, however, that it makes part of itself inorganic, that protective shell may be said to be involved in a kind of surrender to death. Thus, however consistent virtually everything Freud says concerning the ubiquity of the conservative disposition of living things, he cannot account for all life on this model. No matter that the organism adopts such an inorganic shield against an excess of stimulation from the external world Freud is still left with the unanswered question of why

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it is that the remainder of the organism does not also partake of this deathward movement that the crusty protective shield takes. Freud acknowledges activity which suggests that there is an interest on the part of the organism to maintain the life process, at least for time enough to 'experience' what the life process has to offer, and sufficient enough too that it goes to such lengths, as was pointed out above, to protect itself in order to continue with life for a time. Freud allows, it is true, that the emergence of a substance into life is of sufficient 'value' to the organism that it only travels by quite a circuitous path back to the inorganic state. But he does not address himself to what it is about the life state that an organism intent on returning to the inorganic seeks to stay with for so long.

For Freud the life instinct too *eventually* seeks the reduction of tension and the return to the inorganic state, but by way of a wider and wider path. First, however, the living substance is externally disturbed and diverted from its quest for the quiescence of the inorganic state, and these diversions become increasingly frequent, requiring ever more circuitous detours, but they too participate in the compulsion to return to inanimacy. But Freud will acknowledge no mystery here, no surd, no 'discovery' on the part of the living entity that the external disturbances that divert it from its inclination toward death are perhaps pleasurable in their own right; and that perhaps this kind of pleasure, one based on the increase of stimulation rather than its decrease, may be an experience considered to be worth pursuing and cherishing. He freely acknowledges that Eros is a contradiction to the otherwise conservative nature of the instincts. He asks:

> Is it really the case that, apart from the sexual instincts, there are no instincts that do not seek to restore an earlier state of things? That there are none that aim at a state of things which has never yet been attained? I know of no certain example from the organic world that would contradict the characterization I have thus proposed.[9]

Yet, to our mystification, Freud does not pursue the question concerning what it is about the experience of life that gives rise to a life instinct in the first place, and why life proves to be tolerable enough so that the organism postpones its flight toward death sufficiently even to develop an instinct to seek and preserve the life process for such a lengthy period of time. Life, instead, is simply explained in terms of the unavoidable necessity of responding to the irritating diversions external to the organism so that the organism can the more surely go to its death in its own way and only in its own way. Freud explains:

> The implications in regard to the great groups of instincts which, as we believe, lie behind the phenomena of life in organisms must appear no less bewildering. The hypothesis of self-preservative instincts, such as we attribute to all living beings, stands in marked opposition to the idea that instinctual life as a whole serves to bring about death. Seen in this light, *the theoretical importance of the instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes.* They are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself. We have no longer to reckon with the organism's *puzzling* determination (so hard to fit into any context) to maintain its own existence in the face of every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion. Thus these guardians of life, too, were originally the myrmidons of death. Hence arises the paradoxical situation that the living organism struggles most energetically against events (dangers, in fact) which might help it to attain its life's goal rapidly--by a kind of short-circuit.[10] [italics added]

Freud later modifies this rather extreme position wherein the entire life process is explained solely in terms of the pursuit of death. He says of the sexual instincts:

> They are conservative in the same sense as the other instincts in that they bring back earlier states of living substance; but they are conservative to a higher degree in that they are peculiarly resistent to external influences; and they are conservative too in another sense in that they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period. They are the true life instincts. They operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their function, to death; and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them and the other instincts, an opposition whose importance was long ago recognized by the theory of the neuroses.[11]

It is even suggested that "the instincts which were later to be described as sexual may have been in operation from the very first, and it may not be true that it was only at a later time that they started upon their work of opposing the activities of the 'ego instincts.'"[12] The sexual instincts, or Eros, in fact, account for all apparent tendencies toward growth and higher development.[13] Yet even with these concessions the reason that the organism finds life to be worth maintaining are not developed nor even considered to be topics to be speculated upon. Freud gives Eros standing in its own right in contradiction to the work of the death instinct, but the fact remains that he still explains life in terms of death when the real problem that demands explanation is the reason why life maintains itself. It must surely be that life is experienced as more than just an irritant to be removed at convenience.

Let us eschew in our speculations[14] any hint of vitalism and assume that through some kind of chemical process a substance which had been inorganic now exhibits the characteristics of organicity, and 'finds' this state to offer exposure to external stimulation and a sense of

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tension which results therefrom. It develops a way of responding to such stimulation that it is able to reduce the tension and return to the quiescence of the inorganic state. Yet some of these organisms begin to endure the living state for longer and longer periods of time before returning to the inorganic state. It can either be assumed that they are not as efficient as those other organisms that manage to return to the tension-free state more quickly, or that they 'seek' to maintain the life state, we can only presume because there is something quite endurable about the state and its external diversions. Freud suggests that those instincts that pursue life "are clearly aiming at by every possible means is the coalescence of two germ-cells which are differentiated in a particular way."[15] The unicelled organism, let us suppose, discovers that it is able to prolong the life state by joining with other cells. Not only, then, are we left with the likelihood that life is prolonged because it is pleasurable, i.e., that the increase rather than the decrease of stimulation is sought, but that life is better able to be dealt with and experienced in union with other living units than in isolation. Following Ricoeur's understanding of the role of Eros, life would be sought and cherished at the point at which one unit of life made contact with another unit of life, and presumably found in the pleasure that resulted from that contact a reason to continue living rather than seeking a return to the inorganic state. This would suggest that in isolation life is indeed experienced as a tension-state to be ended by the return to a tension-free state. In conjugation with the other, however, life and its tensions are able to be endured and even preserved. Indeed as greater and greater unions of living units took

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place the life experience was found to be more and more pleasurable, and less frightening.

The conclusion to such speculation is that we are now able to understand the basis upon which life is found to be worth maintaining entirely in its own right. Thus understood, the death instinct becomes, not the prior urge of the organism (the isolated organism, however, Yes!), but the urge of the organism in the face of the tension of the life state, an experience which is likely to be painful when the organism remains isolated. It may indeed be that the death instinct remains prior in the experience of the living substance, in that it enters the life state alone and vulnerable. In such condition may it not experience life as something to absent itself from at the earliest possible moment? Fortunately, however, the organism is generally received into life by an other whose care gives it the experience that life is perhaps more to be enjoyed than avoided.

Understood in this manner we are able to consider the death instinct as much in its own right as we are the life instinct: in union with other life life is sought; in separation from other life it is avoided. Life does not have to be understood, as Freud tends to, in terms of death, nor need death be understood in terms of life, as for instance a response to frustration, as the neo-Freudians, as well as those Freudians who reject the death instinct as therapeutically defeatist, are wont to do. Nor is it necessary to understand Eros in either a vitalistic or mystical way. It is simply the tendency of life to find in other life the experience of life's enhancement. Eros is emphatically not, as Ricoeur reminds us, some kind of 'will to live' inscribed in the organism; *by* *itself* the organism seeks death or quiescence, just as if to say that in isolation life is too painful to be endured, hence the stability and greater safety of the tension-free state that is akin to death is preferred.

We are now able to understand the role of the death instinct dynamically instead of in the pessimistic and more static way bequeathed to us in its unfinished form by Freud. Life does not, by its very nature, automatically seek death, however circuitously. *It seeks death to the extent that it is estranged from other life, and it seeks life to the extent that it can unite for strength, confidence and support with other life.* The life process, then, consists of the dialectic between the pursuit of those 'myrmidons of death,' stability, security and safety on one hand, and openness to the stimulation, and enjoyment and risk of life, on the other, each dependent on the relationship of the subject to other life.

Numerous other questions remain however. When we say that the isolated organism is internally driven toward death we do not mean that physical death is specifically sought. The reverse, in fact, tends to be the case: life is clung to, but it is life characterized by the reduction of tension, in short the work of the Nirvana-principle. Death, in other words, is not so much sought as avoided. It is the repressed death instinct, says Norman O. Brown that renders in bondage to death and the Nirvana-principle. All living things must die says Brown, and in that sense Freud is perfectly correct in placing the death instinct in the place of importance that he gives it. Indeed the possibility of death is always with anything that lives, and it is that fate that clouds man's experience of life. His problem is not that he wishes to die, but that he is all too determined to cling to life and in fact deny the possibility of his death. Thus, the very characteristic of life that the living thing finds painful is its vulnerability and unpredictability, both of which signify the ever-present possibility of death.

The withdrawal from life is from the death-in-life that is ever present. "If only," the living unit seems to say, "the threat of death, life's vulnerability and unpredictability could be reduced or removed then life would be fine." "Why not seek their reduction?" says the vulnerable life. It thereupon does so by acting to create a situation that is as tension-free as possible. Ironically, such a tension-free state, the closer to attainment it becomes, resembles nothing so much as death itself. Thus, in seeking to cling to life and banish the possibility of death, the living being brings about a kind of death within life. For Norman O. Brown, who makes a similar argument, such actions are the consequence of the repressed death instinct. Left to its own devices the death instinct does precisely what Freud attributed to it. It seeks death in its own time and in a manner 'imminent in the organism itself.' In the meantime its activities are characterized by a tolerance of the possibilities of death that are ever-present in life. This makes it possible for life to be lived in radical openness to other life, thereby giving Eros free rein to seek out the other that makes for life's enhancement.

The death instinct, then, appears, by following our line of argument, to be less that which directs life back toward death, however circuitously, than it is the drive which enables life to tolerate the possibility of death that is always present in the nature of life, and which eventually returns the living being back to the inorganic state. It is only when death is denied as a possibility, and the death instinct repressed, that its tolerance for death-in-life is banished with it. With the tolerance for death repressed then life itself can only be tolerated without tension, that is, akin to death. When the risks and vulnerability of life are repressed then the 'return of the repressed' can only take the subject into the very self-defeating behavior that he consciously avoids. It is not, then, so much that the repressed death instinct brings about the death that it tolerates through the living death of the Nirvana-principle. That is the goal of the subject, although it is a goal that is not fully attainable for it is simply incompatible with the unpredictability of life. To the extent that it is, moreover, it leads to a state of boredom that all but the most frightened of persons find difficult to tolerate. What the repressed death instinct wreaks upon its owner is behavior that constantly defeats and undermines the conscious intentions of its ego. The conscious ego pursues a virtually impossible goal of stability and mastery, while the repressed experiences of life's vulnerability, which the death instinct is able to tolerate, seek their own expression, thereby constantly undermining the ego's pursuit of stability and mastery.

Presently we have before us two lines of argument concerning the role of the death instinct which derive but at the same time diverge from Freud, and which, at first glance would seem to contradict one another. In the first version the subject seeks death and is therefore subject to the death instinct to the extent that he finds himself in isolation from other life; life is under such circumstances frightening and the subject experiences his powerlessness. In union with other life, that is subject to Eros, on the other hand, life is experienced as meaningful and pleasurable, and the strength that union provides gives the subject a sense of power in the face of life. In this interpretation the death instinct seeks to return to the inorganic state when the isolated hence powerless being confronts the perplexity of life.

In our second interpretation death is not sought only in response to the powerlessness of the isolated life, but is considered to be intrinsic to the life process, and, in fact, the death instinct is what makes it possible for life to tolerate the very perplexity and unpredictability of life that makes the isolated life shrink from life back toward death. However, in the face of his own vulnerability, man is disposed to repress the death instinct, as a consequence of which life is maintained, but in the tension-free state that in its complete form is death.

If the second interpretation is sound then the isolated life would not be expected to seek its death, in the face of its powerlessness, but to repress the death instinct, which has the effect of giving it autonomous power over the subject in the form of self-defeating or destructive behavior. In union with the other, on the other hand, life is enhanced with a power and a support that enables it to be actively pursued and cherished, in spite of its vulnerability and the ever present possibility of death in life. Thus Eros is released to encounter the other freely to the extent that the unrepressed death instinct gives the subject a capacity to tolerate the presence of death in every moment of life.[16] Thus, we are still in a position to maintain that the isolated life powerless in the face of life's apparent threats, is in thrall to the autonomous death instinct, while, with an other, life is able both to tolerate death and delight in life. In the former instance the life and death instincts stand dualistically in opposition to one another, while in the latter they are in dialectical relation to each other, each serving the other.

In what sense are we even justified in presenting the notion of a *repressed* death instinct? For Freud the death instinct is the disposition of a living thing to return from the stress of life to the quiescence of death. It is being suggested here, however, that what Freud describes is merely the external manifestation of the repressed death instinct. Our suggestion that the unrepressed death instinct is precisely what enables the organism to tolerate the stress of life, thereby strengthening the role of its partner, so to speak, Eros, is conceptually at variance with Freud's meaning of the death instinct and the role it plays. Are we not just playing semantic "games" with a concept, then, that ought rightly to be forgotten as merely a speculative idiosyncracy of Freud's, one, moreover, that has already been disregarded by the majority in both the psychoanalytic and intellectual worlds of our time? Freud was striving intuitively and, at times, almost inarticulately, to account for the prevalence of both self-defeating and destructive behavior in humankind. Basing his conceptualizing on the observed behavior and strivings of patients Freud was struck by the prevalence of both the compulsion to repeat that lay 'beyond the pleasure principle,' and by the persistent conservatism of the instincts, all except for the sexual instincts. But here he, of all people, saw only the tip of the iceberg, the visible manifestation of the repressed death instinct. He was misled partly by his inability to comprehend fully the intrinsic satisfaction that the living thing finds in being alive. What is avoided in life is not everything that goes with being alive, but pain, tension, and uncertainty. Life continues to seek to maintain itself, but only on its own terms, by seeking to banish the intimations of precisely the death that Freud insisted it was seeking and preferring. Since, however, death is inseparable from life, being a condition of it as well as its ever-present possibility, it is simply impossible to banish death, or stress for that matter. Those experiences that intimate the mortality of life may be repressed from awareness, but they seek, nonetheless, to express themselves in one way or another. Because their dominant characteristic is the tolerance of death and all its intimations, they tend, in seeking expression, to push the subject into self-destructive actions or into externalized acts of destruction.

In the meantime, having banished the drive toward death from conscious expression, the ego and its defenses engages itself in behavior designed to reduce all tension. The compulsion to repeat may be understood as the return of the repressed death instinct less as an effort to return to death than as an unconscious determination to work precisely at a previously painful experience, as the death instinct is wont to do in the interests of resolving and overcoming it. With the life instinct separated from the death instinct, however, such actions stand in obvious opposition to the interests of the conscious ego, and thus appear as merely self-defeating behavior. Had the two instincts been integrated the work of the death instinct would have served the life instinct by overcoming an obstacle to fuller living.

What Freud, observing the conservatism of the instincts and the repetition compulsion, as well as human aggression, took to be the activity of the death instinct was the consequence of the presence of a death instinct. More than that, however, it was the demonstration of the inseparability of life and death, in that the attempt to repress the organism's tolerance for death and risk not only leads to self-defeating conflict and activity, but to a life that is so severely truncated that it is reminiscent of the very death it is striving to avoid in its quest for tension-reduction.

In a sense, however, our interpretation of the death instinct is not only at variance with Freud's, but it uses the term in the opposite way that Freud uses it. For him it is the inability to tolerate stress, which certainly seems an apt characteristic for a death instinct, while here it is the tolerance of death and stress. We, in fact, have almost succeeded in attributing to it the characteristics of the life instinct, that of 'introducing fresh tensions.' Have we not thereby also succeeded in reducing the death instinct to absurdity? Let us repeat; the death instinct is a conceptual device to account for motives and actions that are self-defeating, destructive, and in pursuit of tension-reduction, in a word, to account for man's thralldom to death. It seems absurd to conceptualize the clinging to life in terms of a drive toward death. If we are to retain the notion of the death instinct it must not only be demonstrated that it is an economical conceptual device to account for deathward behavior, but it must also be the tolerance for death and its intimations that it describes, not the pursuit of self-preservation.

In his best moments man does exhibit in high degree a tolerance for death and a willingness to take risks that could lead to death. Moreover, he does so, not just for bravado or out of a love of death, though he does that too, but in the interests of a fuller life for himself and others. But can such behavior be said to be instinctual? Yes, if we may use instinctual in the sense that the failure to engage in risky or stressful behavior not only truncates his capacity for fuller living, but more importantly that such failure leads to a life of such boredom that his emotional health suffers as a consequence. As a result of the famous sensory deprivation studies at McGill University in the 1950's one of the psychologists was led to conclude that:

> A changing sensory environment seems essential for human beings. Without it, the brain ceases to function in an adequate way and abnormalities of behavior develop. In fact as Christopher Burney observed in his remarkable account of his stay in solitary confinement: 'Variety is not the spice of life; it is the very stuff of it.'[17]

When he is in a state of fear or anxiety, and lacking access to his complete resources man then tends to avoid risks. He does not, at such times, seek death consciously, except in the case of suicide of course; instead neurotic behavior is invariably characterized by the fear of death. It is unconsciously that his behavior is all too often marked by self-punishment, illnesses, accidents, and dangers. Masochism is less a choice than a compulsion, and as such emanates from unconscious motives.

Our intuitions and raw observations tell us, moreover, that when man is at his best life and death are regarded in their inseparability, such that the pursuit of life is assumed to involve risks and the possibility of death. It is when man becomes anxious that he tries to separate death from life and live a risk-free unstressful life. What, in fact, is anxiety but the experience of a fear of pain or death that has forgotten or repressed the original source of danger? Anxious behavior, in short, is the result of the repression of the possibility of death or danger. The problem for the neurotic is that he wants what it is impossible for him to have: life without death, pleasure without pain, excitement without risk. The irony for him is that he is driven toward the death, pain, and risk that have been repressed so that what he does not want is forced upon him, and what he wants on his own terms, life, pleasure, and excitement, is denied him.

Thus we prefer to keep the concept of the death instinct because, in a single concept it accounts for a wide range of death-enthralled behavior, and because man's healthiest behavior seems to be characterized by the kind of tolerance for risk and for death that a dialectically integrated death instinct ought to make possible if it is truly an instinct toward death. But if the death instinct takes care of the tolerance for tension what role is left for Eros? Freud's conceptualization was surely neater, with the death instinct accounting for man's conservative, life-reducing behavior, and Eros accounting for man's actual pursuit of tension.

If Eros and the death instinct are to be understood in dialectical unity then it is precisely the work of the death instinct that allows Eros to pursue the satisfactions of its object-choices and the risks they involve, without being denied such pleasures by the possibility of their loss. Again, it is only when the possibility of death is avoided through repression that Eros is denied the freedom to reach out toward the other for the pleasure and confidence that it obtains from the relationship with the other. Furthermore, it is the characteristic of neurotic behavior that it craves the other, yet fears him, because the tolerance of risk has been repressed. Our interpretation would have it that the neurotic person resolves this dilemma by incorporating the desired other in order to avoid the risk of pain involved in the struggle for recognition that he might lose.

Nor is the pursuit of quiescence per se through the quest for stability in one's life inherently neurotic. It is not that man must constantly be in search of risk, stress, and excitement. He does need tranquility and stability. His illusion, however, is that he can find these in separation from the possibility of death and danger in life. If life and death could remain in a state of dialectical unity with one another then the quiescence and sense of peace would be found, not apart from life's inescapable vulnerability and risk, but within it. In discussing the notion, similar to this, of the Sabbath of Eternity, Brown says:

> Faustian characters as we are, we cannot imagine 'rest,' 'Nirvana,' 'eternity' except as a cessation of all activity--in other words, as death. What our argument is reaching for is not death rather than life but a reconciliation of life and death. We have therefore to sustain the possibility of activity (life) which is also at rest.[18]

Mahayana Buddhism captures this goal of 'activity which is also at rest' in its doctrine of the simultaneity of Nirvana and Samsara. Nirvana, the state of desirelessness and bliss where the restlessness of yearnings is overcome is not experienced after or beyond Samsare the everyday world of change and novelty, but within it and inseparable from it. In Freudian terms when the life and death instincts are united the vulnerability and uncertainty of life can be accepted without anxiety, thereby allowing the activities and relationships of life to be pursued with confidence and calmness.

The death instinct is repressed at the point at which the infant experiences his vulnerability in the face of the power the parental other has over him. Like all living things the subject enters the world alone, and it is only when he discovers that he is cared for and comforted by a loving other who gives him pleasure that the life state is experienced as desirable. As long as pleasure is forthcoming then the stress of life can be tolerated. Indeed, even the uncertainties concerning the responses of others are worth tolerating because of the pleasure that has been and generally continues to be forthcoming from others. The other is the sign, then, that life is worth living, for as long as relationships of union with others continue the subject is able to experience the power to deal with the dangers of life.

To the extent, however, that life is experienced in the helplessness of isolation, or in a state of insecurity concerning the strength and support of the other, then the uncertainties of life are experienced as painful and frightening to the infant, who is overpowered by them. If he experiences the care of the other only conditionally, and the anger or anxiety of the other on other occasions, then he will be disposed to repress from his awareness those reminiscences associated with the separation from the parental other, because they represent the possibility of danger and death (the latter quite unformulated of course). The infant will only remember and learn from those experiences where he derives the pleasure that the contact and care of the parent gives to him. Thus, he learns to seek pleasure that comes when he is recognized by the other, and avoid the pain that warns him of the possibility of his abandonment by the other.

What happens to the child's supposedly innate tolerance of death? The threat of abandonment by the parent arouses a degree of pain in the infant that exceeds the limit of his tolerance, thereby traumatizing him to the point where subsequent exposure to separation from the other sets off the original pain reaction which is an excessive flood of tension too much for the organism to tolerate. Let us propose that the organism does, as Freud indicates, operate according to the principle of homeostasis, where excitation beyond certain limits is experienced as excessively painful, but that within those limits, depending upon the experiences of the organism, thanks to Eros, there is a considerably greater tolerance of tension than Freud assumed. Indeed because of Eros there is a need for it without which the effects of boredom and deprivation set in (see page 125). At any rate the infant's exposure to the danger posed by undue separation from the parent, or the threat thereof, leads to a degree of excitation that exceeds the already vulnerable limits of tolerance that the infant possesses. To the extent that he has been thus traumatized he will not even be able to tolerate the memory of such experiences, much less the consideration of their future possibility. Every experience or possibility associated with such threats will be repressed or avoided, and every experience that maintains the support of the other will be remembered and sought again. Thus is the tolerance of death which is the death instinct repressed in human life, and the attempt made to live only according to the quest for pleasure that is the mark of Eros, namely contact with the other.

Repression, at this point, is the work of the death instinct in the way that it was conceptualized by Freud in its function of returning the organism to death when the level of life pain becomes excessive to the point where life is, to that extent, negated. Excessive anxiety or loss diminishes the drive of Eros and raises that of the death instinct. Thus, the organism which, in the strength of Eros, will tolerate stress in return for the pleasure of life has limits to the amount of stress it will absorb before its drive wanes and the death instinct assumes the ascendancy and seeks the tension-free state of death. In other words, the tolerance of death and danger which is the mark of the death instinct only contradicts the Nirvana-principle as long as Eros makes the life situation satisfying through its supportive contacts with the other. The Nirvana-principle returns to operation when the limits imposed by the success of the life instinct is exceeded. Within those limits tension is acceptable as the life and death instincts operate in unity. Outside those limits the life instinct is weakened and the unity with the death instinct. The now-autonomous death instinct seeks the return to the less painful state of death.

The first move of the organism toward the tension-free state of death occurs with the repression of the painful event. Thus repression is the act of the ascendent death instinct in the face of undue anxiety or loss. *The act of repression itself is both by and of the death instinct*. Yet once repressed the negated impulse still seeks expression. The return of the repressed represents the organism's tolerance of pain in its efforts to master a life-situation in the interests of Eros. Thus we are no longer so much out of step with Freud except that we maintain that the Nirvana-principle is not an invariable function of the instincts (always excepting Eros), but only of the ascendent death instinct in the face of undue anxiety or loss. When Eros and the death instinct are balanced or unified the death instinct operates, not according to the Nirvana-principle, but in tolerance of death, danger and risk.

But if Freud was intent upon explaining the origins of the Nirvana-principle and the compulsion to repeat with the hypothesis of the death instinct he was equally intent upon understanding the role of human aggression. Freud simply accounted for aggression through the hypothesis of the death instinct by postulating it as the externalization of the death instinct: "Is it not plausible to suppose that this sadism is in fact a death instinct which, under the influence of the narcissistic libido, has been forced out of the ego and has consequently emerged in relation to the object? It now enters the service of the sexual function."[19]

Such a solution to the problem of aggression ends up not only in therapeutic pessimism, but in marked cultural pessimism as well. Given that man must, in order to postpone his own death, externalize the death instinct in the form of aggressive behavior, he would seem to be left with the choice of either destroying himself or others. This ubiquity of aggression is somewhat resolved by directing a portion of it toward himself, through the agency of the superego, in the form of civilized morality, the better to keep his aggressions in check. The remaining aggression that is allowed expression comes out in such institutionalized forms as fighting, feuding, private property, and war. But there is no possibility of transcending man's native aggressiveness. Thus there is not the remotest possibility of appreciable betterment of the human situation. The pessimism of Freud's position on aggression and its relation to the death instinct is not a sufficient reason for rejecting it. A pessimistic view may not be to our liking, but it may still be true, and that is the only test of the soundness of the theory. Brown, for instance, complains that "Freud's dualism also leads to suicidal therapeutic pessimism, because it results in representing conflict not as a human aberration but as a universal biological necessity; our modification of Freud's ontology restores the possibility of salvation."[20] That is encouraging for all of us to be sure but it says nothing about the adequacy or inadequacy of the theory in accounting for human behavior, and aggression specifically.

Both Fromm and Horney are more to the point in their criticisms of the inadequacy of Freud's theory of the death instinct to account for aggression. For Fromm, the death instinct leads us to expect that human aggression is an invariable constant wherever there is human culture, but this is not the case. Some individuals are more aggressive than others and some societies more than others.[21] This criticism, however, misses Freud's point concerning the internalization of aggression through the moralistic superego, and the ingenuity of the human capacity for sublimation. Horney's criticism is more apt. She notes that therapeutically:

> The more anxiety is released by psychoanalysis, the more the patient becomes capable of affection and genuine tolerance for himself and others. He is no longer destructive. But if the

> destructiveness were instinctual, how could it vanish? After all, we cannot perform miracles. According to Freud's theory, we should expect that when a patient after he has been analyzed grants himself more gratification in life, the turned-in aggression concentrated heretofore in the superego should now be turned toward the outside world. While he is rendered less masochistic, he has become more destructive toward others. But what actually happens after a successful analysis is that he becomes less destructive.[22]

Even that arch-champion of psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Otto Fenichel, rejects the hypothesis of the death instinct altogether. He says, concerning conflicts between aggressiveness and sexual tendencies, that "both kinds of conflicts have a history; they came into being at a certain point of development and remain conflicts only as long as certain conditions prevail."[23] In spite of these criticisms and objections to the hypothesis of the death instinct the writer of the present account prefers to retain Freud's instinctual division. However arguable the use of the term instinct has always been as applied by Freud, the concept of an interaction between life and death as the central human conflict enables us, as no other conceptual device of which the writer is aware, to account in equal degrees for both the grandeur and the misery of the human condition. Moreover, by locating that conflict in the heart of man, rather than between man and his environment, the seemingly interminable difficulties in the work of man's overcoming of himself are not so readily accountable in terms of merely manipulating man's environment, as though he were merely a passive recipient of it. To do full justice to man's awesome capacity for creation and destruction, for good or ill, he must be given as much responsibility as his social environment. That is what humanism is all about. It does not do justice to man to minimize his difficulties in overcoming himself by resorting to

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interpretations of his nature that view him as readily able to be "self-actualized," or quickly transformed, politically, socially, or therapeutically. Yet the heart of man is social inescapably. It is only, in fact, when it seeks to sever contact with others that the death instinct becomes autonomous. Thus, it is not the heart of man versus the social environment, but that the two are inseparable; the human organism chooses life or death according to its choice of social responsiveness (and responsibility) or the lack of it. In a word, the social proceeds from the heart of man.

Thus, aggression may be understood as a response of the repressed death instinct to the other who threatens the subject. The repression of the will to die, hence its separation from the will to live, renders it autonomous. But the rage that it generates when denied expression through repression is readily directed, in the interests of self-preservation, toward destruction of the threatening other as one possible way of ridding the ego of its sense of vulnerability and mortality. (The other possibility, of course, is incorporation.) Aggression is therefore the response of the organism that rejects its own death, and, in so doing, seeks to dispatch whatever threatens it to its death. Whether, as Freud insisted, it is the death instinct externalized that commits aggression, or whether it is the self-preservative work of the independent life instinct that is aggressive is a moot point. The question before us is: How may a drive toward death that is imminent in the organism itself become externalized as aggression?

Only man represses himself in order to negate the death that he alone of animals is able to anticipate. Aggression by itself is a common

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characteristic of animals. Man's aggressiveness, however, is noteworthy for its inordinacy. This suggests that his aggressiveness has the function of not only self-preservation but of expressing repressed tension and anger. Anger that is repressed is repressed for the same reason that any other impulse is, because its expression is dangerous to self-preservation. But it still seeks expression by whatever safe or approved means happen to be available. As such, repressed anger is particularly liable to take advantage of sanctioned opportunities for aggression in order to express itself, and then expresses itself inordinately. By this interpretation, then, the inordinacy of human aggression would not be classified as an externalization of the death instinct, but as an additional consequence of the repression of the death instinct.

For Brown the death instinct as Freud develops it has, by implication, to do with separation; indeed that is its aim. Freud specifically identifies the life instinct with the preservation of the life of the species. Accordingly it aims for unification and interdependence with other life of its species. The death instinct, then, says Brown, has to do with separation and individuality, if, one supposes, the opposites are to be covered by each of the instincts. If, as we have argued, Eros is elicited by the support of the other, and the path to death is followed in isolation, then we must agree with Brown that the drive toward death has to do with the willingness to be a separate individual. It also implies that one must be separate in order to become an individual. Our earlier dialectic involving the willingness of the subject to acknowledge the otherness of the object-choice in order that he may become a self, therefore, also implies the dialectic between Eros and the death instinct whereby union is necessary for there to be separation, and separation for there to be Erotic union. If, however, the infant experiences an excess of separation, or separation used as a threat, then it ceases to be available to facilitate the growth of the infant into selfhood. The dialectical union between separation and union, between death and life is broken at this point. It is the self that cannot tolerate the anxiety of separation who proceeds to deal with the other by incorporation, by narcissistic-cathexis rather than by object-cathexis. He must have union at all costs, since separation has been given to mean the threat of his abandonment before the overpowering world in which he finds himself. Ironically, however, the only kind of union that contains the guaranteed presence of the other, union by incorporation, brings about isolation from the other, which, in turn, leads to the very death the subject seeks to avoid, since it is only in the self-other relationship that Eros can be satisfied and thereby continue to maintain the life of the individual. When the will-to-live is vitiated the death instinct, however repressed, is given the upper hand. For just because the latter is repressed does not mean at all that its activity is lessened. That is the first and perhaps most valuable axiom of Freudian psychology. Repression is a completely negative and self-defeating solution to the problem of the vulnerability of life.

Brown indicates that man could put an end to repression, as though repression were the result of a decision of some kind. "It is the privilege of man," he says, "to revolt against nature and make himself sick. But if man has revolted from nature, it is possible for him to return to nature and heal himself."[24] By this statement Brown reveals that he is the heir, not of Freud, but of Rousseau. Repression is not merely the consequence of a reversible cruelty done to the infant, nor is it, as Marcuse implies, the result of a conspiracy of domination, which would reverse itself, given the right kind of revolution whereby all mastery and domination were abolished.[25] Primal repression, from which all subsequent repression follows, has nothing rational or conspiratorial about it. It is the response of a terrified and helpless infant to a situation so threatening to him that an intolerable degree of tension is caused.

Our interpretation of the death instinct, then, reverses Freud at many points on the subject by simply following the logic of the fact that man does not seek death, he avoids it; it is life that he clings to, often at any cost. It is the cost that we are concerned with, and which the doctrine of the death instinct accounts for. According to our interpretation, however, it is not the death instinct per se that is man's greatest problem; on the contrary it is the tolerance of death that it makes possible that permits life to be lived with the utmost freedom, even in the face of loss, separation and danger. It is the death instinct that frees Eros to accept its object-choices in their otherness and thus obtain the support and strength which only mutuality can provide so that life can be cherished but not meanly possessed. We accept Freud's hypothesis that life contains the will to death, but differ from him in the conviction that the will to die has quite different consequences than simply those of tension-reduction, the compulsion to repeat, and aggression. All of these follow upon the repression of the death instinct. Indeed, everything that Freud describes concerning the dynamics of human motivation proceeds, in our view, from the repression of the death instinct. Its repression places beyond reach all those resources in man that enable him to transcend his bondage to his past through the life of the spirit. There can be little room for or understanding of the possibilities of Eros when the death instinct is repressed, because it is the repression of the will to die that places man in bondage to death. Under such conditions, Eros is chained to death because the fear of death denies it the access to the other that gives the will-to-live the satisfaction it needs to prevail. Only the courage to face death gives Eros the courage to allow the object to remain in the freedom of its otherness.

It was indicated in chapter three that life could only prevail while the object was allowed to remain separate from the subject. Only free access to the death instinct gives the self the tolerance of risk and uncertainty that can allow the other person the mystery and freedom of his implacable otherness. The sadist, says Becker, cannot allow the other his mystery, or in his words, his "secret." Accordingly, he will stop at nothing to penetrate and expose the secret of the other.[26] To liberate Eros that it might fulfill those splendid hopes only hinted at by Freud the self must at all times live in the will to die which is the condition for the fullness of life. Such an interpretation of the death instinct places the Freudian doctrine of man into step with the great spiritual traditions of man, without in any way sacrificing Freud's uncompromising insistence upon man's corporeality and his bondage to childhood.

Summary

The death instinct as hypothesized by Freud is given such a central role that life itself becomes more of a problem than does man's thralldom to death. The most obvious characteristic of life is that it persists, and in doing so resists death. It is says Brown, "the flight from death that distinguishes men from animals."[27] At birth life is experienced in its pain and separation. It seeks to return to death or to the peace of a tension-free state that resembles death. However, as soon as the subject discovers that he is supported and comforted in life, and his tensions reduced by the nurturance of the parental other the life experience begins to be experienced as something pleasurable to be maintained. As such the pains and frustrations of life can be tolerated as long as Eros finds satisfaction from the other. In isolation or pain the satisfaction of life wanes and the organism seeks to return to death. It returns to death to the extent that it negates or represses pain and seeks the reduction of tension by acceding to the desire of the all-powerful other.

While Eros satisfies, life and death remain in unity or balance, and the death instinct expresses itself as the tolerance of death, risk, and separation--all of these, the basis for individuality. When Eros fails to be satisfied the death instinct and its tolerance of pain and separation are separated from the life instinct and repressed from consciousness. To the extent that they are in union, however, the death instinct is what enables Eros to seek the other and allow the other to

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retain his freedom and mystery as an object-choice. In the failure of Eros, the other is denied his otherness and mystery, and is incorporated into the ego, which by its isolation is itself thereby placed in bondage to the repressed death instinct. Thus, the death instinct is not a restriction on Eros, as with Freud, but the basis of its enhancement as long as it remains in dialectical union with Eros.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1] S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) trans. James Strachey (London: Hogart Press, 1950), p. 21.

[2] Ibid., p. 23.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 25.

[5] Ibid., p. 47.

[6] Ibid., p. 49.

[7] Ibid., p. 50.

[8] Ibid., p. 32.

[9] Ibid., p. 54.

[10] Ibid., p. 51.

[11] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[12] Ibid., p. 54.

[13] Ibid., pp. 55, 57.

[14] Granted that what follows is the purest speculation, but at this point we are following Freud's own rather tenuous speculations concerning the origin of life, and so are able to do so in no other way than by 'fighting fire with fire,' the better to follow Freud in his scientific mythologizing.

[15] Freud, op. cit., p. 58.

[16] As previously noted this argument is very similar to that proposed by Brown (1959), but is arrived at separately by following an independent argument concerning the activity of the death instinct. However it is exceedingly difficult for one who has studied and admired Brown's work for many years to be fully aware of exactly how independent his argument is of Brown's.

[17] Quoted in R. Cooper, "Psychology of Boredom," Science Journal, 4 no. 2 (1969), 38.

[18] N. O. Brown, Life Against Death: The psychoanalytical meaning of history (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 95.

[19] Freud, op. cit., p. 73.

[20] Brown, p. 84.

[21] E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1941), p. 182 f.

[22] K. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1939), pp. 129-30.

[23] O. Fenichel, The Pschoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945), p. 60.

[24] Brown, op. cit., p. 84.

[25] H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A philosophical inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), is a consistently Marxist interpretation of Freud.

[26] E. Becker, Revolution in Psychiatry (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966), pp. 248-51.

[27] Brown, op. cit., p. 100. Because of the similarity of conclusions between Brown's conception of the consequences of the repression of the death instinct, and those reached in the present work it seems advisable to summarize Brown's position. "The neurotic animal," says Brown, "is the discontented animal; man's discontent implies the disruption of the balanced equilibrium between tension and release of tension which governs the activity of animals." (Brown, 1959, p. 90). Man is disrupted because he represses himself and he does so because he is in flight from death. He is the animal who strives to deny his death and live forever. In disrupting the unity between life and death which is natural to all that lives man represses his own individuality and his body which is the very basis of his individuality, because his body is the most vulnerable and mortal part of him. All human development henceforth becomes a flight from any threat of separation from the mother. The stages of psychosexual development remain determinative in man's life because they are crises of separation from the mother. As such they limit the enjoyment of the body to the displaced satisfactions of those repressed areas: the mouth, the anus, and the penis. Human history is but the return of the repressed, externalized so that man can seek the fulfillment of his repressed wishes outside the mortal body. Thus he tries to erect immortal cultures to deny his own mortality. Sublimation, as the work of higher culture is merely man's most refined way of repressing his body.

Were man able to accept his mortality he could live a life of bodily pleasure in union with the world. Thus would life and death become what they are for all animals: inseparable. Such unity would, in turn, enable life to be lived in such pleasure that death would no longer be threatening. The full life wants to die, only the incomplete life, the repressed life fears death, because it has not yet lived. Brown, at least in Life Against Death, seeks an ego strong enough to die and therefore strong enough to live. Though his conclusions regarding the death instinct are similar to ours, and begin with the same observation, namely that man flees from death, he does not seek it, his project is a different one. Brown seeks a renewal of pleasure and union with the world as a basis for human life, rather than the aggressiveness that is the mark of man's thralldom to death. The present study seeks a role for Eros as the basis for community in contemporary history.

CHAPTER V

THE ANALYST AS THE OTHER

Once the subject has resorted to the repression of the death instinct it can only with the greatest difficulty be dissuaded from a path taken after such an experience of pain. The difficulty of overcoming the path of negation once taken is seen in the analytic problem of *resistance*. Resistance is the phenomenon whereby "the patient clings to his disease and thus even fights against his recovery."[1] Freud also adds that:

> . . . the whole of psychoanalytic theory is in fact built up on the perception of the resistance exerted by the patient when we try to make him conscious of his unconscious . . . . The resistance can only be a manifestation of the ego, which carried through the repression at one time or other and is now endeavoring to keep it up, (moreover) now that we have posited a special function within the ego to represent the demand for restriction and rejection, i.e., the super-ego, we can say that repression is the work of the super-ego--either that it does its work on its own account or else that the ego does it in the obedience to its orders.[2]

The phenomenon of resistance implies that disease is not merely a function of the victimization of the person by circumstance but that he, through his ego, actively fights to remain in his chosen situation. The response to reality having to do with the choice of avoiding certain stresses and uncertainties in preference to quiescence and stability is a formative decision of the ego which, at its repressing boundaries and through the agency of the superego, becomes then a decision that the ego cannot reverse by itself. The conscious ego cannot reverse the decision because it secured the decision that it made under the conviction that

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its survival was at stake. To reverse that decision would be tantamount to allowing its survival to be put at stake again. Moreover, the decision to repress and return to the 'mute work' of the death instinct, as Freud called it, involves a decision to relegate certain actions and choices to the realm of the automatic; for the ego *defenses* act automatically and are not at the command of the *conscious* ego at all. Otherwise, of course, they could not protect the conscious ego from being made aware of those impulses and perceptions which were repressed in the first place because they were felt to be mortally dangerous, as well as unacceptably painful.

So persistent is this disposition of the ego that it is not only powerless to change itself fundamentally by an act of intention, but when pressed to change it actively resists. The signal of anxiety given by the ego is a warning of danger. But, says Freud:

> The pathological factor is not his ignorance in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his inner resistances; it was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still maintain it now. The task of the treatment lies in combatting these resistances. Informing the patient of what he does not know because he has repressed it is only one of the necessary preliminaries to the treatment . . . informing the patient of his unconscious regularly results in an intensification of the conflict in him and an exacerbation of his troubles.[3]

Thus the problem is not only to replace ignorance with knowledge, nor to replace fear with confidence, but to overcome the automatic resistances. Since this work is utterly beyond the power of the subject, which only has its conscious ego to do the work, it necessitates contact with an other. It is a struggle between the repressed death instinct that strives for self-sufficiency, on one hand, and Eros with its openness to the other, on the other.

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"The work of the analyst and that of the analysand are conjoined in the struggle against the resistances."[4] Even with the other's presence it involves a direct attack on the pain involved in acknowledging, and facing one's repressed impulses.

> The fundamental rule--the famous rule, the single rule, that of saying everything, whatever the cost--is the patient's great contribution to the work of the analysis. Here, to speak is a work. This surrender to whatever comes to mind implies a change in the patient's conscious attitude toward his illness and hence a different sort of attention and courage than is exercised in directed thinking.[5]

But the resistance not only involves a struggle on the part of the patient with his defenses and against the analyst for threatening those defenses, all of this involving much courage and trust by the patient, but it is tied in with that other manifestation of reluctance to be fundamentally changed, namely the transference. The resistances themselves actually help to locate the repressed impulses which are feeding it. Resistance and the repressed itself are closely related because among the reasons that the patient resists the cure is not only that it would involve a return of the pain of the repressed, but because he receives secondary gains from his disease, which, however much he is suffering, still seem too valuable to surrender in return for the questionable pain of dealing with the repressed, and doing so without the gains provided by the illness itself. Here the transference enters fully upon the scene as both an agent of the resistances and a means for overcoming them. Freud says of the transference that a treatment "only deserves the name [of a psychoanalysis] if the intensity of the transference has been utilized for the overcoming of resistances."[6]

Just as it is in the resistance that the other is required for overcoming its power to block the cure, so the transference is manifested in the working through of the patient's characteristic way of dealing with the other, from incorporation at the beginning of treatment to the acknowledgement of the otherness of the analyst at its completion. At the point of being able to accept the fact that the analyst is implacably other than himself the patient may be said to be cured. What takes place, according to Lacan, is a "passage from the 'empty words' of an Imaginary discourse to the 'full words' of a Symbolic discourse in which the analyst himself is equally and entirely involved."[7]

The problematic of the transference is that it "emerges both as a means of overcoming the early resistance that contributed to the illness and as a new resistance--as Freud says, the most powerful resistance to the treatment."[8] Moreover, one of the original goals of analytic treatment, apart from catharsis of the forgotten impulse, is to remember it. It came to be thought that remembering, as such, was less important than recognizing the resistances. Even more important, however, came the discovery that, instead of remembering, the patient tends more often to repeat the past, acting it out without knowing that that is what he is doing. The core of the treatment, then, is the sequence: resistance, transference, repetition. "Thus the fight against the resistances, the handling of the transference, and the recourse to repetition form the main constellation of the analytic technique; its tactic consists in using the transference to curb the patient's compulsion to repeat in order to lead him back along the paths of remembering."[9] Freud himself goes on to say:

> The main instrument, however, for curbing the patient's compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for remembering

> lies in the handling of the transference. We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a given field. We admit it into the transference as a playground in which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts that is hidden in the patient's mind . . . . The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and real life through which the transition from one to the other is made.[10]

The significance of the transference, then, particularly in its relationship to resistance is that the former involves a relentless acting out of his disease, itself a problem in relationships, upon the relationship with the analyst, all the while resisting the explicit goal of remembering. In effect, the transference testifies to the fact that, however much the patient seeks to forget or repress, a largely ideational exercise after all, in his actions he betrays his repressions with his every move. The transference is the compulsion to repeat the significant relationships of one's childhood in one's relationships with significant persons. Thus, the neurosis is acted out where it is not remembered, and it is acted out in the analytic relationship, the more so as the relationship frustrates the attempts of the patient to derive customary satisfaction from acceding to the desire of this parent-surrogate.

Since a sympton may be said to be a way of pursuing satisfaction, the greater the satisfaction experienced by the patient, the less the urgency for cure. After all it is his sufferings alone that impel him to seek an end to his neurotic way of seeking satisfaction. It is the failure of the customary tactic of substitute gratification that "sustains the instinctual force impelling the patient toward recovery . . . . Thus the analyst's work, which we described at first as a struggle against the resistances is now seen as a struggle against substitute satisfactions--precisely in the transference where the patient is particularly looking for such satisfaction."[11]

The transference, then, becomes the paradigm, indeed the stage, for the patient's growth from neurosis to freedom. The neurotic pattern is governed by the bondage of the person to his childhood as a consequence of which he acts under the compulsion to repeat his childhood relationships relentlessly. Such patterns are self-defeating and he suffers as a result, yet their goal remains the tension-reduction that is supposedly to result from conforming to the desire of the all-powerful parent.

The greater the frustration that results from the patient's inability to elicit the same kind of support that he customarily obtained from his parents through conforming to their desires, the greater becomes the tendency to regard the analyst with the same life and death sense of power over him as the parents had. At this point the transference consolidates the resistance and the resistance feeds the transference. Freud admits that "it remains a mystery why in analysis the transference provides the strongest *resistance* to the cure, whereas in other forms of treatment we recognize it as the vehicle of the healing process, the necessary condition for success."[12] Whenever, Freud goes on, a pathogenic complex enters consciousness, whether in symbolic, symptomatic or remembered form, the transference enters upon the scene. Anything in the content of the complex which can be appropriately transferred to the analyst, by virtue of the power he has vis-à-vis the patient, is transferred. That is to say, if the analyst is able to facilitate the expression or the memory of some previously repressed material, adjacent repressions are also liable to be loosened, which, however, not having been "ready" for expression, are resisted by the ego defenses. "Over and over again," says Freud, "when one draws near to a pathogenic complex, that part of it which is first thrust forward into consciousness will be some aspect of it which can be transferred; having been so, it will then be defended with the utmost obstinacy by the patient."[13]

The battle that is being fought here is that between the incorporated other of the threatening parent, and the steadfast otherness of the analyst. That part of the person that has been negated through repression is encouraged to return to consciousness by the nonpunitive recognition of the analyst whose function it is to thus subvert the repressive forces. In turn other negated impulses seek expression in the face of such permission, but the incorporated or alien other is still able to make the patient anxious enough for his ego to deny expression even in the face of the analyst's implicit permission. The skill of the analyst makes it more and more difficult for repressed material to use distortion as its means of simultaneously hiding and revealing itself. Yet such remains the power of the incorporated other which is the ego that the anti-authority of the analytic other must be resisted in some other way; so a new and even more powerful means of distortion or resistance must be found. That distortion is performed by transference.

The convergence of the transference and the resistance are, of course, not merely a diabolical trick played by the ego to maintain its repressions. By virtue of his receptiveness and nonpunitiveness in listening without disapproval to the patient's secrets, and by merely taking him seriously as a person the analyst elicits intense positive feelings from the patient. Long before he has entered the realm of repressed memories the analyst has had bestowed upon him the image of the "good parent," not just because he necessarily resembles the good qualities of the patient's parents, he may do that too; even more powerful is the patient's libidinal attraction to the analyst as the fulfilment of his fantasies of the ideal parent. It is only when the analyst does begin the serious work of undermining the boundaries of the ego itself that the resistance and the transference converge and the image of the analyst in his "parental" role begins to blur. On one hand, the analyst encourages confession yet does not condemn, but, on the other, the punitive parent who resides at the boundaries of the ego, incorporated in the ego defenses, does condemn. The patient's confusion is redoubled by his desire that the analyst as transferred parent return the patient's love. Freud puts the dilemma well:

> It is surely clear enough that it must become peculiarly difficult to own up to any particular reprehended wish when the confession must be made to the very person with whom that feeling is most concerned. To proceed at all in such situations as this necessity produces would appear hardly possible in real life. This impossibility is precisely what the patient is aiming at when he merges the physician with the object of his emotions.[14]

Freud conceptualizes this dilemma by breaking it down into a 'positive' and the 'negative' transference. This is a particularly important distinction for the interpretation of Freud that is being attempted in the present work, for it concerns the work of Eros, which in this case Freud refers to as the sexual instincts:

> Positive transference can then be divided further into such friendly or affectionate feelings as are capable of becoming conscious and the extensions of these in the unconscious. Of these last, analysis shows that they invariably rest ultimately on an erotic basis; so that we have to conclude that all the feelings of sympathy, friendship, trust and so forth which we expend in life are

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> genetically connected with sexuality and have developed out of purely sexual desires by an enfeebling of their sexual aim, however pure and non-sensual they may appear in the forms they take on to our conscious self-perception. To begin with we knew none but sexual objects; psycho-analysis shows us that those persons whom in real life we merely respect or are fond of may be sexual objects to us in our unconscious minds still. So the answer to the riddle is this, that the transference to the physician is only suited for resistance in so far as it consists in *negative* feeling or in the repressed *erotic* elements of positive feeling.[15]

Outside the two elements mentioned by Freud which occasion the emergence of resistance, the conscious and innocuous material discussed continues to elicit the kind of positive transference that furthers the success of psychoanalysis as it does in other remedial methods. In the boundary areas, however, where erotic and other unacceptable impulses are encouraged by the very person who now stands in the place of the forbidding parent, whose offer of love was conditional upon the repudiation of such desire, the emergent feeling toward the analyst is characterized by its pronounced ambivalence; the analyst is both god and devil in the same person. Yet it is such uncertain sensations as ambivalence that the neurotic solution sought to by-pass in the first place. It was the patient's original uncertainty about the possibility of being loved and united with the same person whose punishment or separation were so terrifying to him, that led to the solution of disowning the offending impulses in the first place.

The entire issue must be fought anew in all its uncertainty and ambivalency, and the anxiety that these sensations elicit, though once banished, must be encountered with all its original intensity. Small wonder, then, that the person who has placed the patient in the position where he is confronted with the source of his original anxiety is regarded negatively, at the very same time that he is regarded erotically and therefore positively. In a word, it is the same ambivalence that he felt toward his parents, made, however, the worse because the parents, at least, were not overtly on the side of the forbidden impulses. The ambivalence is even further intensified by the insistence on the part of the analyst that subject matter of such emotional intensity be dealt with within the rational and formal confines of the treatment procedure.

The entire neurosis, which is the way the patient has originally resolved how to deal with the otherness of the desired object, is crystallized into the transference situation. Freud expresses it as follows:

> The struggle between physician and patient, between intellect and the forces of instinct, between recognition and the striving for discharge, is fought out almost entirely over the transference-manifestations. This is the ground on which the victory must be won, the final expression of which is lasting recovery from the neurosis.[16]

But if the neurosis is placed in relief by the transference-resistance, so is the most effective possible basis for working on the cure made present by that very fact. Freud tells us that: "The past is the patient's armoury out of which he fetches his weapons for defending himself against the progress of the analysis, weapons which we must wrest from him one by one."[17] If anything the analysis heightens the neurosis because it is a skilled and systematic attack on not only the sources of anxiety but the means fiercely established to protect the patient from what appeared then to be threats to his very existence. Thus the patient: "reproduces everything in the reservoirs of repressed material that has already permeated his general character--his inhibitions and disadvantageous attitudes of mind, his pathological traits of character. He also repeats during the treatment all his symptoms."[18] This turn of events is both a source of pain and of relief to the patient. It is painful because he is, in effect, fighting for the very terms of his existence, that which, to him, makes it tolerable, against someone who seems perversely intent upon nothing so much as making him suffer anew. It is also a source of some relief. "We render it harmless," says Freud, "and even make use of it, by according it the right to assert itself within certain limits. We admit it into the transference as to a playground, in which it is allowed to let itself go in almost complete freedom and is required to display before us all the pathogenic impulses hidden in the depths of the patient's mind."[19] This freedom in itself robs the resistance of some of its power over the patient, and at the same time gives him a platform where he does not have to fight himself. More importantly, there before the very eyes of both analyst and patient in their relationship with one another, is the problem that must be dealt with. It reveals, too, that the problem was originally, and continues to be one of disordered relationships. This perpetual immediacy that the transference-resistance gives to the neurosis by no means eases the treatment or diminishes the resistance. The analyst, it is true, is able to refer the way the patient reacts to him back to the original relationship, particularly to the extent that a positive transference also exists. Indeed the latter is the major ingredient necessary for such disarming of the neurosis by making of the compulsion to repeat a series of recollections. Yet the very transference-love that makes the latter possible also works against it. The patient who desires the love of the analyst is reluctant indeed to acknowledge

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that what are experienced as genuine feelings of love are merely a neurotic reproduction of an infantile way of assuring the love of the parent. Moreover, this feeling of love for the analyst, and its protestations of sincerity, consolidate the resistance against the repressed material, on one hand, by the very intensity of the feeling involved, allowing the patient to dismiss suggestions that minimize their authenticity, and, on the other, by the satisfaction that seeks to be perpetuated through the relationship, to seek to maintain the repressed way of pursuing love.

It is at this point that the repressed way of obtaining love is most supremely tested and where it must be overcome. At the point at which the patient as an infant discovered that his parent's love was conditional upon his withholding certain impulses he began to respond in ways that seemed likely to retain the love of the parent. In effect, then, he purchased their love, and his own life, by relegating certain parts of himself to the death which would await him were he to persist in behavior that seemed to provoke the parents into withdrawing from him. He could best guarantee the continued love of the parents by regulating himself automatically, so to speak, to remove all risk of acting in those ways that threatened his loss of their support.

The most effective way of always having the right response would be to be as much like the parent as possible. He must therefore mirror them in every way, or, to use another metaphor, incorporate them into himself. He must make their desires his desires, and deny himself to the extent of denying that he could ever have desires of his own that were unacceptable to his parents. It is an abortive solution because mere repression from memory does not eliminate a desire (nor perhaps is it supposed to, but that is another question), it merely places it outside the area of personal responsibility, so that the subject will not be blamed and punished for it. In the meantime the repressed desire continues to seek expression through ways that will not be recognized either by the parent, or by the incorporated eye of the parent within. This ego, or defensive armorplate, Lacan's false self, henceforth regulates the behavior of the subject, and has its own litmus test to apply in all cases affecting himself and his relationships with others. They are measured and accepted to the extent that they do not offend the sensitive incorporated other within the self that makes up the ego.

The mode of pure desire has prevailed. The other, once the object-choice of the subject, has been retained, in Freud's words by being made a narcissistic object-choice--no longer an object outside the subject. In other words, the object has been incorporated into the subject, and, as pure desire is wont, seeks the cancellation of the other for its own satisfaction. Its satisfaction is obtained by taking the desired other into itself, for it needs the other in some form to be at all satisfied. The struggle of desire with desire in this instance has been resolved by making the desire of the other the desire of the self, meanwhile denying, though not forsaking the original desire.

It is this mode that is put to the supreme test during analysis. The transference is its fullest manifestation and the final struggle to retain its continuing mode, that of pure desire, which negates the otherness of the loved object in order to possess it. If the analyst can be possessed in this customary manner then pure desire has won its greatest victory against the highest odds. The power of the analyst to defeat the repressive forces has been routed and the neurosis has been consolidated. The analyst must, at this time, remain implacably himself, other than the patient, yet in the name of the very Eros that is so enticing to the patient, which elicits from him or her, the full intensity of the desire of the sexual instinct.

Ironically, the transference-love represents both the negative of the other in the mode of pure desire, and the surrender to the other by which the subject makes the desire of other his own desire. The analyst encounters the patient in a way that makes such a compromise impossible. In the first place, he does not desire the patient. That is how he differs irremediably from the parents of the patient. The latter has had to repress himself in order, as he believes, to survive in the face of the desire of the parents.

The analyst, however, confronts him as an other so implacable that he will neither impose his desire on the patient nor be negated by the patient's aggression. The desire of the patient is forced to encounter the desire of the analyst, not to impose his desire on the patient, but simply to remain himself. He cannot be incorporated in the sense that the patient cannot make the desire of the analyst his own, since the desire of the analyst is only to be himself. Furthermore, the analyst cannot be fitted into the image of the incorporated parent which is the shape that the patient imposes upon those whose desire he would incorporate, for the analyst invites the very repressions that the parent image represses in the first place, thereby making any correspondence impossible. To incorporate the analyst is to shatter the

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mode of incorporation and of pure desire in the first place, for it is to incorporate one who sides with the repressions. Thus, the patient is faced with the choice of incorporating into his desire an other who sides with the repressions, or else of allowing the analyst to remain himself--other than the patient. Since the analyst does not fit any regular mode of behavior, however, he cannot be fitted into the automaticity of the ego defenses in the first place. There remains, then, really only one choice, if the patient remains in the inherently frustrating analytic situation that is. As soon as he allows the all-important, all-powerful analyst to remain himself the abortive self is undone. It comes to be discovered that the confirmation of Eros does not necessitate the negation of the otherness of the object-choice.

The analyst allows the patient to be himself while he in turn remains himself. This has the effect of demonstrating to the patient in the most graphic way possible that object-cathexis does not have to become narcissistic-cathexis. It is possible for Eros to attach itself to an object outside itself, to find satisfaction from that object without the necessity of negating the otherness of the object through incorporation. Yet it is not necessarily a purely libidinal satisfaction that is derived from the other. This is what is discovered as the outcome of the struggle that has taken place between the pure desire of the patient and the steadfast otherness of the analyst. The outcome of this struggle is something that is even more precious to the patient than libidinal satisfaction, namely recognition of his own otherness and the freedom it bestows.

The patient was denied recognition as an infant when his desire met the more powerful desire of the parent and gave way by making that desire his own. At the point at which the two desires were forced to converge in this manner the separate selfhood of the patient was denied. He was forced to relinquish his desire so that the desire of the parent might prevail. Thus, for the parent the mode of pure desire was allowed to prevail and the desire of the infant was negated. In each case, then, as desire met desire each remained in the mode of pure desire seeking to negate that in the other which he could not tolerate. The parent sought a mirror image of himself in the child, while the child, in turn, sought to become a mirror of the parent, the better, not only to ward off his own anxiety but to guarantee that he would henceforth please the parent.

Though such a process invariably occurs in human relationships, and is the means by which repression begins, it need not happen, and perhaps does not always happen to the extreme degree. What could, at least in the ideal state, happen is what is attempted in the analytic relationship. Just as the analyst refrains from imposing his desire on the patient and resists all his attempts to incorporate him, thereby allowing the patient to come to terms with an object-choice in its steadfast otherness, so the parent does not *have* to impose his otherness on the infant. Of course such a situation is entirely hypothetical because the imposition of desire is a direct function of repression in the parent. The parent imposes his desire on the infant because his own repressions are threatened by their expression in his child. In the ideal state, then, toward which there may be varying degrees of approximation in reality, were the parent to respect the otherness of the infant and refrain from imposing his desire upon him, then the infant would not feel the need to resort to the extreme recourse of deferring to the parent through self-negation.

In turn, the infant, not needing to incorporate the parental object into himself, could allow the object-choice to remain in its otherness. By virtue of the recognition bestowed on the infant by the non-imposing parent the infant would be able to be confident enough of the presence and support of the parent love-object that he would not have to have object-cathexis become narcissistic-cathexis. In other words, this process, which Freud sees as the invariable basis by which identification takes place, is, in reality, a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the anxious child. It is not a necessity of the relationship *per se* even if it does happen invariably in fact.

If it is purely a hypothetical event of what use is it? Even if it is one pole of two opposites that is never fully reached, such an ideal model has the effect of creating a continuum along which the development of selfhood can be shown to take place. Who will deny that there are varying degrees of defensiveness and self-imposition among parents in relation to their children? Such a model, more importantly offers a theoretically consistent way out of the solipsism of the Freudian understanding of the personality. It shows us that object-cathexes do not in the nature of things have to become narcissistic-cathexes which thereby negate the importance of the object once it has served its initial purpose. The object of desire can still remain other than the subject and continue to satisfy the subject. Desexualization of the object may even take place as would occur when desire met desire, and in the struggle for recognition that took place the pure desire of the libido yielded in recognition of the desire of the other. Yet in that mutual recognition whereby pure desire is educated concerning the right of the other to remain himself and not merely an object of pure desire, something more precious than pure desire-gratification would have taken place and been granted, namely the realization of an emerging self that he, too, had been recognized in the mystery and freedom of his otherness.

Freud could not offer anything better as an outcome of the subject's encounter with the reality outside himself than the futility of the retention of pure libidinal desire. All such desire would eventually have to be modified and all that one would get out of its modification was better terms with reality, a little less stress in one's life. Freud, for the most part, described life as it is for most people. Once the choice is made to deal with the other by incorporation and the negation of his otherness, then the other who is thereby made a part of self-sufficient ego no longer remains in the place from whence alone he can, in that mutual struggle of desire meeting desire, grant recognition to the other that he has met, on any other terms than that of parent to child.

Does not our alternative interpretation do scant justice to Freud, the supreme skeptic and realist? Yet it is from Freud himself that such an extension of the personality theory was obtained. The quasi-Hegelian language of pure desire, desire meeting desire, and the struggle for recognition should not blind us to the fact that what is being described is the analytic treatment process extended back into the original development of the personality. When the analyst declines to be incorporated into the desire of the patient what ensues in the transference relationship is a struggle reminiscent of nothing so much as the struggle for recognition. Indeed what is any kind of struggle between two people where each has a desire? The patient seeks love and the analyst seeks to be himself in his willingness to recognize the patient. Ricoeur expresses this process as follows:

> The entire analytic relation can be reinterpreted as a dialectic of consciousness, rising from life to self-consciousness, from the satisfaction of desire to the recognition of the other consciousness. As the decisive episode of the transference teaches us, insight or the process of becoming conscious not only entails another consciousness, the analyst's, but contains a struggle reminiscent of the struggle for recognition. . . . One of the signs that the analysis is ended is precisely the attainment of the equality of the two consciousnesses, when the truth in the analyst has become the truth of the sick consciousness. Then the patient is no longer alienated, no longer another: he has become a self, he has become himself. . . . A desire or wish, in the Freudian sense, is never a mere vital impulse, for it is from the very beginning set within an intersubjective situation. Hence we can say that all the dramas psychoanalysis discovers are located on the path that leads from 'satisfaction' to 'recognition.'[20]

Here is Freud on the same subject:

> And yet the analyst is absolutely debarred from giving way. However highly he may prize love, he must prize even more highly the opportunity to help his patient over a decisive moment in her life. She has to learn from him to overcome the pleasure-principle, to give up a gratification which lies to hand but is not sanctioned by the world she lives in, in favour of a distant and perhaps altogether doubtful one, which is, however, socially and psychologically unimpeachable. To achieve this mastery of herself she must be taken through the primordial era of her mental development and in this way reach that greater freedom within the mind which distinguishes conscious mental activity--in the systematic sense--from unconscious.[21]

If the transference is such a powerful vehicle, not only for curing the neurosis, but, as such, a means for what might be called the "education of desire" in which desire meets desire, relinquishing the totality of its claim, but gaining something more needful as a result, then it surely does not stand completely outside of the rest of life. Its traces must occur elsewhere, and analysis must be understood, not as some kind of new *deus ex machina* for the injured psyche, but as making up for a missed opportunity. What happens in analysis, in other words, must be said to be something that ought to have happened originally. It is something of a marvel that Freud himself apparently never saw this; certainly he did not incorporate its implications into his personality theory. Nonetheless, they are there for all to see, and they are the basis upon which we may not only take the psyche out of its defensive isolation, but the basis too through which we may see how Eros operates in life.

Are we not suggesting, however, that Eros is something else than the pure desire of the libido, and if so is this not a contradiction? Eros, after all, is only another name, albeit with broader functions, than the libido of the sexual instinct. Yet Freud's use of Eros brings in the wide range of relationships to others of the same species than did the earlier version of the sexual instinct and its source in libido. Our re-interpretation of Freud is saying, however, that, in the meeting of desire with desire, with certain exceptions, the desire of each person involved must be modified, or in Freud's term, desexualized, at least in terms of total gratification of desire. We have said more than once, too, that out of that struggle may come a prize that is more necessary for one's social well-being than the gratification of desire, and that is recognition of one's selfhood by the other. In the failure of the encounter of desire with desire to yield recognition, because each desire refuses to yield itself, the mode of desire remains through incorporation of the desire of the other; yet it is a desire that cannot be gratified. By incorporating the desire of the other and making it one's own, what happens is that the struggle of desire with desire is transferred within the subject where it continues to collide with the desire of the subject in the first place. In this mode of self-division we have what the Freudian theory of motivation is describing as normative.

The mode of pure desire is represented by the always unregenerate id which, to insure its own survival, incorporates part of the outside world into itself in the form, first of the all-powerful parents, then of other portions of reality which provide for the organism a regulated way of interpreting the world that it must satisfy itself in, as best it can. It is, from the start, however, an adjustment that involves pure self-division. The pure desire of the id forever pushes at the boundaries of the desire of the incorporated others that make up the superego and the ego. The clash of desires is made the worse by the fact that the internalized struggle is but the continuation of an originally external struggle that was characterized by two desires that would not yield to each other. The subject responds to the frustration of this struggle wherein his desire cannot be satisfied by incorporating the object that he cannot have because it will not yield itself to him. Here is Freud's familiar description of the same process:

> This transformation of an erotic object-choice into a modification of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it--at the cost, it is true, of acquiescing to a large extent in the id's experiences. When the ego assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, 'Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me.'[22]

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The solution cannot be a happy one for it is no solution at all. It is conceived in anxiety and executed in desperation. It must have the object which threatens to abandon the subject, at all costs, and it must have him in a way that guarantees that he will forever possess the object. How better to insure that than by making the object part of the self, in the form of the ego, and so be protected against the wiles and uncertainties of a world that unpredictably gratifies then denies one's desires? It is, however, the same capricious, unyielding, threatening object-choice, once incorporated, as it was when it stood outside the subject. The only satisfaction that such a solution offers is that it does provide for the subject an automatic regulative device that constantly informs him of what kind of reality he must contend with if he is to survive and obtain any gratification at all. Furthermore, he does so by gratifying his own desire (the id), with his own ego through its mirrored resemblance to the original object-choice, and satisfies the all-powerful desire of the parents by making their desires his own. But he winds up himself, as the price for this solution, with at least two sets of warring desires within his own breast.

If the realm of pure desire which becomes the state of division of the clashing desires deals with the Erotic relation with the other by negating its otherness, withdrawing into isolation in order to possess the other, then this would suggest that the subject has placed himself in bondage to the death instinct. Repression or self-negation, and the incorporation of the other are inseparable in the sense that one is simply the reverse side of the other. Self-negation, moreover, as we have mentioned earlier, involves the repression of the death instinct.

But the very resort to a method of dealing with the other that involves his negation as other in order to satisfy the desire of the subject represents a kind of abandonment of Eros, in the sense in which Ricoeur views Freud's understanding of Eros as irreducibly involving the other, death on the other hand being the result of isolation.[23] The irony of this outcome is that the subject's choice is made in order to pursue life not death, and it is also an effort, not to forsake the other but to possess him securely. But it is only by his separateness from the other that Eros can truly be satisfied in the other. A substitute gratification may well be obtained as the libido is persuaded to be satisfied by the resemblance of its own ego to the desired object.[24] It is, however greatly diminished satisfaction, just as masturbation may do as a substitute, even though the act itself is a reminder that the real object of satisfaction is absent.

To the extent that libidinal satisfaction is not obtained, there must be a certain diminishment in the strength of the life instinct, and, at the same time, a corresponding strengthening of the death instinct within the economics of the libido. In order for the subject to prevail under these circumstances the actions of the ego must be sufficiently in keeping with the desires of the incorporated parents as to please the subject's libido. Any failure to do so leads both to the criticism of the superego and to the withdrawal of libido from the ego. Both of these internal reactions weaken the life process, for under such circumstances the superego represents, in Freud's words "a pure culture of the death instinct,"[25] and the withdrawal of libido represents a weakening of the life instinct. Such a state of affairs "often enough succeeds in driving the ego into death, if the latter does not protect itself from the tyrant in time by a revulsion into mania."[26] Once the choice of self-sufficiency, which incorporation of the other represents, is made then the subject finds himself under more intense pressure and tension than ever before, in spite of his manifest preference for a state of affairs that seeks tension-reduction, for he must always be satisfying the warring desires that reside within him. The more intense those inner pressures become, furthermore, the more intolerant the organism becomes of the life process and all the tensions that 'flesh is heir to,' and the greater becomes repressed, and therefore automatic, drive toward death.

The mode of desire incorporating desire, then, is unmistakably and inevitably the way that leads to the subjection of the person to the death instinct, in spite of his conscious and rather desperate choice to the contrary. Only as the other is allowed the mystery and freedom of his otherness is Eros strengthened, for Eros must have the other. Only the other as separate from the self is in a position to support, recognize and give pleasure to the self. The separation of the other, however, involves the risk that, in his freedom, the other may choose not to remain with the subject in the relationship. This is a frightening prospect, but one that there is no way of disallowing if the object-choice is granted his otherness. Only a self that is willing to die and willing to accept the possibility of his separateness can tolerate that freedom and uncertainty. Thus only as the death instinct remains unrepressed, so that the willingness to be separate and to accept death is consciously present for the self, can the conditions under which Eros

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can be satisfied be present, as well.

The analytic relationship is the Freudian paradigm of the acceptance of this dilemma. The outcome of analysis is the acceptance of the otherness of the analyst who refuses to gratify the pure desire of the patient. Were he to do so the forces of Eros would be set to flight and those of the death instinct would have had their greatest victory, for the greater wisdom and safety of the mode of pure desire would have been proven. His refusal to gratify the desire of the patient forces the latter to modify his desire; but what does he obtain in return for that sacrifice? He is shown graphic evidence that it is possible for someone to remain other than himself, yet also remain trustworthy and confirming of the whole person, with all those impulses that those whom he has incorporated in the past have rejected. The one who was so perverse as to encourage the acknowledgement of those supposedly dangerous impulses, who seemed to side with the urges that threaten the very death of the patient, is the same one who, by his otherness gives him the possibility of a better, freer life than that obtainable through the deceptive security of pure desire.

The education of desire that takes place during the analytic relationship, indeed in any authentic, confirming relationship with another, places the reality principle in a new light. For Freud the reality-principle was purely a function of man's having to come to terms with *Ananke*--necessity. Certain rewards accompanied the compliance with the inescapable demands that reality imposed, but, at best these rewards came in the form of desexualized satisfaction, sublimations, and the life. Since such rewards were desexualized there could be no bodily

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satisfaction in them, only what later came to be known as ego rewards. If the other is able to regain the importance that he had before the ego was formed in the first place then, if he is not able to provide libidinal satisfaction, he will still be able to bestow recognition.

The Freudian system has, as its greatest single limitation, its inability to consider that there can be any meaningful satisfaction than the bodily pleasure that the gratified libido experiences. The Freudian utopians--Marcuse and Brown, and their forebear, Wilhelm Reich--have made Herculean attempts to show that all genuine satisfaction must proceed from the body or else it is a flight from death--and from life. Both Marcuse and Brown, however, sacrifice the other, with apparent unwittingness--one must give them that--in order to argue that the body remains the only seat of genuine satisfaction. The way of purely bodily satisfaction remains, however, the mode of pure desire to the extent that it is unmodified by the consideration of the desire of the other. Out of that encounter it may be found necessary to allow the source of satisfaction to proceed from the realm of primary instinctual satisfaction to that experienced in the pleasure of the relationship itself. Brown, in particular, would free the body from the tyranny of those orifices that mark the psychosexual stages: the mouth, the anus, and the penis. According to him the reason these areas become the focus of developmental crises has to do with the fact that they represent points at which the mother in particular separates herself from the infant, thus arousing the anxiety of loss and death. Brown suggests that:

> One effect of the incapacity to accept separation, individuality, and death is to erotize death--to activate a morbid wish to die, a

> wish to regress to the prenatal state before life (and separation) began, to the mother's womb. Freud analyzed the castration complex as the fear of losing one instrument for reuniting with (a substitute for) the mother's womb. The implication is not only that the morbid or regressive death wish underlies the Oedipal project in infancy, but also that it underlies the adult genital arrangements which fall heir to the destruction of the Oedipus complex--the human family and the genital organization of the human body . . . . In human beings at any rate, the special concentration of libido in the genital region, in the infantile phallic phase and in the adult genital organization, is engineered by the regressive death instinct, and represents the residue of the human incapacity to accept death, separation, and individuality . . . the earlier phases of infantile sexuality, the oral and anal, are also dominated by the same regressive trend. The special concentration of libido in the mouth in earliest infancy, the hypercathexis of the act of suckling, results from the inability to accept separation from the mother and is sustained by fantasies of uterine regression. The anal stage . . . involves symbolic manipulation of feces as a magic instrument for restoring communion with the mother. Altogether, therefore, the sexual organizations, pregenital as well as genital, appear to be constructed by anxiety, by the flight from death and the wish to die; the distribution of libido in a life not a war with death is polymorphous perversity.[27]

The anxiety of separation is what occasions the resort to repression in the first place. If man were not repressed, however, he would once again have access to his entire body and the pleasure that it would give him, rather than deriving his bodily pleasures from displacements and projections of repressed desires emanating from the pregenital zones and from, as he believes, the one organ of supreme pleasure, the genitals. If he were thus free, also, he would not be restricted in what he sought as sources of pleasure in the world to objects that satisfied his repressed pregenital wishes on one hand, and the all-consuming genital goal, on the other. The whole body instead would be free to enjoy and unite with the whole world.

Brown does not understand the problem posed by the freedom of the other to remain himself. He notes that, in the Freudian system, identification is modeled after the desire for union through incorporation of the object, following the model of the relation of the child to his mother's breast. He notes as well that "incorporation of the object is [likewise] the aim of normal adult loving, i.e., of object-choice. Thus the distinction between object-choice and identification breaks down, both of them meeting in a project of incorporation or being-one-with-the-world, modeled on the primal relation of the child to the mother's breast."[28] Eros, says Brown, is satisfied by union with objects outside the self, and narcissistic love at the same time. How, he asks, is this possible? His conclusion is that:

> The abstract antinomy of Self and Other in love can be overcome if we return to the concrete reality of pleasure and to the fundamental definition of sexuality as the pleasurable activity of the body, and think of loving as the relation of the ego to its sources of pleasure. Narcissistic love is fundamentally a desire for pleasurable activity of one's own body. Our problem then is: How does the desire for pleasurable activity of one's own body lead to other bodies?[29]

Brown suggests that the ego of the infant initially begins to develop according to an unreal sense of reality, his mother, or, in other words, love and pleasure; "infantile sexuality affirms the union of the self with a whole world of love and pleasure."[30] The infant develops a pure pleasure-ego rather than a reality-ego. As such it brings into identity with itself its sources of pleasure: its world, its mother. This early experience of union of the self with a world of love and pleasure is the preparation for all subsequent human love, and later on when an object is determined to be pleasurable it becomes not only loved but incorporated into the ego. "Thus," says Brown, "the human libido is essentially narcissistic, but it seeks a world to love as it loves itself."[31] This primal narcissism in which the infant is unable to distinguish between the self and the world of pleasure it loves is continually sought for in the development of the ego. In Brown's words: "In primal narcissism the self is at one with a world of love and pleasure; hence the ultimate aim of the human ego is to reinstate what Freud calls 'limitless narcissism' and find itself once more at one with the whole world in love and pleasure."[32]

The enjoyment of the world as of oneself keeps the self and its relation to the other well-rooted in the body, and Brown draws upon Spinoza's words for support: "'If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power of thought.'"[33] Finally, Brown concludes:

> Hence the expansion of the self, in which human perfection consists, is at the same time the expansion of the active life of the human body, unifying our body with other bodies in the world in active interaction . . . [yet] the endeavor to acquire 'a body which is fitted for many things' is the endeavor to recover the body of infancy. Spinoza's 'body fitted for many things' is structurally identical with the polymorphously perverse body of infantile sexuality in Freud, the body delighting in the activity of all of its organs.[34]

Brown's attempt to solve the problem of the self and the other in Freud is defeated the moment he accepts Freud's understanding of identification as the normative one, instead of realizing that incorporation is the mode of the repressed death instinct and not of Eros, though Eros, it might be said, tries to live with it. This restricts Brown to a definition of the relationship to the other that offers the subject unmodified primary instinctual gratification. There is no place for the frustrations and surrenders that must be involved in any struggle with the other for recognition, that is to say, in the meeting of desire with desire. That Brown steadfastly holds to the infant as his model toward which the human pursuit of perfection ought to strive demonstrates that his solution remains rooted in the mode of pure desire, where nothing disagreeable impinges itself upon the pure pleasure state of his fully gratified and indulged infant. Notwithstanding that ten minutes with any live infant ought assuredly to disabuse anyone of such sentimental myths concerning the bliss of infancy, even were it approximately true that the infant has times of instinctual gratification it is because of a human other that he is made to feel that way. Further encounters with that loving other, however loving she may continue to be, will involve a struggle of her desire with the infant's. Many things, pleasant and unpleasant will come out of that struggle, and others like it, but one thing will have to be surrendered, and that is a manner of living that involves total dependency upon the love and continuous support of another who meets one's every need.

Out of such struggles and such surrenders, however, there does not need to come merely a grim abandonment of instinctual gratification accompanied by efforts to eke out as close an approximation to such pleasure as the world will allow. The abandonment of the infant state of pure desire is made possible by the process of the education of desire, in which the infant discovers as he grows into childhood and beyond that there are also others in the world who have desires, and all of these impinge upon one another. Yet this need not be cause for mourning the lost pleasure of infancy. To the extent that the meeting of desires is undertaken in the acknowledgement of the otherness of those

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whose desires impinge upon his own, then out of that understanding may come the recognition that provides an intrinsic satisfaction of its own. This kind of satisfaction fills in the missing piece in the Freudian puzzle and provides, at the same time, a middle ground between the grim and discontented realism of unreconstructed Freudian man, on one hand, and the narcissistic utopias of Brown and Marcuse, on the other.

Civilization does not have only the choice of a truce between the discontented individual and imperious society, and utopia. Freud is a dangerous guide whether he is followed obediently or whether he is transformed, for in rooting all human satisfaction only in the body, then civilization is only able to satisfy man to the extent that it can offer him either a few institutionalized forms of direct gratification, as in marriage and possibly the granting of some modifications of the strictness of that limitation, or through the sublimations of culture. Given Freud's restriction to the body as the sole source of satisfaction, however tenuous the link sometimes, civilized life can offer nothing intrinsically satisfying of its own, except for the negative satisfactions of security and safety. This is why those utopian thinkers who come to Freud from Rousseau by way of Marx, as Reich, Brown, and Marcuse all have, find him to be such an unsuspecting ally in spite of Freud's own cultural conservatism. For Freud, as with them, civilization frustrates, and only infancy offered unalloyed pleasure. Freud, after all, once defined happiness as the "subsequent fulfillment of a prehistoric wish. That is why wealth brings so little happiness: money was not a wish in childhood."[35] While Freud's answer was that one had really no choice but to acquiesce before the demands of civilization, in return for the secondary and negative satisfactions it offered, the 'utopian Freudians' conclude that it is possible to reach a stage of human life in which all desires can be gratified, a state that is reminiscent of infancy. Indeed one can hardly suppose that the Freudo-Marxists, as Reich called himself, have understood Marx at all in this respect. Surely the unmitigated gratification of desire would be viewed by Marx as some kind of typical individualistic bourgeoise fantasy. It is precisely social responsibility according to its widest definition that Marx seeks, to replace the narrow gratification of the desires of one sector of the population. Everyone having equal access to the resources of the society by no means guarantees each person gratifying his heart's desire. It more likely means the more or less equal modification of each person's desire, thereby putting an end to a state of virtually total gratification by some at the expense of little or none by most. China would seem to be, by this standard, the most truly Marxist society; it elevates personal sacrifice as the highest virtue, that the greater good of all might prevail.

If it is considered, however, that life with others not only inhibits and denies desire, but it offers a positive satisfaction that can be obtained only outside oneself in the relationship with another, then the return to infancy need not represent the only state wherein man may be happy. Nor need frustration and the denial of instinctual gratification be automatically considered at best regrettable but necessary, or at worst, a distortion of man from the perfection that would otherwise be forthcoming were he to have everything he desired. In fact, Marcuse goes so far as to insist that: "Order is freedom only if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of the individuals."[36]

The pursuit of pure desire, however, is the way of the repressed death instinct. We have argued this on the grounds that when one desire confronts another desire the solution in the mode of pure desire is to make the desire of the other one's own. What would happen if there were no such conflict between the desire of one and that of another and each desire was fully gratified? There would be no need to acknowledge the other in his separateness from the subject. The subject would indeed remain in a state of unquestioned oneness with the world, a state described by Freud when he said that "the ego-feeling we are aware of now is . . . only a shrunken residue of a far more extensive feeling--a feeling which embraced the universe and expressed an inseparable connection of the ego with the external world."[37] Is not such a state of primordial unity desirable? The original object-cathexis, however, is not based on a recognition of the independence of the object, but of its extension with the pleasure-ego, as Freud calls this earliest development. Freud writes:

> The objects presenting themselves, in so far as they are sources of pleasure, are absorbed by the ego into itself, 'introjected' . . . while, on the other hand, the ego thrusts forth upon the external world whatever within itself gives rise to pain [*v. infra:* the mechanism of projection].
>
> Thus the original *reality-ego*, which distinguished outer and inner by means of a sound objective criterion, changes into a purified *pleasure-ego*, which prizes above all else the quality of pleasure. For this pleasure-ego the outside world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is alien to it. A part of itself it has separated off, and this it projects into the external world and regards as hostile . . . .
>
> When the stage of primary narcissism is invaded by the object, the second contrary attitude to that of love, namely, hate, attains to development . . . . When the object becomes a source of

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> pleasurable feelings, a motor tendency is set up which strives to bring the object near to and incorporate it into the ego; we then speak of the 'attraction' exercised by the pleasure-giving object, and say that we 'love' that object. Conversely, when the object is the source of painful feelings, there is a tendency which endeavours to increase the distance between object and ego and to repeat in relation to the former the primordial attempt at flight from the external world with its flow of stimuli. We feel a 'repulsion' from the object, and hate it; this hate can then be intensified to the point of an aggressive tendency towards the object, with the tendency of destroying it.[38]

On the basis of what Freud says here it appears that the state of pure desire does not lead into narcissistic-cathexis as a consequence of the loss of the object. It is, instead, intrinsic to the state of pure desire to incorporate what gives it pleasure, to reject what causes it pain, and to negate any pain that persists by whatever means it has available. Thus, the state of pure desire is inclined to do just what Hegel says of the pure ego--comparable, in this instance, to Freud's pleasure-ego--in that, in Ricoeur's words which both concern and quote Hegel:

> . . . the pure ego is the naive self-consciousness that thinks it immediately attains itself in the suppression or sublation of the object, in the direct consumption of the object:
>
> > The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, *for which the differences are of no account;* . . . self-consciousness is *desire*. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it affirms this nothingness to be *for itself* the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as *true* certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in *objective form*.
>
> The pure ego says: I exist, for I experience satisfaction and in this satisfaction I see the disappearance and dissolution of that object whose solidity has been assured me by all the physics in the world.[39]

Were the state of pure desire to be ceaselessly gratified then pleasure would be its sole criterion for measuring the worth of the other, and hatred and aggression would be the fate of any object that failed to satisfy desire. Brown sees a state of affairs in which the infantile desire is not to consume the object and thereby negate it, but to become one with it in love. Would not such gratification of desire lead to its cessation? Marcuse says as much and uses Freud to justify such an assumption. He says:

> Is there perhaps a 'natural' self-restraint in Eros so that its genuine gratification would call for delay, detour, and arrest? Then there would be obstructions and limitations imposed not from outside, by a repressive reality principle, but set and accepted by the instinct itself because they have inherent libidinal value. Freud indeed suggested this notion. He thought that 'unrestrained sexual liberty from the beginning' results in lack of full satisfaction:
>
> > It is easy to show that the value the mind sets on erotic needs instantly sinks as soon as satisfaction becomes readily obtainable. Some obstacle is necessary to swell the tide of the libido to its height.
>
> Moreover, he considered the 'strange' possibility that 'something in the nature of the sexual instinct is unfavorable to the achievement of absolute gratification.[40]

Desire, however, is not merely a characteristic of isolated or successive impulses. It is a process that feeds on itself. If one desire is instantly gratified, then the next desire that arises will seek instant gratification, and the next and the next. Marcuse acknowledges that: "The ascendancy of the pleasure principle would thus engender antagonisms, pains, and frustrations--individual conflicts in the striving for gratification. But these conflicts would themselves have libidinal value: they would be permeated with the rationality of gratification. This *sensuous* rationality contains its own moral laws."[41] Marcuse, furthermore, bases his hypothesis of such a natural law of the instincts upon the assumption that once modern man acknowledges that he now lives in a world that has banished scarcity, or is shortly about to,

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then he will be able to arrange matters so that desire is no longer something that needs to be frustrated, but, since there will be enough for everyone, desires will be able to be gratified to an overwhelming degree.

Such assumptions concerning the nature of desire are based on the notion that desires are for objects, rather than on the realization that: "Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."[42] If this is indeed the case then it is a very large presumption to expect that the other who is the object of desire will always gratify that desire. Furthermore, when Freud suggested that there was something in the nature of desire that was unfavorable to its absolute gratification it seems more likely that he was referring to the blindness of desire. Desire, in this sense, can never really be content because no particular object can ever give it precisely what it wants. Be that as it may, Marcuse may, in fact, be correct to the extent that something wished for, attained, loses its hold over the person. There comes such a time, especially where it pertains to something of a specific nature that is wanted: a particular person or object. Marcuse does not understand the nature of unconscious desire, however, and this is the reason why the adult cannot easily be gratified by merely finding that there is enough of everything to go around. It is because he is no longer in a position to be aware of what he really desires, because the driving desire that makes him so restless and insatiable is an infantile desire. Thus, anything that he is given as an adult by way of gratifying his infant desire will not be satisfying, because that is not what he really wants, and, worst of all, he can no longer have what

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he continues to want: the possession of the mothering one. This is at the heart of the reason why the mode of pure desire and incorporation of the other is futile at its core. Though the desired object is reinstated in the ego, the substitution really fools no one, least of all the desire itself, which is for the mother, not merely an ego that mirrors her.

When Freud describes the id as containing "nothing corresponding to the idea of time, nor recognition of the passage of time, and . . . no alteration of mental processes by the passage of time"[43] what he may be describing is the fact that the mode of pure desire maintains itself. It first of all desires an object, then, in the face of uncertainty, incorporates that object and takes over its desire as well, so that desire is clashing with desire within the same person. As long, then, as the subject remains in the mode of pure desire for gaining his way in the world his desires remain, no matter how infantile their origin or how long ago. The only antidote to the persistence of desire is its surrender. This also fills in an empty piece in the Freudian personality puzzle and takes us out of its solipsism. The subject is only self-contained to the extent that he remains in the mode of pure desire, and only in that mode does his desire endure and remain insatiable--because he still wants the object, qua object, that he 'thought' he could as easily have by incorporation. Desire runs up against the problem that only the object, qua object, can truly satisfy. Moreover, what the object in its otherness really has to offer is not the gratification of desire but recognition, which, ironically, is the only thing that would actually satisfy the infant in the first place. He wants his mother to be always there with her love and protection. The only thing that would insure her continued presence, and her refusal to threaten the infant with separation for colliding with her desire would be for her to recognize her infant, and not simply to desire him--in which case she too is operating by the pleasure-ego, incorporating what she finds pleasurable, or acceptable, and rejecting what she finds unpleasing in the infant. Thus is the mode of pure desire perpetuated in human life.

The entire import of the current chapter, however, is an attempt to find a way out of this bondage to pure desire. Such an escape is found in the model of the analytic relationship where the analyst does not desire the patient, and therefore has nothing to impose on him or to incorporate from him. He merely recognizes the patient who comes to find this to be more gratifying than possession of the analyst would have been. After all, the analyst, if possessed, would also turn to ashes in the mouth of the patient, for he, no more than anyone or anything else would gratify the infantile desire. It is the parent who is desired, and it is not even the possession of her that gratifies--only her recognition of the infant. That alone allows him to be himself without undue strain and uncertainty, and enables him to find that life is sufficiently enjoyable that even its frustrations, uncertainties, and tensions are worth accepting. In short, that gives him the courage to accept the possibility of death, separation and pain in life. It may not grant him constant, uninterrupted pleasure, but it gives him sufficient support, security and protection to explore what life offers.

What the analytic relationship offers, then, is not something that is utterly unique in life, but merely a 'second chance' at a recognizing relationship, which most humans, by virtue of the near universality of the mode of pure desire, have lacked. Nor is the mode of recognition an all-or-none thing, which is why some people are more neurotic than others, and why some human beings are able to lead the confident, open, courageous lives that are the mark of having been recognized, and being able to recognize others in return. The mode of recognition does not demand a utopia for it to reveal itself, in other words. It may have small beginnings within an imperfect world, but it is something that civilization can offer its members that the mere gratification of desire can never, however fulfilled, offer. This is the model, then, with which we shall proceed to test the extent to which life in a civilized community is possible. The modification of desire upon meeting the desire of the other not only makes it possible for people to live together in communities, but it has the possibility of offering in the community of others the most life-enhancing satisfaction of all--that of the recognition of the self in all its mystery and freedom to be itself.

Such a resolution of the problem of where and how it is that a human organism becomes a person or a self is an important step in overcoming the singular hold that Rousseau--and his implicit notion that at birth the human infant is "just fine" and society is what ruins him--has had on modern thought and social practice for nearly two-hundred years. Our proposal suggests that selfhood is a possibility of *life with others*, which is not present at birth. All that is present at birth is the state of pure desire. It can be no other way, for the infant comes into the world alone and in a state of utter vulnerability, a state, moreover, which he cannot but be made aware of at every turn,

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hence his propensity for alarm concerning his dependency upon those who care for him. In such a state of deficiency, he must be said to live in the mode of pure desire--for that which will complete him. That can only be attained through the gift of recognition from the other. Thus man may be born free, and he may everywhere be in chains, but in his freedom he is in a state of pure, insatiable desire, and that is why he is in chains. Any deliverance that may be forthcoming will not be by gratifying his insatiable desire but by recognizing him so that he may find a greater satisfaction and so learn with others to modify his desire in the recognition of the mystery and freedom of the other.

Summary

In the search for a fuller place for Eros in terms of an intrinsically satisfying relationship with the other the analytic relationship is found to open Eros to its fullest potentialities within the Freudian system. This discovery enables us to develop Eros, not forgetting its relationship to the death instinct, in a way that preserves us from the danger of an eclectic or syncretistic addition of someone else--for Marcuse, Marx; for Brown, when all is said and done, Rousseau; for Ricoeur, Hegel--onto Freud. In fact, Ricoeur's synthesis of Hegel with Freud--a teleology to go with Freud's archaeology--is very useful both conceptually and dynamically. Yet the work of Eros that we are looking for is found by integrating Freudian practice into the theory, in the last analysis.

The resistance-transference intrinsic to every analysis is the battleground upon which the mode of pure desire encounters the implacable

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otherness of an object-choice that will not yield to the patient's negation of that otherness. The patient discovers through that refusal that there is a satisfaction to be obtained from the recognition of his full selfhood that offers more than the restlessness of perpetual desire. The analytic relationship is not a unique phenomenon in human affairs, it is a kind of 'second chance' to gain the recognition that the parental other is called upon to offer to the child. It is, therefore, out of the struggle of desire with desire that mutual recognition may occur, which forms the basis upon which life may be sought and enjoyed, not because it can offer pure pleasure, but because the sense of one's own recognition enables each person to bring his whole self to bear upon the world in all its uncertainty. This, in turn, brings with it the possibility of death at any time. As Brown says, however, the full life wants to die, and in the fullness of life that recognition makes possible the death instinct may become the ally of Eros, that which enables the self to tolerate the possibility of death in every moment of life. Eros seeks its way and its satisfaction in union with others, and dares to be a separate individual rather than the incorporation of desired-others, while seeking relationships with others whom it is thereby willing to recognize in their separateness and mystery.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1] P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay on interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 407.

[2] S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), trans. W. J. H. Sprott (New York: Norton and Co., 1933), pp. 97-98.

3Quoted in Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 410.

[4] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 411.

[5] Ibid., p. 412.

[6] S. Freud, "The Dynamics of Transference," (1912) in Collected Papers, 2, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), 354.

[7] A. Wilden, "Libido as Language," in Psychology Today, 5, no. 12 (May, 1972), 84.

[8] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 414.

[9] Ibid., p. 415.

[10] S. Freud, "Further Recommendations: And the Technique of Psycho-Analysis. Recollection, Repetition and Working Through" (1914), in Collected Papers, 2, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), 374.

[11] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 417.

[12] Freud, 1912, op. cit., p. 314.

[13] Ibid., p. 317.

[14] Ibid., p. 318.

[15] Ibid., p. 319.

[16] Ibid., p. 322.

[17] Ibid., p. 371.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Freud, 1914, loc. cit.

[20] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 474.

[21] S. Freud, "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: Observations on transference love," (1915) Collected Papers, 2, trans, James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 390.

[22] S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogart Press, 1950), p. 37.

[23] "It is always with another that the living substance fights against death, . . . in the living substance *by itself* he finds only death." Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 291.

[24] Freud, 1923, loc. cit. [25] Ibid., p. 77.

[26] Ibid.

[27] N. O. Brown, Life Against Death: The psychoanalytical meaning of history (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 115-16.

[28] Ibid., p. 43. [29] Ibid., p. 45.

[30] Ibid. [31] Ibid., p. 46.

[32] Ibid. [33] Ibid., p. 48.

[34] Ibid.

[35] E. Jones, Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 1 (New York: Basic Books, 1953), p. 330.

[36] H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A philosophical inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 191.

[37] S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton and Co., 1962), p. 15.

[38] S. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," (1915a) in Collected Papers, 4, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), 79-80.

[39] Ricoeur, op. cit., pp. 469-70.

[40] Marcuse, op. cit., p. 226. [41] Ibid., p. 228.

[42] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 470-71.

[43] Freud, 1933, p. 104.

CHAPTER VI

EROS IN HUMAN GROUPS

Having shown a basis by which Eros operates in relation to union with others in their otherness through the person-to-person analytic relationship, and suggested, in doing so, certain implications for the life of man in groups and in society it behooves us to move on to a closer examination of how Freud himself conceived of man's possibilities and limitations in groups and in the larger society. Freud's view of human society is rather pessimistic; it makes demands on the individual for the containment of his instincts and for the aspiration toward degrees of harmony and mutual love that are beyond his instinctual limitations.[1] If society is demanding beyond human capacity to subscribe to its demands, it is also very impersonal. We have also suggested in chapter two that were society organized into more intimate levels of community, the demands that it makes might proceed more from Eros than from that representative of the death instinct, the superego. Freud addresses himself, by implication at least, to such possibilities in his study of groups, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.

Eros is the power that binds the members of a group or a cohesive society together; in Freud's words: "a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which holds together everything in the world."[2] Though the members of a group are bound to each other by Eros, this is not, for Freud, a sufficient explanation to account for their cohesiveness.

What brought the members of the group together in the first place? Freud asks; it must have been something extraneous which they came to share. It is, he maintains, the example and power of the leader of the group that, first of all, occasions the binding of members to each other, through their allegiance to the leader. Freud uses the sample of the Church to demonstrate the importance of the leader, and notes that: "There is no doubt that the tie which unites each individual with Christ is also the cause of the tie which unites them with one another."[3]

As bound as the members of a group or society are to each other, through their common love for the leader they are, at the same time, correspondingly able to direct their aggressive impulses toward those who are not members of the group. Thus is the instinctual dualism of love and hate served, as it must be, though it allows for little amelioration of the human situation. In other words, if life is to be served, for Freud, death must be served as well. Freud notes drily:

> But even during the kingdom of Christ those people who do not belong to the community of believers, who do not love him, and whom he does not love stand outside this tie. Therefore a religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. Fundamentally indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance toward those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion.[4]

Herein lies the paradox of the work of Eros in group life: the more love is felt for members of a group the more hostility toward those outside it. The lesson that Freud takes from this phenomenon is that close group membership is perhaps a danger to be avoided in the name of humanity. In this manner, while some may not be loved as much as they otherwise would, many more will be preserved from the intolerance and persecution of those who are outside the fold. This phenomenon is endemic to the very nature of group membership, whether it be a religious, political, or even, in all likelihood, a scientific body; it is not merely a function of religious bigotry, Freud does not hesitate to point out.

Once inside the group however:

> . . . the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently . . . . So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends, individuals in the group behave as though they were uniform, tolerate the peculiarities of its other members, equate themselves with them and have no feeling of aversion toward them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows only one barrier--love for others, love for objects.[5]

Anyone or anything that satisfies the vital needs of a person has his libido attached to that object. "And," says Freud, "in the development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone acts as a civilizing factor in the sense that it brings a change from egoism to altruism."[6] It is desexualized, aim-inhibited or sublimated love that Freud is referring to, but it is no less the power of love which takes individuals beyond themselves, even encouraging them to contain their own impulses if need be for the sake of the beloved. "Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views," Freud points out, "only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows only one barrier--love for others, love for objects."[7]

Identification is the mechanism by which Eros operates between the members of a group. It happens according to the following process, with which we are already familiar:

> First, identification is the original form of emotional tie with a person; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for

> a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. . . .
>
> We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader.[8]

The leader tends at the same time to be idealized as the object of allegiance and love. The reason for this is that narcissism is always at work, according to Freud, in the act of love: "We see that the object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object . . . . We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we would now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism."[9] The process that takes place is almost a direct reversal of the customary identification procedure in which the ego replaces the object of the narcissistic-cathexis; toward the leader the object replaces the ego or the ego ideal. As such Freud suggests that the mechanism at work is similar to hypnotism where the person submits his will to the will of the other person, in this case the hypnotist, and in the instance of love, to that of the beloved. Thus Freud reaches a definition of a primary group as "a number of individuals who have placed one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."[10]

Not surprisingly, Freud sees a similarity between what happens in the formation of a group, and the theory, or "Just-So-Story" as he half-acknowledges it to be, of the Primal Horde: "The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority; in LeBon's phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in the place of the ego ideal."[11]

It must be noted too that the direct expression of the sexual impulses is regarded by Freud as being inimical to the way sexual needs are best met in the formation of the group. "Two people coming together for the purpose of sexual satisfaction, in so far as they seek for solitude, are making a demonstration against the herd instinct, the group feeling. The more they are in love, the more completely they suffice for each other."[12] Freud had noted previously, in fact, that "it is precisely those sexual impulses that are inhibited in their aims which achieve such lasting ties between people."[13] It is precisely the inability to find direct sexual satisfaction, the societal proscription of it, or the voluntary abandonment of it (as in the priestly vow of celibacy) that binds all the more tightly the ties of the individual to the group, and allows the uninterrupted flow of Eros to proceed from him to the group and vice-versa. Freud is establishing the same point here that he made a decade later in his work on civilization, namely that a certain restraint on the sexual impulse is a necessity of societal well-being and survival, the direct expression of the sexual impulse always being a privatistic matter.

It is common-place to observe that Freud's observations on group formation are authoritarian. Roazen has suggested they closely mirror the unquestioned assumptions of any good nineteenth century European liberal, namely that liberty can only be safely pursued within the

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bounds provided by allegiance to a respected if not revered leader.[14] By attaching as much importance as he does to the role of the leader as the binding force of a group, Freud leaves unaccounted for the dynamics of a democratic society. The direct implication is that democratic societies also owe the strength of whatever communal bonds they develop to the common allegiance of their members to a leader who inspires their loyalty. Yet Freud's assumptions are the direct opposite of those which form the basis for the proper functioning of a democratic society. Whereas, for Freud a society or group operates on the analogy of the members as children to the leader as father, a democratic society operates on the assumption of responsibility by the members of a society, which assumes their maturity and adulthood. They in turn only invest a certain trust in the leader whom *they* choose and they reserve the right to reverse that choice if the leader fails that trust. As always, however, Freud is largely ignoring the conscious aspect of human actions, and concerning himself exclusively with the unconscious motives that influence those actions. He is saying, in effect, that no matter how rationally a group thinks it is operating, behind the rationality lurk the unresolved needs and desires of the child who longs to be protected by an all-powerful father. Until such motives are recognized and taken into account they will continue to be the major force behind whatever conscious plans and decisions are made by groups, just as occurs with individuals. Democracies are no more free of these influences than are dictatorships, or those few absolute monarchies that remain today. In fact, precisely because they are so convinced of their rationality and superiority, they are more likely to remain oblivious to their unheeded and scorned unconscious motives, which, on that account, are liable to operate all the more powerfully, because deviously.

Alexander points out that, although Freud acknowledged, usually only parenthetically, that abstract ideals may substitute for the leader, he does not elaborate upon the structures of such societies, nor upon how issues like freedom, responsibility, and self-government relate to the unresolved childhood needs that he sees being at the heart of the allegiance to the group and its leader. However, democracies fail, and to whatever extent they remain susceptible to unconscious desires, the fact remains that there are differences between societies which lay stress "on the individual's critical faculty and self-responsibility," and those which demand that "blind obedience to authority which is the essence of hypnosis."[15] Alexander concludes emphatically: "The mentality of free societies cannot be explained either by mob psychology or by the spirit prevailing in authoritarian societies."[16] In other words, notwithstanding the fact that a democratic society may be more influenced by unconscious motives in its operations than we are generally aware, they do operate in ways that are different and less binding than totalitarian and authoritarian societies. But rather than relegating Freud's contributions in this respect to the realm of historical curiosities they should be taken all the more seriously just because the *apparent* differences between democratic societies and the authoritarian motives of the child are greater than those between authoritarian societies and childish needs and desires.

To return to Alexander's observation that contemporary societies

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and groups are more likely to form allegiances around ideals and principles than around leaders and father figures, it must be added that the kind of ideals that such societies follow must mirror, in however idealized a form, the behavior that is sanctioned by the parental others whom the members of a group have incorporated in their various infancies. A personalized embodiment of such ideals probably still galvanizes the ego ideal more effectively than does an abstract principle, but the individual, and the society as a whole are likely to remain limited in their idealizations to infantile models, as long as the incorporation of the other according to the mode of pure desire remains the predominant way the conflicts of childhood are resolved, and recognition of the other remains in scarce supply. We can only, at the moment, wonder about the reciprocal influence that the mode of pure desire has upon both the individual and the society, particularly concerning the extent to which the latter consolidates the former in that mode, as, indeed, a commodity-oriented society must in order to maintain itself.

An area where Freud's contribution remains as pertinent today as in his perhaps more authoritarian day concerns that of the boundaries that the group imposes around the expression of Eros. Indeed it is analogous to the problem that Freud saw with the direct expression of Eros between individuals, namely that it left the rest of mankind excluded. The outcome of this problem where it concerns the group, however, is even more ominous for the outsider. Lovers are merely indifferent to the rest of the world; group members, according to Freud, are bound to turn their destructive instincts against the outsider. Since this outcome of strong group loyalty must be invariable, on account of the equally pressing need for the death instinct to gain expression--an expression which the group is unlikely to receive--Freud tends to be of the opinion that it is perhaps as well to remain skeptical and unaffiliated and spare mankind much of the suffering that has been the consequence of group intolerance for the disaffiliate. The latter would seem to be Freud's personal preference, and despite his hopes for science as the great ameliorator of the human condition he does not even exclude science from this kind of party spirit.

The differences between groups do not have to be significant ones even, Freud points out. The smallest of differences tend to be magnified in the interests of feeling comfortable as well as superior. Such small differences between 'us' and 'them' may then be pointed out, as the occasion arises to augment either feelings of belonging or of superiority. Freud points out:

> Of two neighboring towns each is the other's most jealous rival; every little canton looks down upon the others with contempt. Closely related races keep one another at arm's length; the South German cannot endure the North German, the Englishman casts every kind of aspersion upon the Scot, the Spaniard despises the Portugese. We are no longer astonished that greater differences should lead to an almost insuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic people feel for the German, the Aryan for the Semite, and the white races for the colored.[17]

It is man's narcissism, says Freud, that disposes him to select out of the human race people with qualities similar to his own in whom to trust, much as it disposes him to mistrust those with qualities not shared or approved by himself. He observes that:

> In the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feel toward strangers with whom they have to do we may recognize the expression of self-love--of narcissism. This self-love works for the preservation of the individual, and behaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from his own particular lines of

> development involved a criticism of them and a demand for their alteration. We do not know why such sensitiveness should have been directed to just these details of differentiation; but it is unmistakable that in this whole connection men find evidence of a readiness for hatred, an aggressiveness, the source of which is unknown and to which one is tempted to ascribe an elementary character.
>
> But when a group is formed the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently, within the group. So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends, individuals in the group behave as though they were uniform, tolerate the peculiarities of its other members, equate themselves with them, and have no feeling of aversion toward them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows only one barrier--love for others, love for objects.[18]

From its earliest beginnings the mode of pure desire is characterized by the incorporation of that which is desired and the repudiation and, if need be, destruction of that which is undesirable or unpleasant. The same dynamism may be at work in the narcissism of the group, indeed it would be surprising if it were not. Once the boundaries of the ego have been established according to the desires of the incorporated others who make up those boundaries, those desires and standards become the determinants of what the individual will find acceptable or unacceptable in others. His attitude toward others will reflect the narcissism of such desires and standards as he has made a part of his ego. He will be disposed to like whatever resembles himself, and the more closely the better, and he will tend to dislike that which is different from himself, not because he *loves* himself, but because whatever does not fit the incorporated desires and demands within himself evokes the sense of uncertainty and separation-anxiety of disapproval which occasioned his repression of his own desires--the one's incompatible with the significant other's at least--in the first place.

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The stranger is strange, and to that extent potentially dangerous, as long as it is with the incorporation of another's desires and demands that the person judges other people.

Once brought together with others in a common task, however, one chosen, moreover, by a common sense of importance attached to that task, then as long as that group remains together they share a common desire, whatever their other differences might be. As soon as a common desire is shared then, to that extent, the compatriot becomes a part of each person's desire. Within those boundaries Eros is allowed to operate and does so to bring units of life together so that life may bring whatever satisfactions are available. Once Eros begins to work and finds the satisfactions that it does then it begins to form bonds of its own based purely on those satisfactions so that the members of the group are not, henceforth, merely joined together by the necessity of the common task. Freud observes that:

> The question will be at once raised whether *community of interest* in itself, without any addition of libido, must not necessarily lead to the toleration of other people and to considerateness for them. This objection may be met by the reply that nevertheless no lasting limitation of narcissism is effected in this way, since this tolerance does not persist longer than the immediate advantage gained from other people's collaboration. . . in cases of collaboration between fellow-workers which prolong and solidify the relation between them to a point beyond what is merely profitable . . . . The libido attaches itself to the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and chooses as its first objects the people who have a share in the process. And in the development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it brings a change from egoism to altruism.[19]

Within the boundaries of the common task Eros is apparently able to work without restriction so that even the boundaries within each person that are a product of their incorporations are able to be relaxed.

It is, in such cases, the contact of each person with the other that is able to take place as a function of the satisfaction or the urgency of the task that, in allowing Eros to do *its* work, allows the other to be respected in his otherness, because of the discovery in that interaction and experience that his otherness is not dangerous or threatening.

Dare we go so far as to suggest then, that the common task contains within it the basis by which Eros is able to break down boundaries and overcome repressions in a similar way than that taking place within the analytic relationship? Up to a point, but probably no further. The common task contains within it the limitations that are a function of what portions of the person are allowed to be acknowledged. Accidents of skin color or ethnic origin, or even differences in taste or certain values, say religious differences or political convictions, may indeed give way before the recognition of common humanity and good will that are discovered during the common task. For most of what people generally show of themselves to others, and considering the nature of what it is that divides people from each other and feeds their antagonisms, the common task cannot be despised merely because it does not do everything in so far as removing the boundaries that separate people from each other. Indeed one of the central points that we have sought to make in pursuing the issue of recognition of the other as the primary vehicle of Eros in the world, is that what is recognized is the mystery of his otherness, the right of the other to be different, and his freedom to not be obligated to display his whole self, in a word his right to secrecy. Thus we do not propose the common task to be the royal road to human liberation, nor comparable at the group level to the unique work of the analytic relationship, unless, that is, the common task of such a group happens to be the specific task performed in the analytic relationship, that is, the overcoming of repressions and the modification of the mode of pure desire. The common task does break down as many divisions as are requisite for the accomplishment of the task, but not only may yesterday's enemies become today's friends through the discovery of common interests, but today's friends may as likely become tomorrow's enemies through the emergence of fresh interests that are inimical to one another.

What perhaps we may apply of the analytic relationship for a better understanding of how the common task may serve Eros in the world, is the role of the analytic work in specifically seeking human liberation. In other words, the goal of a common task matters crucially. Doubtless, after all, Naziism brought together many people of otherwise divergent interests and origins in other regards in order to solve the 'Jewish problem.' The common task, however, does not have to aim for ultimate human liberty all in one fell swoop. Indeed, the grandiosity of such a task probably tends to reduce the importance of the other person so that he is sacrificed to the task rather than being recognized with the respect due his otherness. The history of human divisions, however, amply shows us that it has rarely taken much for the stranger to be thought deserving of destruction. It is vital, therefore, to consider the pursuit of common tasks for men that make little of differences even while acknowledging their right to be retained.

Perhaps, in fact, we have it backwards. Is it not more likely to be the acknowledgement of the right of the other to be different, nay [illegible] the *freedom* to be able to allow the other his differentness that lies behind transcending the human limitation of Eros to his own group, while imposing the destructive instinct on those outside? Thus do we return to the problem of the universality of the mode of pure desire. Unlike original sin which it surely resembles in both its consequences and its ubiquity we have maintained that the mode of pure desire has an effective antidote in Eros, a power that, Freud somewhat to the contrary, is not altogether heavenly in its sphere of activity. Eros, we have suggested, is most fully and effectively manifested in the recognition of one person in his otherness by another. We surely cannot wait for such a mode of liberation from pure desire to occur person by person. Are there ways of a social nature, that is to say, through the medium of the group or of society, that can facilitate an end to man's thralldom to pure desire and the repression of death?

There is, first of all, no possibility of separating the question of the group and societal work of Eros from the interpersonal. Both relate to the question of the establishment of boundaries between and within human beings. Brown puts the matter well:

> . . . the distinction between self and external world is not an immutable fact, but an artificial construction. It is a boundary line; like all boundaries, based on love and hate.
>
> The distinction between self and not-self is made by the childish decision to claim all that the ego likes as 'mine' and to repudiate all that the ego dislikes as 'not-mine.'[20]

Eros is restricted in the individual to the boundaries imposed by the desires and demands of the incorporated other as they clash with those of the subject that are antithetical, and which the subject therefore represses in the interests of survival and of freedom from the discomfort

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of anxiety, the signal of such a threat. In other words, Eros is allowed as much freedom within the individual as is consistent with the desires and demands of the incorporated other. Similarly in the group, community or society, Eros is allowed only an amount of freedom of expression that is compatible with working with those others whose desires and limits are shared by himself. Those whose desires are contradictory to these are dangerous, hence to be avoided or destroyed as inimical to "our" well-being. Thus the boundaries around the group are closely related to the desires and demands of each individual's incorporated others, although the factor of the diffusion of responsibility, wherein, not being accountable personally, each individual in the group is freed from customary superego demands, must not be forgotten. This phenomenon allows people in groups to be both better and worse than their customary individual internalized demands would otherwise permit.[21] Notwithstanding, people tend to be attracted to others on the basis of their incorporated desires and demands in the first instance. Once together, greater freedom of action, for better or worse, may develop.

The direction of the influence is by no means one way--from the individual to the group--it is, rather, reciprocal. Social, economic, political, and religious forces influence, in the first place, what desires and demands individuals impose on one another. Any effort, therefore, to suggest means for overcoming the thralldom to pure desire must come to terms with the full range of determinants that encourage the use of domination of people by other people, both individually and socially. In a word, repression is the response of an intimidated subject to its *domination* by another. "Domination," says Marcuse, "is exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself."[22] As such domination represents the determination of pure desire to gratify itself regardless of the desire of the other. For Marcuse, therefore, the issue is first and foremost a politico-economic one, as a consequence of which the latter means must be the ones primarily employed if there is to be any possibility of the abolition of repression. We have already argued that the weakness in Marcuse's position is the fact that he sees the unimpeded gratification of desire for all as the goal and outcome of the abolition of repression, whereas our work inclines toward the view that it is precisely the mode of pure desire that is the ineluctable source of repression in the first place. Moreover, if there were indeed guaranteed to be an object always present that would satisfy the desire at hand then perhaps one person or group would not see any need to dominate another in order to gratify its desire. Since, however, desire tends to be in a large measure infantile in origin, and, as such, unconscious, it is, to that extent, insatiable, because there is no object that can simply satisfy it. Such desire is for another who is not present any longer. It is the fatal seduction of a commodity-oriented society that it seeks to offer objects to satisfy the desires of its members, desires which are for persons however, thus its members must always remain unsatisfied. Convinced, nonetheless, that it is objects that they want, they can only then look for more, and more, and more--all the while remaining unavoidably unsatisfied. In order, then, to insure that there will always be enough objects available for them to satisfy their desires, those who already possess sufficient power to be in a position to gratify their desires will be inclined to

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cling to that power, thus insuring the maintenance of repression and the mode of pure desire.

If it is the determination to gratify desire that is the source of repression, then the only manner in which repression could be overcome is through the *deference of desire* before the *recognition* of the desire of the other--but by no means by surrender to it. The mode of pure desire is perpetuated because life, which begins in an awareness of one's vulnerability, is made repeatedly aware of that state of helplessness before the other who uses the weakness of others over whom he has power to satisfy his desire. In other words, man, born weak, seeks compensating strength throughout life so that he may become strong enough to impose his long-denied desires on others weaker than himself. Such a cycle will only be halted when the helpless infant is recognized in his right to be other than his parents, who have, in turn, been sufficiently recognized that they have no longer any desire or determination to impose themselves on anyone else. The cycle of pure desire can only be broken in on through the exposure of people to an experience in which their otherness is recognized. It has been suggested in the present work that the analytic relationship is the paradigm of such a 'second chance' at gaining the personal recognition that is all too often denied in infancy and childhood. Yet the hope for such a second chance cannot rest upon such an uneconomical means for its eventual realization--if, indeed, it is to happen.

The deference of desire has vast socio-political implications which must be considered in order for it to become something more than the person-by-person option that has made psychoanalysis socially almost irrelevant. Obviously, for instance, the deference of desire does not have the same relevance for those in grinding poverty as it does for those enjoying the luxuries of a post-scarcity society. Faced with such inequities, the deference of desire represents almost an indulgence by the latter, and a cruel, exploitive affront to the former. Desire is only modified socially, that is, in the meeting of mutually interacting desires that are seriously recognized from both sides. Presently, the affluent have more desire to defer, so to speak, than do the poor who still want for the basic necessities. The modification of desire, then, requires a just political order where a measure of equal relevancy is made possible to the very question of the deference of desire.

A program for the recognition of people must find a way if it is to happen at all on a group and community basis. Moreover, it can only take place in a way that works with people in sufficiently small numbers that they *can* be recognized as individuals, rather than treated in the anonymity of the aggregate, which would be a self-evident denial of the entire project. All political programs that are directed at the betterment of society have thus directed themselves, although, in the cell group as used by the Communist party, what betterment is sought for society is performed for the members, in that the means for obtaining recognition are made more available there than in any programs of a larger political nature directed toward the society. At any rate, the kind of program that could recognize people would have to take the form of a social movement, so that small cells, groups, or communities formed the basic unit by which people could be recognized, but which could be linked to similar cells or groups on a societal scale so that

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more than just pockets of individuals could be affected.

It is precisely because contemporary man is aware of himself as a psychological being who seeks to be more fully and freely himself that the therapeutic model, instead of encouraging the perpetuation of the mode of pure desire, actually could enable the individual to experience a desired object as an other who refuses to be incorporated but who offers something more valuable than desire-gratification, namely the recognition that psychological man probably needs for his well-being more than anything else. Yet modern society is manifestly in no position to meet this need--quite the reverse in fact. All it is in a position to offer him is more gratification than has ever before been the case--thus must remain the perpetuation of the mode of pure desire and its ineluctable accompaniest, repression, which is to say, the domination of the other where it becomes necessary in order to have one's desire. Psychological man wants to feel good, and he thinks that desire-gratification will bring that about. It will not, as we have pointed out, because objects are not what he wants--only what he thinks he wants. He wants to be recognized. Only when this is forthcoming will psychological man be happy.

Psychological man, as he is characterized by Rieff, is singularly aware of his needs and intolerant of his tensions. He may not know what he wants in the sense in which we have described the true object of desire, but he knows that he wants to feel good. He also has few ties with others to provide him with any proper sense of the other as having any particular claim upon him or bridge to him. These are, in Nietschze's famous word, 'weightless' times, characterized by a waning of the great common myth that held Western man in a sense of relatedness and obligation to others. In the absence of a common belief how may modern man feel a sense of relatedness to his fellows? Freud maintains that once drawn together in the first place by common allegiance to a leader or a task, libidinal ties will develop in their own right between those with the same object of allegiance incorporated in the place of the ego ideal.[23] What happens when there is no such common object of allegiance, no faith to bind men together? How may they then regard their common humanity? The implication of Rieff's thesis is that they cannot. Each man, pursuing his own well-being, uninvolved with a faith commitment that he shares with others, will not be able to see in the other a limiting factor on his desire.

A new dimension in the self-other struggle for recognition is at the point of emergence in our reconstruction of Freudian theory and practice. The otherness of the person must be acknowledged before there can be any limits on pure desire. However, before his otherness is likely to be acknowledged, there must first be a recognition of what is already shared with the other. Otherness, in other words, does not refer to the utter strangeness of that person from the subject. The strangeness of the other can only lead to a consolidation of the repressive reaction to something incomprehensible and perhaps dangerous to the ever-alert defensive ego. Within the family the commonality between parent and child is, in a certain sense, self-evident, in the sense that the parent regards the child as either already an extension of himself, or as his special responsibility. Thus, it is the otherness that must be encouraged to emerge and be taken seriously alongside the prior unity.

In larger social relationships, outside those established by kinship, there is no self-evident sense of union, one with the other. The other meets the subject first of all in his strangeness, unbound by ties of responsibility or feeling. Only the emergence of a set of values, beliefs, or an allegiance held in common is likely to reduce the sheer strangeness of one to the other, and create a dimension of unity. This is the kind of unity of which Freud speaks when he says:

> We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader.[24]

Freud, in fact, defines a primary group as "a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."[25] We should not be misled by Freud's insistence that the common object of allegiance or commitment is, in each case, a personalized leader. In fact, Freud's polemic against religion is easily interpretable as an effort to encourage man to abandon his childish dependency upon an idealized father-figure as his primary object of allegiance, in favor of a more rational and mature dedication to the common ideal of "the brotherhood of man and the reduction of human suffering."[26] What, in other words, remains of enduring value in Freud's theory of the common object of allegiance is not his own animus in favor of leadership, but his reminder that groups of strangers come together, not in any instant recognition of their common humanity, but come to share regard and responsibility for one another out of regard for 'the same object,' which replaces their own incorporated ego ideals. Only then do they become identified with one another.

Without that dimension of unity and identification no prior sense of responsibility is likely to emerge. The sense of responsibility arises as a function of the perception of identity. Identity, however, that does not recognize otherness allows no separateness of one from the other to emerge, and leaves the subject unable to encounter life in his individuality, his aloneness. He must remain utterly dependent upon the other, unwilling to let him be other, and unwilling himself to be a self. In short, the inability, for whatever reason, to acknowledge the otherness of the object of desire in its identity with the subject maintains the subject, ineluctably, in the mode of pure desire.

But otherness that does not recognize identity sees in the other no limitation upon its own desire. This is the situation that exists in the time of the therapeutic. Bereft of the common commitment to Christian communal purposes, contemporary man sees less and less that he has in common with his fellows, other, perhaps, than a vague realization of common humanity, the outcome of the idealism of modern liberal humanitarian education. There is not, however, a sense of active recognition of that common humanity in any way that provides bonds of responsibility toward the others that one encounters with one's desires. The other simply impinges upon the self in its sheer otherness, unmodified by any vital sense of identity. Without this sense of identity, however, it is virtually impossible to live in any other mode than that of pure desire. The other is something to be negated or, a more telling word, nullified, in the face of desire that does not acknowledge any identity between subject and object.

Rieff, then, is correct that the absence of communal purposes leads to the remission of controls, but he is erronious to the extent that he maintains that the modern era must resign itself to a future bereft of communal purposes. Civilization itself cannot long prevail where the relationship with the stranger is not made up equally of a recognition of the identity with and the otherness from the self. Otherwise man cannot but live in the mode of pure desire, recognizing no limitation upon him and condemned to suffer from the isolation and destructiveness of that mode.

If we would rectify such a state of affairs, a renewal of the sense of communal purpose is no less than a necessity of the future of civilization. Man has yet to find another means than communal purposes for linking the stranger to each person in a recognition of their common humanity that, in turn, creates bonds of obligation of one to the other, and a willingness to see in his otherness a prior realization of his irrefragable identity with him.

Given a sense of identity provided by common allegiances and purposes, man is more prone to feel a sense of regard for those who share such purposes with him, thus voluntarily limiting his desire out of regard for the other, who is, to that extent identified with him. What however, of the therapeutic? How may he identify himself with others in the absence of communal purposes to form such bonds of identity? It has been indicated that, in all probability, he cannot form the necessary sense of identity with others without communal purposes. Is there any basis upon which communal purposes could emerge in the time of the therapeutic? Yet more than merely a new set of communal purposes is

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surely required; purposes must emerge, if the human condition is to be appreciably ameliorated, that transcend the very limits of the communal purposes of old, which allowed Eros expression toward those of like mind, saving the destructive instincts for those who were not.

Modern man's rationality forbids him from taking seriously the old divisions of religion, and his irrationality demands that such divisions, whether religious, political, or even sexual, be modified so that they will cease to be the basis upon which his destructive and sadistic impulses are rent. We are, in other words, suggesting a basis for human identity that does not contain an outgroup which is regarded with lessened humanity. It has been suggested above (Chapter IV) that man's destructiveness is not an invariable product of his disposition, but a function of the *repression* of the death instinct, and of life lived in the mode of pure desire. Pure desire, in turn, is an outcome of the unwillingness to recognize the otherness of the desired object, and the identity of the excluded object. The project before us concerns the basis upon which the identical may be recognized in his otherness and the other in his identity with the self. It is nothing less than a project for the abolition of the mode of pure desire--and, by our definition, of repression.

As the abolition of repression it would seem fully compatible with the yearnings of the therapeutic, who seeks the removal of all gratuitous limitations on his nature so that he may be fully aware of himself, in order to be fully himself. As the abolition of pure desire, however, it runs in opposition to the yearnings of the therapeutic for unimpeded self-expression. In that pure desire and repression are, in our view, one and the same thing, we part ways with those abolitionists of repression through pure desire, Marcuse and Brown. The full awareness of the self that proceeds from the abolition of repression does not necessitate the expression of desire. Awareness is being conscious of what one wants to do, but without the necessity for doing it. Under such conditions it is the recognition of the other alone that can stand as a viable and hopefully acceptable restriction of pure desire, one, that is, that need not be imposed by the domination of one by the other.

The therapeutic seeks unrestricted desire, both because he does not recognize his identity with the other, and because the restrictions that are operative are oppressive and meaningless ones. Thus, the therapeutic kicks against the pricks of an obsolescent demand system. To seek to impose new demands upon the therapeutic would be an exercise in futility. Could not the therapeutic, however, in his awareness of himself find a basis for recognizing his identity with the other who would, thereupon, become one whom the therapeutic would not seek to impose his desire upon?

The therapeutic, by virtue of the unprecedented degree of attention he pays to his own emotions would perhaps be in a better position to identify with the other, as soon as an adequate basis could be found for bringing him into an active relationship that would in turn, enable him to recognize his otherness. Such a process will, by no means, take place automatically. It demands a sufficient acquaintance with the other on some basis upon which they meet at a common point before their inner identity is likely to be realized. Thus, the therapeutic is likely to be brought into relationship with his fellows in communal purposes that meet at the point of their shared concern with their personal enhancement. If, furthermore, we are correct in affirming that it is only with the other that Eros can be satisfied in the living of a full life, then, even the therapeutic must find that his well-being is a function, not of being able to gratify his desires, but of confirming relations with others. Perhaps such a realization is beginning to occur in the emergence of the encounter group phenomenon and the human potential movement. Here the goal of personal growth and enhancement takes place within the context of relationships with others who are in pursuit of similar goals.

The emergence of the encounter group and its outgrowth, the human potential movement, probably represents a convergence of two factors, both of which derive from the diminution of ties of identity between people in contemporary society: the pursuit of personal well-being, and the need for closer relationships with others than people presently have. The latter is the other side of the coin from the emergence of the therapeutic. It is the waning of ties between men that lead them, on one hand, to seek their own happiness without a particular sense of responsibility and regard for others; indeed, as deTocqueville warned democracy encourages such a self-sufficient pursuit of well-being, moreover, it developed as a kind of legitimation of private pursuits.[27] Such a pursuit may have been acceptable for economic man, who kept his own emotions and personal needs well in check. Psychological man, however, is his opposite number in that regard. He is aware of his inner self, his emotions, his loneliness, and therefore, presumably, his need for others. Intent upon himself, furthermore, he must know who he is--he must discover his identity--but that is, inescapably, a task that involves the way he characteristically relates to others. The structures of modern society make it difficult to relate to others deeply, for *shared* meanings are what make such relationships possible. The only basis upon which psychological man could share meanings would be on the basis of the sharing of personal experiences and feelings about these. He could, in a word, share his inner self. The given structures of modern society are characterized by the distance of their centers of decision-making from those affected, and by their vastness which makes for the inability of the individual to be recognized. Thus, if psychological man was to find himself in relation to others, and share his inner self in so doing, he would have no recourse but to invent a new institution.

The use of the small group to facilitate mutual sharing is not a contemporary invention. In fact, it was probably the characteristic way of learning and sharing before the size and complexity of the modern mass society came into being. Group processes, sensitivity training or encounter groups represent, perhaps more than anything else, an attempt to *recapture* what man has always taken for granted--at least before universal education became a modern goal--namely that learning, whether cognitive or emotional in nature, takes place best in situations where the numbers are small enough so that each participant is able to receive optimal personal attention, while also benefitting from what and how others are learning. From its beginnings, progressive education began to stress the value of give and take through free discussion. This diminished the role of the teacher as expert and focussed it on the student's experiences as something important to be shared in his

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learning process. In the 1920s Human Relations Management and the work of Elton Mayo and his associates encouraged regard for the personal feelings and motives of the worker as a vitally important factor in his productivity. The Oxford Groups (later Moral Re-Armament), and Alcoholics Anonymous gave the group confession a good name once again (for some at least) in the 1930s. It was not until the work of Kurt Lewin and his students, particularly during and immediately after the war years that group dynamics became a discipline *and* a movement in its own right.

The impact that Lewin's work had--far beyond the academic walls--was a product of his ever-present practical concerns. Group dynamics was never merely content to study the dynamics of people in groups in its pure form. It was always done in the context of studies of the respective efficacies of the lecture method versus the discussion method for learning, or of democratic versus authoritarian leadership styles, or how housewives might be persuaded to use fewer "choice" meats during the scarce days of World War II. Shortly after the war a number of Lewin's students, Bradford, Benne, Lippitt, and others formed the so-called Bethel group at Bethel, Maine, which later became the National Training Laboratories where formal training in group dynamics leadership for T groups or sensitivity training groups was carried on. The thrust of such groups has been academic, educational, and professional, rather than clinical. They have had a widespread effect on the business and educational institutions of contemporary American society.

Carl Rogers, perhaps the best-known and most respected figure in the encounter group field has tended to bridge both the clinical and the educational dimensions of groups. His use of groups on a large

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scale began in the aftermath of World War II when the University of Chicago was inundated by great numbers of returning veterans who required counselling for both career choices and for re-adjustment to civilian student life. To meet these demands, Rogers instituted a crash program to prepare counsellors. It consisted of intensive group experiences for the counsellor-trainees of several hours per day, so that they could come to understand themselves better, become aware of self-defeating attitudes and behaviors, and learn more effective ways of relating to each other that would hopefully carry over into their counselling work. Its combination of cognitive and experiential learning proved to be so effective that that method continued to be used in the staff's summer workshops thereafter. Rogers continued to apply the use of groups both clinically and educationally, the latter for business and professional as well as student populations. His approach differed from the group dynamics approach in its degree of emphasis on personal growth through mutual sharing and the improvement of communications and relationships with others, rather than on the work of the group process as such.[28]

It was the personal growth emphasis, if not its precise methods, that came to characterize the use of the group in the so-called human potential movement which began at the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California in the early 1960s, although it did not begin to have a wide-spread cultural impact until the mid- to late-1960s. The major early influences to come out of Esalen and the Human Potential Movement were those of the so-called "Joy" workshops of William Schutz, a once-conventional and highly respected figure in the field of group dynamics, author of a formidable work entitled FIRO (later more alluringly retitled The Interpersonal Underworld), and the Gestalt Therapy of Frederick S. Perls, hitherto a relatively obscure former psychoanalyst. Both men used a highly personalized style of group leadership which had an avowed emphasis on the "here-and-now" in a way that eschewed explanations and interpretations, in favor of the immediate experience of the participant's feelings. If he could better realize "how" he felt, rather than "why," he would be in a far better position to decide whether and to what extent he was free to act on his feelings instead of always ruminating them away, thereby keeping himself bottled up with suppressed feelings of both anger and tenderness, both of which he was all-too-often afraid to express--quite needlessly, it was usually discovered.

Such groups as these indulged the two major needs which were alluded to above: the desire of the therapeutic to be free of meaningless and oppressive restrictions on his actions, but also his overriding concern for the effect of his actions upon others. Indeed, the entire group movement has catered overwhelmingly to the latter concern. It was one thing for the therapeutic to be aware that his feeling of well-being was hindered by his inability to express feelings of anger and tenderness that he was fully aware that he felt, but the reception that he feared from others was quite another matter, and the major reason that he was not freer in his behavior. If he no longer had to hold back because his religion said it was wrong, he would certainly contain himself if it was likely to alienate him any further from other people. The latter, in fact, is the dimension that Rieff appears not to understand in his dissection of the therapeutic. He is self-indulgent and he experiences a great deal of tension when he is prevented from having or doing what he wants; this is no problem when it comes to indulging himself in the objects of desire that are so plentiful in a commodity society. The therapeutic does not, however, know what to do with desires and impulses that impinge on the other person who, by the nature of the culture is distant from him. What, in other words, is expected of him by others? That is perhaps the major problem for the therapeutic. How better for the therapeutic to find out what is expected of him in the absence of formalized behavioral expectancies, than to join together with others who are similarly preoccupied, and ask them in the way they all understand: "How do you feel when . . . ."

The other, in other words, is problematical indeed for the therapeutic, because the therapeutic wants his approbation, needs it, in fact, if he is to understand himself or accept himself--a very important issue for the therapeutic. With all his regard for his own feelings and their satisfaction, he cannot adequately understand himself without another person, otherwise he gets lost in his own inner labyrinth. In addition, just because the therapeutic has multiplied as a contemporary phenomenon, a sense is emerging in which not only does Everyman need his own therapist, but it only becomes a matter of time before Everyman becomes therapist to his fellows and they to him. That, in fact, may become the largest significance of the encounter group as a cultural phenomenon. He has tried to be his own therapist, but only Freud was ever strong enough to take that bitter medicine day after day by himself.

The encounter group, however, is far from being a steady diet of bitter medicine. To the extent that it is, it has found many spectacular ways of sugar-coating the pill. In return for exposing himself to the group and letting them see what is inside him, thereby allowing them to participate vicariously in his liberation from the same inhibitions that bind them, the working member is fairly bathed in emotional support. He is apt to be closely surrounded by the members of the group as he works through his particular problems, and at the climax be lifted up and gently rocked. The effect of such graphic evidence of the confirmation of others can be overwhelming, especially when it is considered that what most people probably fear in facing themselves is their rejection by others. To find that he is not only accepted but rewarded with such a demonstration of apparent love could scarcely be more reassuring.

At its best the encounter group can be a very liberating experience. It provides for the therapeutic much in the way of reassurance concerning his major desire: a greater freedom to express the latter, precisely because he discovers that he is not condemned but rewarded for doing so. But herein lies perhaps its greatest weakness for many. It is too much of a good thing. To be able to express his most pent-up desires of anger and tenderness is the fondest wish of the therapeutic, especially in the context of approval for doing so. However much the times we live in are characterized by the therapeutic ethos, the experience may be too discontinuous with the participant's everyday life. This may not be the case for the person whose inhibitions are minor, and who only needs some encouragement to be more free in his self-expression. For the person, however, whose problems are a function of deep repressions the encouragement to acknowledge and even express them, and on top of that receive the kind of warmth from others for which his whole being has fairly craved, may be to perpetrate upon him a cruel hoax. When such a person returns to his everyday world he quickly discovers that his needs and yearnings are not any more readily accepted in reality than they were in his fantasies, hence his disappointment may send him further into himself than ever. Another consequence for him might well be that divorced from the strong emotional support in which he was able to acknowledge his repressions, he will find himself in a severe state of anxiety or depression.

The problem of the return to everyday reality may be traumatic enough for the most normal of participants, in the sense that the artificial paradise of the group often gives its members the feeling that all will be well now, that they have met and bested the dragons in their lives, meanwhile not stopping to wonder what kind of dragons could be subdued forever in only a weekend or a week. An initial period of euphoria characterizes the first few days or more after the group experience, but gradually the old inhibitions and fears creep back. His response to this might either be the conviction that he needs another encounter group to get him back into those good feelings, or that personal growth is a rather hopeless undertaking, since it never lasts.

Perhaps the major criticism directed at encounter groups and the human potential movement concerns the problem of group leadership. Because the encounter group is both a new phenomenon, and therefore uninstitutionalized, and because it wears a fashionably subversive mantle, leadership goes to the most charismatic and flamboyant. Thus, it tends to draw its leadership candidates from a wide variety of backgrounds, many of them not remotely related to training or experience in working in depth with the problems of other human beings. What they do tend to share with each other is a usually compelling and often forceful personality accompanied by an intuitive understanding of other people's feelings and emotional needs. Without, however, any systematic exposure to a wide variety of personality types and disturbances they are often quite unprepared for the complexity of many neurotic or borderline psychotic personalities, and least of all for the intensity of the emotional demands that, once encouraged, the disturbed person may direct toward the group. These kinds of problems often elicit, particularly from the more narcissistic charismatic leaders (a common characteristic of the charismatic)[29] quick resort to either very forceful pressure for the disturbed person to fall into line or an attempt simply to ignore the person and his problems in hopes that both will go away. Given the unique dynamics of groups, often at best intuitively understood by the untrained leader and then only in ways that are self-serving, the authority of the leader tends to unleash tremendous pressure on the problem person to acquiesce.

Yalom and Lieberman in their now-famous study of encounter group casualties place the rate at a forbidding 9.4 percent.[30] Such a rate would be bad enough, but when encounter groups are more closely examined with an eye to styles of group leadership it turns out that just as the foregoing criticism suggests, the casualty rate in groups led by the more intense, charismatic style of leader almost doubles over the overall figure. In fact, nearly half (44 percent) of the casualties discovered in their study of eighteen groups took place in the five groups led by high dominance, charismatic leaders. The authors state emphatically

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that:

> The casualty rate seemed truly *caused*, not merely hastened or facilitated, by the leader style, and is therefore preventable by a change in leader style. The type A leaders ("aggressive stimulators") were forceful and impatient. If some sign of growth or change (crying, testimonial, breakdown, or breakthrough) was not given to them in the group, they increased pressure on the participants. The "A" leaders appeared to operate on an immediate gratification system; they paid little heed to the concept of 'working through' and demanded that their members change and change 'now.'[31]

At the same time as the above criticism is made it must be added, to place the issue in its proper perspective, that less aggressive and demanding styles of leadership elicited far fewer casualties, and many positive benefits afterward, although, as the authors point out, the latter was not the subject of the study. They report, however, that: "The type B leaders ('Love leaders') offered much positive support for members. They helped create an accepting, trusting climate in the group which permitted members to participate at their own pace."[32] This suggests that, under the right conditions, and given the proper atmosphere of support and encouragement, the encounter group can remain a potentially powerful tool for personal growth and enhancement. Indeed, Carl Rogers, with due regard for his personal bias, has made the oft-quoted statement that the encounter group is "the most rapidly spreading social invention of the century and probably the most potent."[33]

Kurt Back, in his rather critical study of the encounter group phenomenon, says, concerning research on the results of sensitivity and encounter groups reported in the literature during the period 1945-1970: "Eighteen studies showed definite improvement, while 14 studies gave no positive results. Where there were control groups . . . 19 studies showed positive results and 14 showed negative or mixed results."[34] Of groups that did follow-up work with members, "12 studies showed sustained or incipient improvement during the follow-up, and 7 showed either reverses or continued non-improvement. The equivalent numbers among studies with control groups is 5 with positive results and 6 without." Back concludes that: "Research and evaluation studies tend to show that something happens as a consequence of sensitivity training, but that the effect is not reproducible and that intended benefits are as likely as not to result."[35]

Back then goes on to quote extensively from a rather eloquent defense of encounter groups precisely on the basis of the fact that they do *not* change behavior. Richard Farson says in a personal interview with Back that those positive statements (which from 80 to 90 percent of group participants can be counted on to divulge) involving "changing my life," "turning a corner," "the best thing that ever happened to me," represent not behavioral change but subjective significance. No truly significant human experience, Farson goes on to insist, is ever evaluated in terms of the behavioral change that results from it. In fact, an encounter group experience is valuable and significant in and of itself just as any other outstanding aesthetic and human experience in the realm of say theatre or art. "It's a beautiful moving experience that qualifies with any of these,"[36] Farson says of the encounter group. It does not change behavior, nor should it be expected to, any more than a symphony concert, sexual intercourse, looking at a sunset or reading a good book does. An encounter group is valuable and significant *while it is happening* and that is all that matters.

> The things we value most in our world are those experiences. The things we value least are those that are designed to change you, like training for example. Who cares about training? Advertising. Who cares about advertising? Those are the things that we *don't* care about in our society. Higher education we *do* care about. That's not supposed to change anybody. No *specific* changes are supposed to result from higher education. Romance is not supposed to change you. It's too important to change people.[37]

It might be said, in substantial agreement with Farson, that the intimate encounter with a number of people wherein one is made aware of the depths of joy and pain in persons not dissimilar from oneself is a deepening and enriching experience, one that breeds a greater degree of respect and awareness of others. No one could legitimately deny that such an experience is of no moment simply because it failed to show measurable changes in subsequent behavior. Such changes, furthermore, would be of a quality that would be particularly resistant to measurement. Yet, in the time of the therapeutic, such exposure to the depths of another human being could hardly fail to be a salutary and deepening experience in the education of desire. Of course, while Farson's argument is novel and worthy of serious consideration, it can hardly be disputed that encounter groups do spring out of the therapeutic disposition that concerns itself and does justify itself in terms of its capacity to transform the participant. Even deepening must be expected to have an eventual effect on behavior, as one takes the reality of the other person into greater consideration in one's subsequent actions.

For Back the underlying philosophy of the encounter group movement is concerned with rejecting:

> . . . the intellectual aspect of life, or in somatic language, the influence of the cortex. All the attempts to produce a changed state of mind, such as physical exercises, are directed toward the

> appreciation of the body before the central nervous system developed, relaxing the brain by relying on the importance of other centers of man's physical activity . . . . It is a concerted effort to turn away from the emphasis on intellect, on tool-making activities of the human animal, on classification, in short, on mediation of any experience through reflection, and to push the participants toward a direct experience that is not thought about and not analyzed.[38]

Back's analysis of the philosophy of the encounter group is accurate, but it misses the point of the attack made on reflection and the mediation of experience. The human potential movement may be said to represent a probably much-needed corrective for many against an excess of mediation and reflection. Such people go to encounter groups and other growth activities precisely because they feel unduly hindered in the capacity to experience themselves, others, and the world around them with at least occasional directness. The capacity to reflect and mediate experience is probably safe from the onslaughts of the human potential movement which may, at best, succeed in enabling a few excessively ruminative individuals to develop the beginnings of a capacity to experience some things in life that are not improved by undue mediation and excessive thought more directly.

However, Back is not finished with the philosophy of the group movement. He writes:

> The philosophy of the movement has developed from an abnormal situation, a situation in which, on the one hand, economic needs were not as salient as they had been, and on the other hand, the traditional religious and cultural values no longer affected a great part of the population. Sensitivity training has become a symbol of the search for new types of positive values, for a new 'center' within man, and for similar social expressions. The movement starts from the regeneration of the individual, the way most religions start. In this context, its main claim is the fact that a reconstructed individual, an individual who can express his own feelings, has a chance through sensitivity training to create his own society. According to this view, there is no

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distinction between social needs and needs of the individual.[39]

The human potential movement does possess some of the signs of a religious movement, but it is presently threatened from within into becoming merely a new form of recreation, using the readily available emotions of the therapeutic as its plaything. That is hardly the basis upon which a new faith begins. The increasing frivolity of the group movement is probably a function of the relative brevity of the experience, which in turn seems to be a function of the stress placed on a degree of drama and intensity which could not be sustained over long periods. As such, it is only likely to recapture some of its earlier seriousness to the extent that it develops a greater sense of continuity and a lessened emphasis on the dramatics of growth which seem too often designed to provide people with evidence that they are not quite as dead as they suspect they are.

Whatever its current limitations--as long as they can be adequately overcome--the encounter group may represent the forerunner of an answer to the most pressing needs of the therapeutic: an awareness of the other in both his identity with and otherness from the therapeutic. There is nowhere for the therapeutic to meet the other on his own grounds unless it is in a setting where they both share the same purpose, personal growth, and talk the same language, their emotions. Such conditions provide the basis upon which a sense of identity can be established. In such terms it is probably unprecedented for the way that it discloses to each participant, in the most intense way, the commonality of emotional pain, a basis for identity that undoubtedly excludes no one. Because it creates a basis upon which identity may be established, between people, moreover, who were strangers hours before and may have little else in common, it also creates a foundation upon which a recognition of the otherness of the other person may be founded.

It may seem surprising or even far-fetched to maintain that in the encounter group of all places--where secrecy is all but proscribed--a respect for the *mystery* of the other person would even be tolerated. Granted, the encounter group could only be a vehicle of recognition of the other to the extent that it is allowed and encouraged to operate in an atmosphere where pressure on each person to disclose himself totally is minimized. This is no simple task, for group pressure is always a potentially tyrannical thing, and that pressure very easily turns to pressure to *know* the other person, and in particular the other person who would maintain his mystery. What, after all, is an encounter group supposed to be but a vehicle for self-disclosure? Notwithstanding, what is disclosed in the group is invariably a quality in the other person that elicits a high degree of regard for and recognition of him precisely for what he has endured. That, in the last analysis, may represent the greatest of all human mysteries: the capacity to endure pain and deprivation and yet to prevail.

There is still more to the recognition of the other than a respect for the mystery of his sheer otherness, though without that the rest is lessened. However much of the other is known, what is finally important is the extent to which the other is sufficiently recognized that the desire of the subject does not either incorporate him or nullify him out of haste for the subject to have the object of his desire. What the encounter group can enable the therapeutic to discover is that the other forces him to modify his desire if the other is to remain, in order to give the therapeutic the recognition that he needs more than he needs anything else. What the 'new consciousness' may be all about, in fact, is a realization on the part of growing numbers of affluent people that the commodities of a materially abundant society do not, after all--are incapable even--of providing satisfaction for their desires. The mode of pure desire, as has been reiterated throughout the present work, cannot find satisfaction in objects and their possession, for what desire wants is only obtainable in the *recognition* that the other offers, and can only offer to the extent that it is allowed to remain free and other than the subject. The realization of the fact that the source of desire is always for another desire, another self-consciousness, in Hegel's words, by no means makes it easy to turn from an object-orientation to an other-orientation. In the state of affluence objects, after all, are readily obtained, and they do not, once possessed, struggle for recognition. The other does, but there is never guarantee that it will give it in return. The struggle for recognition always involves the risk that what is desired will not be forthcoming. The only way that it can be made automatic is if the other is made into an *object* of desire and incorporated, thereby negating its otherness.

The widespread popularity of the encounter group may testify to the growing realization on the part of many who, having been in a position to taste the fruit of affluence and, having found that it dissolves in the enjoyment, have found that their real desire is for what only the other is able to give, namely personal recognition. On the other hand, the fears directed at encounter groups, aside from those legitimately based on concerns over inadequate and unscrupulous leadership and other such limitations, may be due to the intuitive realization that genuine encounter involves the risk that the other will not, after all, yield the recognition that is sought, at least in any way that can be secured. Possessions are still safer.

Perhaps the major reason for the failure of the encounter group to offer what it so briefly gives a taste of is precisely its brevity. As such it has almost become a recreation, a ready, intense but brief means for gratifying certain usually suppressed or unavoidably inhibited desires: venting one's spleen in a socially approved way, hugging and caressing attractive people, and more. In its present setting it can scarcely be more than a recreation. It is too brief to be anything else, particularly now that its participants are no longer so naive as to believe that they can overcome a life-time of fears and inhibitions in such an absurdly short period of time. Anyone who has led encounter groups and talked to participants some time after the group has heard the kinds of comments that Carl Rogers reports as a result of follow-up research that he has undertaken: "I wish I had the ability to hold permanently the 'openness' I left the conference with"; another reports: "I experienced a lot of acceptance, warmth and love at the workshop. I find it hard to carry the ability to share this in the same way with people outside the workshop. I find it easier to slip back into my old unemotional role than to do the work necessary to open relationships."[40]

To lead people to expect that when they return to their everyday lives they will be able, after such a brief effort at personality change and growth, to act with any consistency in openness and spontaneity toward others, is to add in the way of expectations an additional burden on the person--precisely what such groups make a point of declaring that they exist to free people of. Significant personality change or growth simply cannot happen quickly; Freud, no stranger to the problem, observed upon at least one occasion that personality change was such a painstaking process that one must operate according to the maxim that the quicker the apparent change the more suspect its significance. Only a sustained approach that took place over a lengthy period of time was likely to produce significant and lasting growth from neurosis to maturity.[41] In spite of a general awareness of the difficulty of significant change occurring in the human personality, encounter groups have continued to operate as though permanent change could be expected to occur almost instantaneously, apparently as the result of the drama and intensity of the procedure used, as though the rule-of-thumb were something like: the more emotion the greater the change. All of this suggests that, far from becoming a medium that contains within itself the potential for taking the therapeutic out of his self-indulgent preoccupation with only his own enhancement, the encounter group tends to represent merely one more instance of the pursuit of immediate gratification that knows no capacity for delay in its desire for well-being and the satisfaction of desire that is characteristic of the therapeutic, and the mode of pure desire that he embodies.

It is as though the method which the encounter group primarily relies on to facilitate change, namely the exposure to intense emotion and the drama of the methods used, has become an end in itself, something, amidst the boredom and alienation from the significant experiences

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of the other person, that, for a brief period gives the therapeutic the sense of being alive. If, however, drama and intense emotions are to be the staple of such experiences, both for recreation and for any change that is expected to occur, then the encounter group cannot chance longer and more permanent exposure to a method which cannot be maintained or endured for longer than brief periods of time. If the encounter group is to make the kind of contribution to ending the essential isolation of the therapeutic in his world of pure desire then it will have to adopt a more serious and certainly more enduring approach to the matter of personal growth and the fulfillment of the self.

One place that the encounter group might begin in seeking a more lasting basis for change than is presently possible within its present format would be through the regular institution of follow-up programs. It has long been one of the most justified criticisms of such groups that no attempts are generally made to follow through on the intense method of change that the participant is exposed to. It lends further credence to the suspicion that such groups are little more than recreational experiences in emotional intensity and close contact with others both physically and emotionally that serve to at once purge and titillate the therapeutic in his need for both excitement and contact with others to convince himself he is alive.

In defense of the growth centers, those that have tried to initiate follow-up sessions have not met with quite the response that might have been expected, given the addiction of many participants to the group method. One growth center that has been both responsible and successful in the establishment of follow-up procedures has been the

Cold Mountain Institute of Cortes Island and Vancouver, British Columbia. It began a procedure known as "Life-Styles," in which evenings were set aside to examine the implications for everyday living of the group experience. To the extent that such a procedure is able to be implemented, what it creates, in effect, is the growth center as the basis for an enduring community for personal and transpersonal growth. Individuals would be free to return to such a growth center repeatedly to continue seriously the sustained work of growth begun in the initial group experience, free from any suspicion that they were merely involved in an addiction to groups. Such experiences could, in all likelihood, not be expected to sustain the level of intensity and drama of the founding group experience, nor should they.

There is certainly something to be said for the initial drama and excitement of the encounter group as a kind of introduction or initiation to the growth experience. One of the major problems associated with the pursuit of significant personal change lies in the resistance of the ego to the process that represents its undoing. How better to disarm the ego than by seducing it with the drama, excitement, and, to use Schutz's word, "Joy" of the encounter experience? The project is lost, however, if the "inducement" becomes an end in itself, and the considerable potentialities for growth that exist in the encounter experience are passed up in order to entertain the therapeutic by merely giving him periodic opportunities to play with his emotions while under the illusion that he is "growing." Once the participant has gotten past the initial attraction stage, and has discovered the benefits of personal growth, as well as its interminable difficulties, then let him commit himself to the process with others of like mind. Then the group experience can forego the need to excite for its own sake and, instead, get down to the hard, joyous, frustrating, satisfying work of personal growth.

Until, in fact, the growth center becomes, in effect, a growth community, where the work begun in the founding group experience may be continued in a sustained way, dealing with the resistances and transferences that are the inevitable accompaniments of the growth experience then the encounter group and the human potential movement are bound to remain as but highly appropriate forms of entertainment for the therapeutic, on the ground where he feels most at home: his emotions. As such they would cease contributing significantly to anyone's growth, although they might help the therapeutic take his all-important emotions less seriously were he simply to continue making them the subject of his weekend or holiday entertainment.

The emergence of the growth community for those who want to continue in a committed way the task of personal growth is already beginning to take place in many different ways. Communal families, Gestalt kibbutzim and other semi-permanent to permanent gatherings of individuals brought together by a realization that growth is not only a long and arduous procedure but that it needs the encouraging, prodding role of other people and the context of a community united by those goals, are emerging (and folding) across America in recent years. Many such communities have involved a commitment, in addition to personal growth, to rural living of a self-subsistent nature and, as such, probably are of limited appeal and relevance to be considered as a widespread cultural option. Probably those are of the greatest interest that direct themselves to those middle-class North Americans who are in the process of a certain disillusionment with the gratification of their desires for possessions, and who seek, instead, satisfaction through self-awareness and more authentic interaction with others.

Bloomberg, Bloomberg, and Miller reported one such attempt to found a growth community, based on a sharing of the members of the initial intensive group experience as what the authors refer to as a "founding experience," and the continuing gatherings of the community in the pursuit of the agreed-upon task of growth as "renewing experiences."[42] The founding experience is defined as:

> . . . the pattern of shared perceptions and prehensions evoked in the participants of a real event that has profound emotional impact and promotes an awareness of interdependence and an increased sense of the individual potential for self-realization. The renewing experience is the periodic reaffirmation of the founding experience in the here and now. The continuity action is the temporal pattern of behavior that constitutes a style of relationship that evolves from a group, giving it a tradition for its ongoing interaction.[43]

At the time of their writing this particular growth community had been in operation, successfully by all accounts, for three years, even with the departure of its original leaders who had moved elsewhere. The regular members had long since taken over full responsibility for the group meetings which had grown to several groups of people meeting in small numbers in members' homes. In addition, a larger range of activities across the spectrum of means for bringing about personal growth had developed. The authors point out that after three years: "A Summerhill-type school is in operation, the theater continues without the original director, another community member directed the last play, and groups and meetings are continuing regularly."[44] They conclude with their conviction that:

> . . . individual growth and change must be achieved within the context of a group that ideally would be a community of people who actively recognize and appreciate each other's common humanity and interdependence. When a person functions within a viable community setting, he can be deeply satisfied with his actions. The founding experience is a focusing on the intrinsic value of each person, and unless people can fall back 'upon authentic and indisputable experiences common to all' they must 'either live in desperate lonely separation,' . . . or press together into a mass.[45]

Another such growth community was begun in Marin County, California in 1969 by Frank Potter. It explicitly sought to develop many of the values associated with the human potential movement within the context of a continuing community of persons similarly committed. Potter's community, named "Open End,"[46] began with about two hundred members and offered each person a choice from a wide variety of growth-oriented activities: encounter groups, study and discussion groups in the literature of the human potential movement, and exposure to many other activities associated with human potential such as yoga, meditation, Gestalt therapy. Such programs were to be of limited duration, six to eight weeks meeting weekly, at the end of which members could enroll in another growth activity of their choice. Thus, there would be a revolving series of related activities in which members could pursue their interests and felt needs with like-minded individuals, some undoubtedly familiar from previous groups, and some who would be new.

Activities were also offered for the total community membership, weekend activities in the country, and community festivals. By thus rooting the quest for personal growth in an ongoing community it could be taken out of the self-defeating self-centeredness of a situation that probably has been all too common a part of the human potential movement: the isolated individual going to a growth center for perhaps the fourth time, to meet a whole new group of strangers with whom he will briefly form a relationship where he learns much about each person's innermost fears and secrets, but nothing else about a person that he will, in all likelihood, never see again.

Open End has been in operation, at this writing, three and one half years. In addition to *Open End*, Potter has been instrumental in bringing together a growing number of such growth communities into a national body entitled *Well-Being*.[47] The growth communities in this organization differ in many ways from each other; some are small groups of individuals pursuing matters of personal and social growth with each other in a continuing way, and others are attempts to match the larger *Open End* model. It might be said that while the former resembles nothing so much as the cell group model, the latter resembles the suburban church congregation. It is not possible to pass any but the most tentative judgement on the prospects of the growth community as a way of providing both the sense of identity with and recognition of the otherness of the other person as antidotes for the mode of pure desire in which the therapeutic finds himself in these times. The existence and continuing development of such communities do suggest that there is a growing realization of the need for the other in personal growth. Once that awareness begins to take hold then the basis can form once again for norms to develop around the sense of identity with and respect for the other person. To the extent that that realization dawns upon the therapeutic the sense of responsibility toward the other person may once again

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come to serve as a limit freely accepted upon the behavior of one person to the other.

In the meantime, the growth community still remains only a vehicle for a small minority of people who have the material luxury to be able to direct a considerable amount of their attention to their own emotional development. However social such a movement may become, moreover, it yet remains thoroughly privatistic, and in its almost exclusive regard for the emotional development of the individual (as well, perhaps, as the members of his community) it shows no signs of public concern whatsoever. It may be, of course, that we are simply moving into a time when the public domain is more and more a matter of indifference to most people, and that, as Rieff suggests, psychological man, like spiritual man in times past will remain more concerned with the state of his own soul or, as the case may be, his own psyche, than of how others beyond his own circle are to be able to find the means for their deliverance from their bondage to necessity.

The exclusive concern with the state of one's own and his community's well-being must remain a narrow and self-indulgent one as long as the sole criterion upon which the other will be recognized is in terms of his willingness to disclose himself. For those that do, a realization of both identity and otherness may well develop. There is a danger, however, that this criterion may only serve to create one more boundary between people, with those who share their emotions with each other on the inside and the insensitive on the outside who do not. If such a division were to emerge we would be no further ahead than ever, for the division between "us" and "them" has always been a point at which the split between Eros and the death instinct has been made.

Summary

The group contains much potential for enabling the individual to enter into relationship with the other in a way that creates, in the common task or allegiance, a basis upon which a sense of identity may be established between those who otherwise would remain in a state of sheer otherness, and as such, remain only outsiders to one another--traditional targets for human beings of suspicion, defensiveness and hostility. Once a basis for identity is established through the medium of the group, then the other is in a position to be recognized, but only as each acknowledges the otherness before him. The determination to remain other can only take place when the subject is given enough of the sense of personal identity that a supporting and encouraging group can bestow upon him. Only in that confidence is the subject able to resist the temptation to acquiesce before the desire of the other before him, and remain other while yet in a relationship of firm identity with him. Outside the family, and the one-to-one relationship of therapy, the group of individuals united in a common task or cause is probably the only context in which identity and otherness may come into being so that the isolated individual may be delivered from the illusory freedom of the mode of pure desire. At the same time, the group has always had the disadvantage in human affairs that it has set around itself a boundary with "us" on the inside, the abode of Eros, and "them" on the outside, the ever-ready target for the death instinct.

For the therapeutic the encounter group may offer an appropriate means whereby, bereft of any common values extraneous to the self to share, people may meet at the level where their chief concern is, namely their emotions. Here they may discover a basis for identity and a respect for the otherness of the person with whom they are sharing themselves. The growth community offers a possible context for the pursuit of self-fulfillment in the enduring way that the latter demands, and in the context of an ongoing community. It threatens, however, to establish one more boundary between people: those who seek self-fulfillment through self-sharing, and those on the outside who do not. The political (in the largest sense) and societal implications of this kind of predicament require further examination, and, as such, the issue of self-transcendance which is also a religious problem.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1] Cf., S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton and Co., 1962), p. 90.

[2] S. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1960), p. 31.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 39.

[5] Ibid., p. 43.

[6] Ibid., p. 44.

[7] Ibid., p. 43.

[8] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[9] Ibid., p. 56.

[10] Ibid., p. 61.

[11] Ibid., p. 76.

[12] Ibid., p. 93.

[13] Ibid., p. 55.

[14] P. Roazen, *Freud: Political and Social Thought* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[15] R. Alexander, "Introduction," Freud, 1921, op. cit., pp. xv-xvi.

[16] Ibid., p. xvi.

[17] Ibid., p. 42.

[18] Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[19] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[20] N. O. Brown, *Love's Body* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 142.

[21] P. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order vs. Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos," working draft for Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1969.

[22] H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A philosophical inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 36.

[23] Cf., Freud, 1921, op. cit., p. 44, "The libido attaches itself to the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and chooses as its first objects the people who have a share in that process."

[24] Freud, 1921, op. cit., p. 50.

[25] Ibid., p. 61.

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[26] S. Freud, The Future on an Illusion (1927), trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957), p. 97.

[27] S. S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuing and innovation in Western political thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 9.

[28] C. R. Rogers, Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 3-4.

[29] Cf., S. Freud, "On Narcissism" (1914), Collected Papers, 4, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1959).

[30] I. D. Yalom and M. A. Lieberman, "A Study of Encounter Group Casualties," Archives of General Psychiatry, 25 (July, 1971), 29.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 30.

[33] Rogers, op. cit., p. 1.

[34] Kurt Back, Beyond Words: The story of sensitivity training and the encounter movement (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), p. 193.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 195.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., pp. 207-08.

[39] Ibid., p. 234.

[40] Rogers, op. cit., p. 38.

[41] S. Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937) Collected Papers, 5, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1959).

[42] L. Bloomberg, P. Bloomberg, and R. L. Miller, "The Intensive Group as a Founding Experience," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 9, no. 1 (Spring 1965), 93-95.

[43] Ibid., p. 96.

[44] Ibid., p. 95.

[45] Ibid., p. 99.

[46] Most of the information concerning *Open End* was obtained through correspondence and conversation with Frank Potter, in June, 1972.

[47] Cf., Communication, I, a monthly journal of *Well-Being*, a National Association for Human Community.

CHAPTER VII

THE COMMUNITY OF EROS

No serious attempt to investigate the implications of Freudian thought for man's social life can avoid coming to terms with the implacable portrayal of the limits of human possibility contained in Civilization and its Discontents. Its position has been summarized in Chapter II and will not be repeated, but before we consider some of the larger social, ethical, and religious questions before us it might be well to have our memories refreshed concerning the harshness of the position that we begin with in Freud. Trilling aptly summarizes that position as follows:

> Man's existence in civilization is represented as being decisively conditioned by a psychic entity which under the mask of a concern with social peace or union, carries on a ceaseless aggression to no purpose save that of the enhancement of its own power, inflicts punishment for no act committed but only for a thought denied, and, so far from being appeased by acquiescence in its demands, actually increases its severity in the degree to which it is obeyed. Nor does the insatiable tyrant confine its operations to the internal life of individuals, its rage for peaceableness quickens and rationalizes man's rage against man. The hegemony of this ferocious idol of the psychic cave may indeed not have been required or intended by civilization, but surely in tolerating the great fraud civilization is profoundly implicated in its grotesque inauthenticity.[1]

Since, Trilling goes on to argue, this condition can be discovered and described by the rational intellect, this agency might then be expected to be similarly adept at controlling the aggressiveness both expressed and muted that so characterizes civilization in order to bring about an increase in human happiness. Freud raises this very question, indeed it is central to his concern in dealing with the subject of civilization and what we may hope from it. He gives only what Trilling describes as a tentative and gentle answer combined with a skepticism 'muted in courtesy to our hope.' Freud does go so far as to suggest that a significant change in the relation of human beings to possessions would bring society's ethical ideals more within reach, but he is not sure that this would greatly ameliorate the unconscious influence in man's life. There are simply too many immutable factors acting on the individual from within to expect that any attempt to change his ways from without would significantly weaken the power of that inner tyrant. Trilling reminds us that:

> . . . [Freud] understands the limitless exigence of the superego to be rooted in the immemorial past, in the natural history of an organism in which the will to survive by ceaseless effort is matched in strength by the will to find peace in extinction. Against the psychic dynamics instituted by this ambivalence, by its interfusion of the primal 'Yes' and the no less primal 'No,' and reinforced by later ambivalences, the simultaneous love and hate of the father, the desire for isolate autonomy and for union with others, it is unlikely that any revision of societal norms can prevail. Ultimately it is a given of biology, definitive of man's nature, and its consequences are not to be reversed.[2]

Nonetheless, it is Trilling's contention "that Freud, in insisting upon the essential immitigability of the human condition as determined by the nature of the mind, had the intention of sustaining the authenticity of human existence that formerly had been ratified by God. It was his purpose to keep all things from becoming weightless."[3] If this be the case, however, it can only be assumed that the basis upon which Freud would have modern man live with authenticity could only have to do with obtaining a reason to live without illusion. In a word, the courage to live without illusion could be said to lie at the very heart of the total Freudian project. Freud's work from beginning to end, from the clinical to the great social and religious concerns that compelled his attention in his last decade, had to do with freeing human beings from illusions, whether the illusions have to do with the infantile ones that the neurotic personality clung to to maintain himself in the world with diminishing success, or the collective ones of responding to the cosmos with infantile dependency as to an omnipotent father, thereby preventing him from drawing upon the fullness of his own resources. For Freud, then, disillusioned man is authentic man because nothing extrinsic or infantile stands between his own unaided resources and the world and the tasks for him within it. If modern man is to live authentically it cannot be with the aid of a religious myth which no longer persuades and mostly oppresses, with demands that weigh too heavily upon him for him to meet without great psychic cost.

An intellect strong enough to rely on itself rather than on the consolations of religious myth can, according to Freud, accomplish much:

> The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points in which one may be optimistic about the future of man, but in itself it signifies not a little. And one may make it its starting point for yet other hopes. The primacy of the intellect certainly lies in the far, far, but still probably not infinite distance. And as it will presumably set itself the same aims that you expect to be realized by your God--of course within human limits, in so far as external reality, *Ananke*, allows it--the brotherhood of man and the reduction of human suffering, we may say that our antagonism is only a temporary and not an irreconcilable one.[4]

Without his illusions, says Freud, man is granted much to work with. It is not just that he is robbed of his consolations, he is at the same time given the precious gift of being able to see the world as it is. When he is able to do this he will find, through the aid of science for Freud, that there is a remarkable correspondence between his own mental equipment and the structure of the universe beyond himself. Thus able to respond in truth to the world with his unaided but unimpeded resources, man will find himself increasingly able to understand it and to use that understanding to facilitate the ancient goal of the brotherhood of man and the reduction of human suffering.

Freud does not, then, hold that, in the absence of consoling and demanding cosmic myths, modern man will no longer have reason to work together in community; rather he should be freer to work with others on the level of common humanity, unbound by the limits to the sense of identity imposed by the clashing allegiances to extraneous objects of loyalty.[5] We are not so sanguine today as it was still possible to be in Freud's day concerning the unlimited possibilities that science alone could bring to man, but we need perhaps be no less intent upon finding the means by which man may find ways of uniting with his fellows that transcend those barriers that include some and exclude the rest--as often as not to inhumane treatment. This is the issue to which Freud would have us address ourselves, not merely a resignation into stoic individualism. Both the individual *and* society are expected by Freud to summon the courage to live without illusion.

Freud had, for a healer, remarkably little patience for human weakness. That may be precisely why his patients got better. They were expected to. He had, accordingly, little patience with any form of supportive therapy for he thought it did not expect enough of the patient's capacity to endure the plain truth.[6] Yet it was not merely for a life of sterile rationality that he thought it necessary to disillusion either his patients or mankind as a whole. It was, as Trilling points out, in order that he might live a wholly authentic existence. The latter would involve, in a very helpful distinction pointed out by Rieff in his earlier work on Freud, a life of *honesty* with oneself rather than one of *sincerity*.[7] The latter, Rieff feels, involves a self-indulgent quest for the "real me," whereas Freud's task was to encourage the individual to simply know himself, however painful to his narcissism such knowledge might be. Nor was the individual obliged or justified in any way in inflicting his impulses on others, quite unlike the "sincere" person who feels that to be true to himself he must act as he feels. Such a person for Freud would lose both his freedom and his integrity, both of which were involved with the freedom not to act if that were the better course.

Life without illusions! It is a hard course, and how many are equal to it even in these sophisticated times? And if it is necessary for us to be stripped of the last of our illusions concerning the possibility of being cared for like children once again, before we can break down those barriers that make friends of those who agree with us, and enemies of those who do not, then what kind of communities can men possibly have? The existence of a community of necessity demands that certain beliefs or loyalties be held in common that separate and identify those who are a part of the community from those who are not. Implied in Freud's project of disillusionment is the abandonment of allegiance to a leader who is regarded as a father figure, for it is the function of fathers to protect and guide us. Freud would have us live on the strength of our own resources, rather than leaving part of them undeveloped while we wait for a symbol of the father of our childhood to do for us what we are able to do ourselves. Granted, for Freud such freedom and self-reliance is not likely to manifest itself until the distant future for most of mankind.[8] Until that distant time man is likely to remain under the tyranny of the demanding voice within, and the unrealistic voice of culture without; and Freud can only hope that society will learn soon to mitigate its demands upon man's harried instincts.

Yet, if Rieff's diagnosis of our present condition is correct, then society has followed Freud's advice, and probably far sooner than he had any hope that it would. But who is to say that we are altogether the better for it? We do indeed have greater freedom for our instincts of both love and hate, but it is as if they do not know where or how far to go in their freedom. This, in a word, is Rieff's point. However, it discloses a perennial problem in the classical psychoanalytic understanding of where and how the limits that must be imposed upon the instincts are to come from. Freud, and even more so those who followed him, were well aware of the necessity for limits to be maintained upon the instincts, for psychoanalysis has never been enamoured of doctrines concerning the innocency and inherent goodness, or even of notions of the *tabula rasa*. Implicit in the Freudian doctrine of man is the notion that such is the power of his instincts that their unimpeded expression is as frightening to the child as it is shocking to his parents.[9] He is, therefore, in need from the start of his life for limits to be applied to his instincts, the instinct to love as well as to hate.

Because, however, of its inability to consider the larger implications of its own practice to its theory, psychoanalysis has never really been able to see that the *learned* regard for the other that takes place in the struggle for recognition creates the proper location of the limits on the undiluted expression of the instincts.

The political and ethical implications of this distinction are important. Its failure to see in the other the authentic human source of those limits as the *education of desire* has thus far left psychoanalysis nowhere to go but back again to the arbitrary imposition of limits by an authority who knows what is best for the child. It is this unsatisfactory compromise that has tended to make psychoanalysis ineluctably conservative politically, culturally, and ethically. If, after all, the instincts are not only congenitally unruly, but lead unavoidably (one of them at least) to extinction in one form or another, such that their internalization creates as many problems for the beleaguered individual as their expression does for society, then what choice is there for the human condition but controls, albeit more humane ones? We have indicated periodically that Freud's description of the human psyche and the sources of its motives are an unparalleled statement of life in thrall to death, hence to the helpless and exposed state of childhood where the child was so at the mercy of the threat of the separation that was to him death. Freud, however, made the descriptive into the normative and was left with no way out of an extremely grim situation for human life. Within that state everything that Freud says about human bondage to childhood and the inexorability of the death instinct is sound. Death and fear prevail when one lives essentially

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alone. Eros is only able to eke out limited satisfactions, while, beyond the level of consciousness, the path to extinction away from the pain of life is free to have its way.

Within such a world, where there is no intrinsic place for the other person, all that can be done to contain the dangerous instincts is to apply external controls to them. This relieves the child's apprehensions fully as much as it does the parents because the child does not want to be any more alienated from them than he already feels he is. If, however, we grant that the child enters the world in a state of extreme vulnerability and aloneness, then as long as he remains in that state he will be subject to more fear and tension than he can cope with and will seek primarily a tension-free state. He will also seek to retain the father in his role of all-powerful protector, the source of all his later illusions. Should, in these circumstances, he continue to find the life state filled with an excess of uncertainty, tension and helplessness, unrelieved by anything better, he will remain subject to the instinct that seeks to diminish life. If he should find, however, support, comfort, and pleasure from other life, then life will seem not only satisfying on the whole, but the tensions and separations of life will be able to be tolerated. They will not have to be repressed and life will not have to be governed by the pursuit of tension-reduction. The death instinct will not have to be "paid off" in order to cling to what satisfactions life does have to offer. In fact, the death instinct, unrepressed, will be available to enable the subject to live more fully, unintimidated by the risks of life and the possibilities of death in every moment of life. Then, too, he will be free to let his father go, to become a person instead of a protector. He will be free of illusions.

For a state of life that accepts death to be able to develop, the role of the other is all-important. The human infant is not born in such a state of integration. It is only when he comes up against the other and finds the other both near and separate that he *learns* to accept and enjoy life. If he is fortunate enough to find in the other one who does not use separateness to intimidate, but who shows that it is possible to be available and loving though--in fact, because--separate, then he learns that otherness is not a threat to life but the means by which love and care are given. Separateness may also mean pain and anxiety, but if it primarily means the loving one, it means that life and death can be received equally. The desire of the infant comes up against the desire of the other and learns thereby its own limits. It learns too that there is a more pleasurable satisfaction than that obtainable through the satisfaction of pure desire, and that is the joy of being recognized. Such recognition need not always take the form of pleasure, it may, instead, involve the discovery of the subject's limits, but this too is part of the education of desire. The latter occurs, not in the extinction of desire, nor, certainly, in its repression, but in the coming up of desire against the unmistakable desire of another who does not simply yield, nor impose his desire, rather modifies it as the subject begins to learn to modify his.

Understood in this way, the social world need be seen neither as exploitive of the innocence and desire of the free-born child, nor as a necessarily authoritarian realm where order must be imposed to save the unruly child from his own dangerous impulses. That it often is one or

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the other or both of these is a function of the tyranny of death in the life of man. It is not an irremediable role however. It does say that man and his life in society will be reclaimed neither by enabling the full expression of his desires, as Marcuse, Brown, Reich and the like would have it, nor by containing and sublimating his desires as the orthodox Freudians would consider unavoidable, but it places hope in the education of the pure desire of the child into a recognition of the other, both in his identity and his otherness to the self. This is not an easy task, though it surely puts to rest those notions that rest simply on the spontaneous unfolding of the individual into the fullness of his selfhood. The latter, in our view, has no real possibility apart from the role of the other and the encouragement he gives to Eros, the drive toward life.

We are now able to add a further dimension to the reality-principle, which may be seen, not merely as *Ananke*--necessity--but as that which, through the agency of the other, humanizes. As *Ananke*, the reality-principle imposes reality on the child, he is forced to comply to meet its demands. As the education of desire, however, the reality-principle encounters the child with the reality and gift of the other, in both his identity to, and separateness from the child, as the means by which an organism may become a self. Ricoeur points this out in a slightly different connection, but his words are no less apt:

> . . . reality is also, in psychoanalytic terms, the world of things and of men, such as that world would appear to a human desire which has given up the pleasure principle, that is to say, which has subordinated its point of view to the whole. But then . . . is reality merely Ananke? Is reality simply necessity offered to my resignation? Is it not also possibility opened to the power of loving?[10]

This view says much by implication about human relationships and about the importance of the family in making a beginning of these possible. What is important in what it says, however, has nothing to do with families simply living for their children, sacrificing all for them. It is as important for the child to discover the otherness of his parents as it is for him to learn of his identity with them. His desire will only be educated or humanized as he discovers that his parents have desires as well as he, but that each set of desires is taken into mutual consideration in reaching decisions concerning actions to be taken. Yet before the otherness of the object of desire can be perceived as an educating rather than a repressing experience, it must be presented in the context of the recognition unmistakably given to the child. Such recognition and love are, in fact, most likely to be freely rather than dutifully given to the extent that the parent is able to take refuge, so to speak, in his otherness.

In the time of the therapeutic the education of desire makes for an interesting problem indeed. The therapeutic is characterized by his attempt, encouraged by a commodity society, to live in the mode of pure desire, and as much, in all likelihood, where his children are concerned as anywhere else. If the child enters the world in that mode as well, what happens when desire meets desire? Each might be expected to seek to incorporate the other. The child seeks his desire and so does the parent. This might take the form of the child seeking to identify with or mirror his parents. The parent might impose his desires on the child--but the therapeutic is generally too kind for that--instead he makes the child's desires his own. He would then seek to live his subsequent life

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through his children, identifying with them, perhaps even more than they with him. Why, in the last analysis, should they identify with him? Identification, after all, takes place as a function of the frustration of desire, the loss of the object. The therapeutic, however, gratifies the pure desire of his child, thereby eliminating the need for identification to take place.

The aforementioned corresponds to the suggestion of Wheelis,[11] and later by Homans,[12] that the superego as internalized authority has been largely replaced in the contemporary period by the impersonal pressures and rewards of mass society. Thus, it may not be the prohibition of the incorporated parents that direct behavior so much as the substitute gratifications of material objects (that can never fully satisfy), on one hand, and the incapacity of the mass society and its large corporate structures to satisfy basic human needs for recognition and effectiveness of actions, on the other. In both cases the individual is left in a state of longing in which he has few restraints on him, many unsatisfied desires, along with the illusion that he can be satisfied by the myriad objects available to him by virtue of his affluence. He may slake his desires, but they do not satisfy because, ultimately, only other persons truly satisfy. But the other person modifies or limits desire in the very act of satisfying, because what the other satisfies is not the desire for unmitigated pleasure in the first place so much as the need of the person to be recognized.

The family could redeem itself in the era of the therapeutic were the therapeutic parent to follow some of his own inclinations and meet the desire of the child with his own desire. In that ensuing struggle mutual recognition might begin to arise. If so the therapeutic might begin to be saved from the inherent frustrations and dissatisfactions of the mode of pure desire through the recognition of the other.

It is in man's larger social life, however, that the problems of the other, and the individual's identity with and separateness from him loom largest, even if it is in the family where the basis for adequately dealing with these issues must have its beginning. Whereas in the family identity tends to be the given, and otherness what the child must learn in order to find life satisfying, in the larger society it is the otherness or strangeness of people that is given, and it is a basis upon which identity may be established that is the problem. In man's thralldom to death and to his own childhood he tends to resolve the relationship of otherness and identity by joining with those who are perceived to share certain loyalties or desires in common, and excluding those with whom he does not perceive such a basis for identity. As Freud pointed out, he invests his libido in those within his group, and discharges his destructive instincts on those on the outside. Thus, civilization pays the price for the love that is generated within groups and communities with the hostility that is exercised between groups and communities.

It has been maintained throughout the present work that it is highly consistent with the thrust of Freud's work to find in Eros the sole basis by which civilized life might prevail.[13] But if man's life in community is also the ineluctable source of his social violence[14] then at best man may only inch ahead, always only a step in front of the ever-pursuing death instinct, as Freud made clear in his masterpiece

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of pessimism, Civilization and its Discontents. Let us examine what would become of man's larger social life were he better able to tolerate the otherness of human beings, as he might have learned such tolerance in infancy. The source of repression, we are saying, lies in the fear of what lies behind the uncertainty of otherness. A person who had learned that it was precisely otherness that made the fullness of life possible might not be so suspicious, defensive and hostile toward the otherness of the person who did not share his loyalties, desires, and values. Thus he would not be so inclined to close that person off from himself behind the walls erected around his own community for protection. Is this not part of the project of disillusionment: the destruction of the illusion that the community insures the person's protection from the uncertainties of life? But in bringing about such a state of affairs would we not be eliminating community as perhaps the most effective potential vehicle both for all that is civilizing for man, and for any hopes of the education of pure desire that has not yet learned of the integrity of the other? If the work of disillusionment unavoidably calls for the disintegration of community, then we must yield to Rieff's thesis. We cannot, however, if we are to take what Freud says about Eros seriously.

Community remains a possibility for the future of civilization only if the allegiance of the other to his own community can cease to be a threat to human beings. In order for what might seem like a utopian hope to be realized, the very nature of belief itself must be examined and reinterpreted. Fortunately, as it happens, the times in which we live make belief less of a problem than in times past. Freud notes that, "people who are unbelieving or indifferent are much better off psychologically in this matter (of cruelty and intolerance)."[15] These are such tolerant times that, with the exception of political ideologies and racial differences, most belief systems are unable to be taken seriously when they make ultimate claims, although this phenomenon may have less to do with tolerance *per se* than with a melancholy resignation to the awareness that there is little that modern man finds himself able or willing to believe. Perhaps his very inability to believe anything in an absolute way points the way to a different way of believing; not absolutely but relatively.

We have been made increasingly aware in the twentieth century that we do not live in a fixed world, either concerning what is outside ourselves, or even concerning what is truly outside and what is within ourselves. It was Freud who, more than anyone, made us aware of how much we are subject to feelings that emerge from within yet which we deal with by attributing to forces outside ourselves, because our conscious ego disclaims both responsibility for and awareness of them. Freud pointed out that it was the nature of the ego that it "thrusts forth upon the external world whatever within itself gives rise to pain."[16] The sometimes hyperbolic but essentially accurate words of Norman O. Brown state the case very well: "The boundary line between self and external world bears no relation to reality; the distinction between ego and world is made by spitting out part of the inside, and swallowing in part of the outside."[17] While most people today continue to operate as though the boundaries between the ego and what lies beyond it were fixed and sure, perhaps all of us feel the combined effects of Freud's as well as the host of other relativizing teachings that have inundated modern man, to the point where there seems nothing that he can any longer believe for certain. Freud has furthermore shown us that in all our actions we transfer our accumulated feelings and experiences from our past, and that this tendency is irretrievable so long as man remains the animal who represses himself. Thus, whatever he sees or believes beyond himself cannot in truth be separated from his own history. Man classically does this in his religious beliefs. He projects on to the cosmos his own unconscious and therefore unrealized desire to be protected by someone who is utterly reliable and strong. This belief becomes his lodestar around which the entire cosmos turns. But if he even suspects that what he has been convinced is his fixed star is in reality just a projection of himself, his infantile self--then what *is* certain? It was Freud's intention to tell us quite firmly and uncompromisingly that nothing is certain, and to wish upon us the courage to live in that realization, accepting only that the experience of life itself is its own and only meaning. The pursuit of a something extraneous to that is a concession to our repressions that we give them by alienating ourselves from our own experience of life and asking an outside reference point that we cannot experience to invest life with meaning. That, as Rycroft points out, is the meaning of Freud's vexing words to Marie Bonaparte that: "The moment a man questions the meaning and value of life he is sick, since objectively speaking neither has any existence."[18]

Man's great religious traditions are, in the final analysis, not altogether at odds with Freud's skepticism on these matters. Buddhism is founded precisely upon the saving power that lies in acknowledging that nothing is certain, and that perpetual change is the only reality; life's meaning is found in its own experience and nothing else. The Biblical tradition too is rooted in an understanding of a God who is invisible, nameless, uncontrollable, unlocatable and whose presence can only be realized in the self-abandonment before the flux of all visible things, confident in the spirit. Consolation in both these traditions is found not in infantile desires being gratified, but at the point at which personal desires are relinquished and life is abandoned to the uncertainty of faith. That kind of life is fully as courageous and free of illusion as the skeptical life Freud urges us to lead. Such a life knows no boundaries of the more and the less favored, of those within and those without the fold. But then this has always been the case. The great religions of the world have, from the beginning, taught that consolation was only found at the bitter edge of life when the world's desires had been abandoned as fruitless and deceptive.

Brown and Marcuse are perfectly correct in avowing that man's only hope for actual salvation lies in the abolition of repression. But, as we have observed already, the abolition of repression has naught to do with the abandonment to desire, but if anything to the abandonment *of* desire. It is only in the acknowledgement of the other that desire can be modified and life lived amidst its risk and uncertainties, the incapacity to tolerate which is the source of repression.

As Rieff points out, traditionally the community has been the agent of desiring man's healing through being recognized and provided with a place of security and belonging.[7] It is questionable today

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whether there exists any such thing as a community in any sense of a cohesive body of people who acknowledge bonds of identity through shared convictions concerning their community and the cosmos. Luckmann holds that contemporary society is characterized by a peculiar "discrepancy between the subjective 'autonomy' of the individual . . . and the objective autonomy of the primary institutional domains . . . . Their functional rationality is not part of a system that could be of 'ultimate' significance to the individuals in the society . . . . The functional rationality of the primary social institutions seems to reinforce the isolation of the individual from his society, contributing thereby to the precariousness inherent in all social orders."[19] It is Luckmann's contention, moreover, that the sphere of belief in matters of ultimate significance has become, formal obeisance to various public acts of piety aside, an almost exclusively private matter. He observes that: "Once religion is defined as a 'private affair' the individual may choose from the assortment of 'ultimate' meanings as he sees fit--guided only by the preferences that are determined by his social biography."[20] While such a turn of events gives the individual a sense of freedom and a very private sense of personal identity, both are rather illusory because in the meantime the autonomous institutions of the public domain are increasingly themselves liberated, but their liberation is from any sense of obligation to or influence by such isolated and privately preoccupied individuals. In a word, there is a diminishing sense of public consciousness, even of the capacity to act publicly.

Thus given the freedom to develop their own private world views and systems of belief, vague and clumsily syncretistic though they be, individuals are less and less likely to look to others to form communities of belief. This trend, to the extent that it prevails, divests the individual of one of his major motives for uniting with others in community: to find sanctions for his beliefs about the cosmos. Even the social dimension of religion is abandoned and handed over to the mode of pure desire, for unencumbered by further needs to have his beliefs brought up against those of others he is left simply to believe what he desires and finds personally convenient. Luckmann sees no likely reversal of these trends and concludes with sentiments that Rieff might well echo, indeed they are even harsher than any prognosis of his:

> While the new social form of religion supports the dehumanization of the social structure, it also 'sacralizes' the (relative) liberation of human *consciousness* from the constraint of the latter. This liberation represents a historically unprecedented opportunity for the autonomy of personal life for 'everybody.' It also contains a serious danger--of motivating mass withdrawal into the private sphere while 'Rome burns.'[21]

Yet this private religiosity might have the capacity for taking more of a social form than first meets the eye. Even within its various idiosyncratic forms, while encouraging the individual to indulge his wishful fantasies even more credulously than the dogmatic faiths of old, they have the immediate effect of creating an unprecedentedly high degree of openness toward all belief options--more than tolerance, active sympathy even, as each sect of one seeks what it may find of additional value from the private faiths of friendly rivals. All such individualized religions, after all, seem to be united on one theme: self-expression, self-realization. Luckmann notes:

> Since the 'inner man' is, in effect, an undefinable entity, its presumed discovery involves a lifelong quest. The individual who is to find a source of 'ultimate' significance in the subjective dimension of his biography embarks upon a process of self-realization and self-expression that is, perhaps, not continuous--since it is immersed in the recurrent routines of everyday life--but certainly interminable. In the modern sacred cosmos self-expression and self-realization represent the most important expressions of the ruling topic of individual 'autonomy.'[22]

Once embarked upon, however, even the pursuit of self-realization need not be synonymous with self-indulgence. All religious pursuits, after all, involve the quest for a whole or healed self. What saves such quests from self-indulgence is the fact that once the search has gotten fully underway, presuming it is a serious one and that it is not just another consumer recreation of the bored, it comes to be realized that the greatest obstacle toward one's own realization and self-expression is the narcissism and defensiveness of the ego. To the extent that this discovery dawns upon the seeker, his proximity toward others in similar pursuit, whatever the differences in their private faiths, might well give him something like the traditional companion in the faith. Such, today, is the degree of openness toward the right of each to follow his own vision that, in fact, what unites people in matters of belief or faith is not the identity of the point of view but the simple fact that this particular person *has* a faith or something about which he cares deeply. Thus, with certain exceptions, Christians today tend more and more to be united, whatever their sectarian affiliation, by their shared allegiance to Christ, and, moreover, one notices among the young, at any rate, that it is enough that they find another that shares a faith commitment, and a good part of the involvement of one with the other consists of finding out just what each is "into."

It is far too early to pass firm judgement on these contemporary trends in religious belief; because they are so unprecedented in the annals of human conviction, so at odds with the traditional human intolerance of convictions different from one's own, there is almost no basis for forming judgements, except perhaps those of curiosity. For now it is only possible to wait and see, and hope. If it be an indication of the direction of religious conviction and commitment in the time to come, then it promises the possibility of bridging the autonomy of the modern individual with a degree of life commitment that Rieff seems to find no longer possible; he assumes that all genuine commitments must be social,[23] with social bonds of regard and joint commitment--if only to a serious acknowledgement that there is a reality that transcends that of the ego--and of the autonomous and wholly contingency-bound activities of the public institutions of these times. Indeed, William James foresaw and extolled such a religious vision as this century was just underway. He wrote then:

> Ought it, indeed, to be assumed that the lives of all men should show identical religious elements? In other words, is the existence of so many religious types and sects and creeds regrettable?
>
> To these questions I answer 'No' emphatically. And my reason is that I do not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions and with such different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same functions and the same duties. No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to work out identical solutions. Each, from his peculiar angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner. One of us must soften himself, another must harden himself; one must yield a point, another must stand firm--in order the better to defend the position assigned him. If an Emerson were forced to be a Wesley, or a Moody forced to be a Whitman, the total human consciousness of the divine would suffer. The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group

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> of qualities, by being champions of which in alternation, different men may all find worthy missions. Each attitude being a syllable in human nature's total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely. So a 'god of battles' must be allowed to be the god for one kind of person, a god of peace and heaven and home, the god for another. We must frankly recognize the fact that we live in partial systems, and that parts are not interchangeable in the spiritual life. If we are peevish and jealous, destruction of the self must be an element of our religion; why need it be one if we are good and sympathetic from the outset? If we are sick souls, we require a religion of deliverance, but why think so much of deliverance if we are healthy-minded? Unquestionably, some men have the completer experience and the higher vocation, here just as in the social world; but for each man to stay in his own experience, whate'er it be, and for others to tolerate him there, is surely best.[24]

There are obviously many problems involved in such an understanding of religion, the greatest of them probably being the question of what is to act upon the believing individual to free him from blind acquiescence to his own unconscious needs and desires, what is to take him beyond staying too much 'in his own experience,' for others to tolerate him all too readily there, so that he enters more deeply into his illusions than ever? Only the role of the other. The alternative is the exotic private visions of the Jungians who, furthermore, have no need and no place for the other, for the individual in that scheme is complete unto himself, a microcosm of the entire universe.

In the religions of the East there has always been a role of the other for the serious seeker, precisely because it is recognized that not only are the religious needs of each individual different in an objective sense, but because of the endlessly self-deceptive capabilities of the ego. A guru for each seeking individual in a mass society would not be an altogether credible proposition. Something perhaps would develop as has been the case amongst the thousands who subscribe to the teachings of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and who therefore count him their guru. His role is thereupon taken for the individual by teachers who have taken brief courses in teaching meditation and the deeper disciplines of 'transcendental meditation.' As typically an adaptation of the 'wisdom of the East' to Western values of consumption, technique, and instant results, as it seems, the method, nonetheless, does have much to say for it in terms of effectiveness.[25]

We are not prescribing programs in the present work, only indicating where some present trends might go from here, and, if they do, what ingredients would be necessary in addition to avoid some of the obvious pitfalls of the religious life. Whatever form he takes, the other person would be essential to act as a limit to the desires and illusions of the ego. This suggests the need for something in the way of communities that both allow the enhancement of the private vision, yet retain in common a sense of commitment to being committed, so to speak, to the transcendent or the transpersonal. But more of that later.

Similar to an understanding of truth for the individual is Brown's project for the 'resurrection of the body.' For Brown the abolition of repression does not only involve the surrender to desire, an aspect of his that we have rejected, but a return to symbolic consciousness as a way of understanding the multiplicity of truth. Here, what Brown identifies as Protestant literalism or Blake's 'single vision' is regarded as part and parcel of the dualistic or repressive response to life. If there is only one truth, then in the meeting of one desire with another only one can be true, and, although the neurotic solution is to seek both by disclaiming responsibility for one while subscribing to the other, the real solution for Brown is that both are true, both may have their own desire; there is no reason why one must be imposed on the other. In the present work we propose that it is not both desires that may be gratified, but that, in the meeting of desire with the desire of the other, a mutually arrived at modification takes place, for my desire is best satisfied with the other. Nonetheless, Brown's project of symbolic consciousness bears some examination. He writes:

> There is another kind of Protestantism possible; a Dionysian Christianity; in which the scripture is a dead letter to be made alive by spiritual (symbolical) interpretations; in which meaning is not fixed, but ever new and ever changing; in a continuous revelation; by fresh outpouring of the holy spirit. Meaning is made in a meeting between the holy spirit buried in the Christian and the holy spirit buried underneath the letter of scripture; a breakthrough, from the *Abgrund,* from the unconscious of the reader past the conscious intention of the author to the unconscious meaning; breaking the barrier of the ego and the barrier of the book.[26]

It is of course the ultimate in Protestantism that each seeker is to allow himself to be led by the spirit to whatever it tells him is his truth. It is to remove the determination of what constitutes the truth entirely from the social realm; more seriously, it is to remove the consequences of each determination of the truth from social judgement. We all, after all, have seen what hellish visions some men have been persuaded to obey because they had been made privy to a personal visitation by God. Unless the private vision can come to some terms with a community of faith, however tolerant it may be, it seems unlikely that men would ever be able to be freed from their own desire and their own illusions. It is Brown's hope that by eliminating the literal,

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single sense of what constitutes the truth, that the greatest blow possible would be delivered to man's repression of himself. Polymorphous perversity, for Brown, means that the desires of the whole, unrepressed body are free to find expression--and how do they express themselves but symbolically.

> In freedom is fusion. Pentecostal freedom, Pentecostal fusion, speaking with tongues: many tongues, many meanings. The Babylonian confusion of tongues redeemed in the Pentecostal fusion. Many meanings dwelling together in unity; because it is the unspoken meaning that they mean. Real unification is in the unseen unity, unity at the unconscious level, at the level of symbolism. Pentecostal spirit is a principle of unspoken, unconscious unity, behind the diversity of conscious tongues; a unity which is impersonal or supra-personal, a unity in which personality is dissolved. Literal meaning is conscious meaning, a possession of the ego, a personal thing, a matter of personal self-assertion; contentious, divisive; opinion, dogma. To seek unity through univocation is to assure disunity. The blessing of multiplicity rejected returns as a curse: heresies and sects come from the literal sense of scripture. Instead of the Pentecostal fusion, the Babylonian confusion, the battle of books.[27]

Once the division between conscious and unconscious is overcome through listening to the symbolical language of the unconscious rather than the literal, univocal words of the conscious mind, then the source of all barriers is overcome. Self and other are revealed to be as illusory divisions as that between the conscious and the unconscious; indeed they are the same thing.[28] Break down the latter barrier through play, poetry, metaphor and myth, and all boundaries will quickly fall in its wake, and all things shall be one, "the body that is identical with environment," in Brown's words.[29]

For the times in which we are living, insofar as it concerns what can and shall be believed, Brown's symbolic consciousness has much to say. There is little doubt that, within a Freudian understanding, there is a decided relationship between repression, and the maintenance of the literal truth as a means of separating 'my' certainty from the uncertainty beyond what 'I' believe, and between 'our' truth and 'their' untruth. To the extent, therefore, that we are able to realize that 'Newton's sleep' of Blake's 'single vision' is the sleep of death, and often of murder, we shall be able to allow the other person his understanding of truth, and yet realize that his truth, in fact, is not totally other than mine. This is how Brown's symbolic consciousness differs from James' multiverse of single truths. For Brown, all the various symbolic representations of truth return to one underlying truth of the self in unity with all that is. Indeed for Brown: "Unification is deification."[30] He writes, triumphantly: "Dionysus, the mad god, breaks down the boundaries; releases the prisoners; abolishes repression; and abolishes the *principium individuationis*, substituting for it the unity of man and the unity of man with nature."[31]

Bellah sums up very well what the outcome would be of taking Brown seriously:

> One consequence of the mass of symbolic equivalences in which the Christian language of the book is enmeshed could be called purgative or 'fiery.' Here everything specifically Christian seems to be washed away or burned up. If Buddhism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis are all saying 'the same thing' as Christianity, then what is left of Christian particularity? God is more or less equivalent to the unconscious; the idea of the Fall is similar to the Buddhist notion of the world as illusion; the sacrament of the eucharist is 'oral incorporation' or 'primitive participation,' and so forth. But since none of these equations is to be taken 'literally,' since the effort is least of all to 'explain' Christianity in terms of some consistent theory that claims a higher truth value than the Christian terms themselves, what eventually is purged away is not Christian particularity but Christian parochialism. Christianity is seen finally, not as 'a religious tradition' or even as 'a great religion' but as a way of thinking about what it means to be human, and a way which is

> as immediate, powerful, and contemporary as any terminology we possess to deal with that problem.[32]

Such is the religious possibility and vision for contemporary man in search of ultimate truth in a world that offers no single vision, no fixed point of reference around which the rest of the universe may be expected to revolve. Brown shows us a way of regarding the spirit that involves neither despair, nostalgia, skepticism nor esotericism. All truths of the spirit are one truth which is the transcendence of all boundaries so that the continuity of the self and the other, and of the self and the cosmos is recognized. There can no longer, for Brown, be a boundary between "mine" and "thine," or between "ours" and "theirs," for the boundary of all boundaries, that between ego and id, or even more basically, between life and death has been overcome. Each person, then, is free to symbolize his own understanding of the one truth which is large enough to unite all visions as but particular ways of expressing, as a function of each person's 'social biography,' to use Luckmann's phrase, the coming together of all that lives, which is how Freud, the great skeptic, describes the work of Eros.

Brown's project also points to a path beyond one of the most serious limitations of the contemporary 'invisible religion,' its single-minded pursuit of *self*-realization. Luckmann, for instance, notes that: "The dominant themes in the modern sacred cosmos bestow something like a sacred status upon the individual by articulating his 'autonomy.'[33] Could anything be more foreign to the notion of individual autonomy than these words of Brown's:

> Separateness, then, is the fall—the fall into division, the original lie. Separation is secrecy, hiding from one another, the private [illegible] ation [illegible] [illegible] ing [illegible] the plague of [illegible]

> parts or property. Ownership is hiding; separation is repression. It is a private corporation. The right to privacy: something secret and shameful, which is one's own . . . . The plague of darkness is a symbol of the opaque Selfhood: "For while they thought they were unseen in their secret sins, they were sundered one from another by a dark curtain of forgetfulness, stricken with terrible awe, and sore troubled by spectral forms."[34]

In Brown's vision, then, there is no real problem of the religious sanctioning of the individual, nor, therefore, of the privacy of his particular vision, for, if it is a vision of the spirit it will carry the self beyond the crustacean confines of his personal ego to a realization that all such boundaries are but conventions, beyond which he must go if he is truly to realize his selfhood, for his selfhood is continuous with all life. Such a quest is, as Luckmann wryly acknowledges, 'interminable.' Thus, the search for self-realization may be seen as a kind of 'Moses basket' for the therapeutic, an irresistably attractive vehicle which, when retrieved, proves to be carrying the 'giver of the law' of life, which is that the pursuit of self takes one beyond all boundaries.

But what of boundaries? The direction toward which the present work has been inclined is toward the conclusion that there is, at the very least, a proximate place for boundaries, if not between ego and id, then between self and other certainly. Indeed, any dialectical understanding of the inseparability of life and death, of Eros and the death instinct, ineluctably involves the courage to accept the separateness from the self of the other. It is the very unwillingness to allow the other his mystery, his secret, his privacy, that is the mark of the incorporation of the other so that "he" will become forever "mine," thereby leading to the formation of the ego and the repression of the self. Brown puts it well himself: "the ego is a bit of the outside world swallowed, introjected; or rather a bit of the outside world that we insist on pretending we have swallowed. The nucleus of one's own self is the incorporated other."[35] But the very fact that Brown can say this involves him in a contradiction of his own position. If the incorporation of the other leads to the formation of the ego, which is the basis for the Fall of Man, then not to incorporate the other but to allow him to remain outside the self, and therefore other than the self must be the life-oriented alternative. Brown, in other words, does not appear to appreciate the full implications of the incorporation of the other; it is an attempt to nullify his otherness, because otherness represents the possibility of death which the self-preservative drive represses. Thus, otherness or separateness are not the original lie unless that is understood as the ego's attempt to make *itself* invulnerable by separating *itself* from the world outside itself through incorporating what of that world it finds pleasurable or strong, and rejecting what it finds unpleasurable.[36] The separateness of the other is what makes the reception of his love possible, and it is what makes it possible to accept the mystery and the pain of life. It is the point of synthesis, in other words, between the life instinct and the death instinct.

Similarly, the willingness to tolerate the otherness of someone else's convictions, not regarding them as a necessary threat to the ego, is a mark of freedom from repression. Brown's position, then, is appealing in the time of the therapeutic, because it corresponds to the religious position of contemporary man, who finds no credible community of belief outside himself, and who seeks, at any rate, to transcend the problems of intolerance and subsequent destructiveness that have followed in the wake of the separate community as a means by which man discovers and experiences the life-enhancing power of Eros. Furthermore, however private the commitments of the therapeutic might be they do tend, as Luckmann suggests, to converge around the pursuit of self-realization and self-expression. As far as such a pursuit goes, the emergence of some kind of community of others could provide limits without which such visions must become self-indulgent and illusory. Brown shows us a way beyond the solipsism of the private vision and the multiplicity of truths that are implicit in the religion of the autonomous individual. Symbolic truth brings all private visions back to their source in a profound appreciation, not only of the oneness of all things, but of the power of Eros which is the force that brings all things together.

Eros may also represent the force that brings men, even with their private visions, into communities of the committed. Ricoeur wonders how it was that Freud chose to interpret religion solely in terms of the killing of the primal father and the subsequent guilt and attempt at reconciliation with the father, rather than in terms of:

> . . . the forming of the covenant among the brothers whereby they agreed not to report among themselves the murder of the father. This covenant is highly significant, for it puts an end to a repetition of the act of parricide; by prohibiting fratricide, the covenant engenders a history. But Freud is much more preoccupied with the symbolic repetition of the murder in the totem meal than with the conciliation among the brothers, which makes possible the reconciliation with the father image henceforward engraved in the hearts of men. Why not link the destiny of faith with this fraternal conciliation, rather than with the perpetual repetition

> of the parricide? But Freud has decided that the son religion is not a true advance beyond the father complex: the fiction that the son is the leader of the revolt, and hence a murderer, immediately closes the half-opened door.[37]

Freud probably also closed that door because the reconciliation of the sons had no obvious relationship to the drama of every family in the Oedipus situation, which is what Freud was also trying to account for, and not only the origin of religion. Nonetheless, the basis is there for an understanding, within the Freudian myth itself, for an understanding of the origins of religion in human brotherhood and the foreswearance of desire, rather than in patricide and guilt. True to the Freudian description, it maintains man under thralldom to death rather than in the overcoming of pure desire in Eros. In the mode of pure desire the subject does seek to negate the obstacle to his ultimate desire but in doing so he incorporates the rival and so must pay for his desire with the guilt that is the internalized presence of the father within. The reconciliation of the brothers, on the other hand, represents the education of desire in the realization of the brothers that it was not only futile to have murdered the father, but that if their desires remain unchecked the way of murder for the gratification of desire is likely to continue unabated. They agree then to modify their desires so that they may live together in peace. Freud could not emphasize the reconciliation of the brothers because he described the neurotic pattern of life, what we have described as the mode of pure desire consistently, and not what happened in its overcoming through the education of desire that takes place in struggle for recognition. The results of the latter would only be seen after analysis, and Freud did not theorize upon the aftermath of the analytic relationship.

The reconciliation of the brothers would, in fact, give a better myth of the origin of religion within the Freudian system if that system were to deal with the transformation of man. Rieff observes repeatedly that it does not, but that is perhaps because Freud refused, in his single-minded preoccupation with understanding, with analysis in short, to plumb the implications of the analytic relationship.[38] True, the latter does not count on enabling the patient to discover his True Self, that *is* totally foreign to Freud's temperament, but in showing the patient that the limits of his desire are the other person, he makes it possible for the patient to live subsequently in relationship to others, in a word, in community. It is perhaps not a commitment community that Freud makes it possible for the person to attach himself to, and in that respect Rieff may be correct, but the community that Freud introduces to the individual may perhaps be termed an ethical community, a community of responsibility and awareness of the mystery and separateness of the other, with whom, in Eros, he also finds a source of mutual identity.

An ethical community is one that takes the other with full regard and seriousness. It is a community of the I and the Thou, and not merely one of identity only between members. It considers that there is a limit to the desire and even the fulfillment of the individual, and that is the right of the other to certain of his desires and a degree of fulfillment for himself as well. Communities of identity tend to recognize no discrepancies between the desires of each person. It is such communities, wholly utopian in nature that Brown and Marcuse espouse--and in this regard, oddly enough, they probably resemble the kind of community that the Jungians might espouse--where each individual is complete unto himself, and manages somehow to avoid collision with others. People do collide, for they have different desires, but a community of Eros, an ethical community, would be one where the desires of others were recognized and one's own modified accordingly.

Martin Buber maintains that a rebirth of such a sense of community is nothing less than a matter of human survival. He writes:

> I declare in favour of a rebirth of the commune . . . . Yet whether a rebirth of the commune will ensue from the 'water and spirit' of the social transformation that is imminent--on this, it seems to me, hangs the whole fate of the human race. An organic commonwealth --and only such commonwealths can join together to form a shapely and articulated race of men--will never build itself up out of individuals but only out of small and ever smaller communities: a nation is a community only to the degree that it is a community of communities.[39]

But for such communities to come into being they must congregate around common centers or purposes--communal purposes:

> Community is the inner disposition or constitution of a life in common, which knows and embraces in itself hard 'calculation,' adverse 'chance,' the sudden access of 'anxiety.' It is community of tribulation and only because of that community of spirit; community of toil and only because of that community of salvation. Even those communities which call the spirit their master and salvation their Promised Land, the 'religious' communities, are community only if they serve their lord and master in the midst of simple, unexalted, unselected reality, a reality not so much chosen by them as sent to them just as it is; they are community only if they prepare the way to the Promised Land through the thickets of this pathless hour. True, it is not 'works' that count, but the work of faith does. A community of faith truly exists only when it is a community of work.
>
> The real essence of community is to be found in the fact--manifest or otherwise--that it has a centre. The real beginning of a community is when its members have a common relation to the centre overriding all other relations: the circle is described by the radii, not by the points along its circumference. And the originality of the centre cannot be discerned unless it is discerned as being transpicuous to the light of something divine. All this is true; but the more earthly, the more creaturely, the more attached the centre is, the truer and more transpicuous it will be; this is

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> where the 'social' element comes in. Not as something separate, but as the all-pervading realm where man stands the test; and it is here that the truth of the centre is proved.[40]

Lewis Mumford similarly looks to the small community to rescue modern man from his thralldom to the large, impersonal aggregate that he calls the Pentagon of Power:

> The changes that have so far been effective, and that give promise of further success, are those that have been initiated by animated individual minds, small groups, and local communities nibbling at the edges of the power structure, by breaking routines and defying regulations. Such an attack seeks, not to capture the citadel of power, but to withdraw from it and quietly paralyze it. Once such initiatives become widespread, as they at last show signs of becoming, it will restore power and confident authority to its proper source: the human personality and the small face-to-face community.[41]

In such a context, the growth community represents, not a proposal for the renewal of an entire society. Instead, it is suggested as one type of small community or network of communities, one, moreover, which seems particularly appropriate to the needs and interests of the therapeutic, but which, at the same time, offers a sphere of activity that would operate in the direction of the renewal of community and mutual recognition.

There is no gainsaying that the ethical community, or the community of Eros is not altogether in keeping with the inclinations of the therapeutic. Whether, however, it pertains to his appetities or to his private world view he will find, if he is to live together with others, that he has to take their desires into consideration and come to terms with them. If it is not to be to a community's sacred cosmos that each person commits himself in the time of the therapeutic, of individual autonomy, but only to his own version of the sacred cosmos, he will, nevertheless, need to share some underlying assumptions with the others with whom he lives. That underlying assumption may be that each private vision comes together in a single vision of love as 'the power which holds everything together.' We refer, of course, to what Freud described as Eros, the satisfaction that life experiences when it discovers that it is not alone in the world, but that it can share itself with another and discover, in that sharing and the mutual recognition that comes out of it, that life is meaningful in and of itself. In fact, never more than in the time of the therapeutic is it essential that the power of Eros be brought into the interactions of individuals with one another. Desire, and the encouragement in the time of the therapeutic to gratify it, is an insatiable thing, for its very presence derives from the sense of isolation and vulnerability stemming all the way back to infancy. As such, as has been indicated earlier, it cannot be satisfied with commodities, only with the other who is the object of all desire. If, then, the therapeutic is to find the satisfaction he seeks, it will only be in the recognition of and by the other. In order for that to happen his own desire will have to modify itself, and it can only do that freely out of regard for the other.

We have already indicated that the private world views of Luckmann's autonomous individual require, yet at the same time presuppose, a certain sharing with others in what we referred to as "communities of commitment," where individuals, following whatever private visions, myths, and symbols that give meaning and the power of overcoming archaic origins, gather to share a sense of the underlying unity of their various visions. That unity is of the coming together of all things in love and mutual recognition which is what the pursuit of self-realization finds that its quest is all about, in other words, that the self knows no boundaries that are fixed, only those which are born of love and trust in the other, and, as such, are themselves too a function of Eros, an Eros, moreover, that is so full that it can also accept its own death when *its* time comes.

It is only, however, in the recognition of the other, his desire and his symbols for overcoming his archaic past that the narrow self of individual autonomy can be transcended so that an identity with him may also be recognized. But only as the communities of commitment are also able to make of themselves ethical communities will they be in any position to go beyond the self-indulgence of the quest for individual autonomy. The latter is probably the single biggest shortcoming of the human potential movement. Otherwise it might contain within itself the opportunity for returning the sense of community to the fragmented and individualized modern world.

Is it possible, however, for a personal symbolic in a community of commitment to represent a life free of illusions? Is it not merely letting illusions in through the back door, so to speak--with the Jungians, a sophisticated capitulation to the old illusions? As long as the individual remains in a relationship of community to others, then his private beliefs could be taken literally only with the greatest difficulty. Illusions are perpetuated when there is no outside frame of reference. In the community of commitment, each person represents an outside frame of reference for the other, so that no personal symbolic may be taken to have any other referent than his individualized way of pursuing self-realization. In other words, what he symbolizes is *himself, his* particular way of overcoming his personal bondage to the archaic desires of childhood, and uniting with others in what is common in his symbolic--the pursuit of self-realization. In the latter he may come increasingly to discover that the formation of immutable boundaries is a function of repression. Behind, therefore, the recognition of the separateness of the other is a realization of identity with him in the movement of life toward other life.

Such personal yet communal purposes, then, represent the abandonment of the illusion that the father of childhood might yet protect us. It is instead, the use of symbols of wholeness, unity, and self-transcendence--of the Christ, the Buddha, death and resurrection--to discover the unity of the self, not in a return to an archaic unity of childish innocency--that *would* be an illusion--but toward the self-overcoming realm of the spirit, where the person develops his full resources as a self in order to encounter the other in openness and recognition, rather than by incorporation and the denial or repression of his own resources.

Yet the pursuit of self-realization that occurs directly, that is to say without mediation, encounters the problem of the ego as its only conscious vehicle. The ego, however, and its irrational appendage the superego, is the major agent of repression of the self. All attempts at self-realization must, therefore, subvert the ego. This can only be done through the agency of another person who, to the extent that he is disinterested, can be sufficiently other than the ego to subvert it, or it can be done through the medium of the symbol or myth, which has the capacity to hide what it reveals and reveal what it hides. Through the agency of the symbol, the repressed impulses of childhood are able to gain expression, but in indirect ways that do not alert the defensive ego. The symbol also expresses the hidden impulse in an "imaged" or manageable way so that the ego can mediate the emotion in a way that does not threaten to overwhelm it as would tend to be the case were only the naked emotion to express itself. Through this means the ego is able to transform an archaic impulse into an act of self-transcendence. This function enables Ricoeur to suggest "that sublimation is the symbolic function itself."[42] The symbol, like sublimation, is a means for both expressing and checking desire, and, by making repressed desire conscious in an acceptable form, provides the ego, with its yearning for the tangible, something that it can act upon in the light of awareness. Thus, says Ricoeur; "We nourish our least carnal symbols with desires that have been checked, deviated, transformed. We represent our ideals with images issuing from cleansed desire."[43] With Brown, Ricoeur maintains that: "What is symbolically represented is the human body."[44]

While the repressions seek to express themselves ceaselessly, even in sleep through dreams, it is in religion, myth and art that man is able to use the blind expression of the repressed as a means for self-understanding and liberation from the self-truncation of repression which we have referred to in the present work as the mode of pure desire. The myth, the religious symbol and the work of art may be said to embody the joining of spontaneity and intentionality, or spirit and will. According to Ricoeur: "Because of their emphasis on disguise, dreams look more to the past, to childhood. But in works of art the emphasis is on disclosure; thus works of art tend to be prospective symbols of one's personal synthesis and of man's future and not merely a regressive symptom of the artist's unresolved conflicts."[45] The symbol creates the possibility of bringing what Ricoeur calls regression and progression together as "two limits of a single scale of symbolization."[46] This suggests that all great symbols of art and myth are rooted in the archaic conflicts of childhood, but the creator is able to transform them so that they disclose "man's most open and fundamental possibilities and [he] erects them into new symbols of the suffering of self-consciousness."[47]

The symbol or myth, however, is never a *guarantee* of personal liberation. Because it concretizes an ineffable experience it is always in danger of becoming an idol: merely the externalization or projection of a desire. Moreover, if the symbol itself becomes literalized or objectified it alienates that which it seeks to express of the self. The symbol can only remain alive and transformative as it remains a symbol, that is, as it only *points* to the reality that it seeks to represent. The literalization or objectification of the symbol makes of it an end-in-itself, i.e., an idol. As such it cannot transform the archaic into the realm of spirit, for it is frozen and merely becomes the screen upon which repressed desires are projected. The degeneration of a symbol into an idol is fully as alienating as is repression because the ego remains as blind as it ever was concerning the fact that its repression, far from increasing self-understanding, have only been removed further than ever from the self by being projected onto the objectified symbol. In order, then, for the religious symbol to remain

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a vehicle for self-transcendence it must constantly be cleansed of the accretions of repressed infantile desire. In order that the symbol may be thus cleansed it must be constantly interpreted and reinterpreted so that it may be understood as a product of the repressed self yet wholly other than the ego. The repressed and the ego are never entirely other than each other, however unconscious the latter may be of the former. In that they both participate in the mode of pure desire, albeit in conflict, they are, so to speak, fellow conspirators. But the symbol must be wholly other than the ego; yet paradoxically the ego must come to understand its identity with what is symbolized.

The symbol as Wholly Other represents the dimension of reality which both recognizes the self and negates the ego--in order that the self may live. The Wholly Other, then, does not represent only the expression of the repressed as the source of self-transcendence, rather it is the realization that only the recognition of the self by one who is allowed to remain in the mystery and freedom of his otherness from the self, where he is impervious to the pure desire of the repressed self, can liberate the self from its archaic mode. The Wholly Other is met whenever the subject meets one who recognizes without either imposing or acquiescing. Yet such a one only symbolizes or points to the Wholly Other which might be said to be a metasymbol for the experience of being recognized by that which is beyond reach, control or comprehension: the ineffable nature of Being-itself which is Eros or love, "which binds all living things together."[48]

Eros is intrinsic to life--it is an instinct--thus it may be said to direct life in and of itself. Regardless of the conscious will, in other words, life moves spontaneously toward other life, and is enhanced in that movement. Thus, the Wholly Other is the metasymbol for the realization--whatever concrete form it takes, whether, for instance, it be God, Amida Buddha, or Eros--that life is ineluctably interdependent with other life. The development of the life of any individual comes only through his recognition by another in his mystery and freedom. The life instinct can be served under no other circumstance. The alternative is the abortive self-sufficiency of narcissism, the repression of the death instinct, hence the handing of the person over to the mute and automatic drive toward death in a way that is beyond any intentionality or freedom for the person.

In our time, it has come to be realized that the personalized symbol of the reliance of life on love--God--receives the projections of, in Homan's words: "All the wishes, longings, and nostalgias--everything unfulfilled, unlived, and unexpressed--[all] appear in the guise of the God image."[49] The massive attacks by Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud upon this God have all been upon the human longings and possibilities that have been disowned by man and given over to God. But instead of realizing that such attacks have always been a necessity of the prophetic tradition, whereby the Wholly Other retains unutterable mystery and freedom, modern man has chosen, by and large, to let the symbol itself lapse into caricature. Meanwhile, he is left with no dynamic symbol of the saving power of the Wholly Other for his life and so is driven further into self-indulgence--the mode of pure desire--and dependence upon the machine rather than upon life. Meanwhile, it is to be expected that, since man is the symbolic animal, he will in time begin to symbolize once again his awareness of the saving power of the Wholly Other--but who knows in what form? It has been suggested in this work that such symbols will take many forms. Perhaps, however, the various symbols may unite themselves around love or Eros, 'which unites all things.' Ricoeur, for instance, suggests:

> [Freud] never suspected that this mythology of Eros might concern an epigenesis of religious feeling, nor that Eros might be another name for the Johannine God, and further back, for the Deuteronomic God, and further still, for the God of Osee, when the prophet celebrates in his songs, the betrothal in the desert. And why may it not be that 'our god Logos, who promises no consolation, whose voice is soft but does not rest till it has gained a hearing,' is--in spite of Freud's ironic tone on this occasion--another name for Eros, in the profound unity of the symbols of Life and Light? Freud seems to me to exclude without reason, I mean without any psychoanalytic reason, the possibility that faith is a participation in the source of Eros and thus concerns, not the consolation of the child in us, but the power of loving; he excludes the possibility that faith aims at making this power adult in the face of the hatred within us and outside of us--in the face of death. The only thing that can escape Freud's critique is faith as the kerygma of love: 'God so loved the world . . . .' But in return his critique can help me discern what this kerygma of love excludes--a penal Christology and a moral God--and what it implies--a certain coincidence of the tragic God of Job and the lyric God of John.[50]

Homans argues that contemporary religious thought concerning the self is rapidly abandoning the sense of self-limitation which so characterized the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, in favor of the pursuit of self-completion, a theme which is pronounced in the work of the death-of-God theologians, Thomas Altizer and Richard Rubenstein, as well as a secular theologian like Harvey Cox.[51] This transition corresponds theologically to the collapse of the sense of divine transcendence or distance into pure immanence, and the substitution of conformity to mass society in place of the tyranny of the superego. Homans seeks the basis for a return to distance, and bases it on a dialectic between nostalgia and hope which is comparable to Ricoeur's dialectic between archaeology and teleology. The metasymbol of the Wholly Other represents the possibility of both a sense of self-limitation and of self-completion. Self-limitation is the recognition of the limits to pure desire posed by the presence of the other. But the other is also the only possible basis for self-completion, for it is only the recognition of the self by the other that creates the 'Light and Life' of consciousness and freedom, the ingredients of selfhood. Thus, the recognizing other may be said to be a channel of the Wholly Other--of Eros--so that the union of self-limitation and self-completion through the recognition by and of the other is vouchsafed to be the means for the liberation of life--not to do as it pleases, but to enter into oneness with other life in the endless overcoming or transcendence of the solitary or narcissistic self which is the anxious ego.

Furthermore, as Paul Tillich points out, the recognition of the other is the very foundation of the moral imperative and thus of ethics. He writes:

> . . . in the encounter of a person who is already and not yet a person with another in the same condition, both are constituted as real persons. 'Oughtness' is basically experienced in the ego-thou relation. This situation can also be described in the following way: man, facing his world, has the whole universe as the potential content of his centered self. Certainly, there are actual limits because of the finitude of every being, but the world is indefinitely open to man; everything can become a content of the self. This is the structural basis for the endlessness of libido in the state of estrangement; it is the condition for man's desire to 'win the whole world.'
>
> But there is one limit to man's attempt to draw all content into himself--the other self. One can subject and exploit another in his organic basis, including his psychological self, but not the other self in the dimension of the spirit. One can destroy it as a self, but one cannot assimilate it as a content of one's own centeredness . . . . Nobody can deprive a person of his claim to

> be a person and to be dealt with as a person. Therefore the other self is the unconditional limit to the desire to assimilate one's whole world, and the experience of this limit is the experience of the ought-to-be, the moral imperative. The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of the spirit begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and no other way.[52]

In the recognition of the other the modification of desire, as what Ricoeur calls the 'love of creation,' takes place. That recognition, in turn, is the means by which Eros is activated and life affirmed. Here we have the basis by which, using Tillich's terminology, autonomous ethics may become theonomous. In the act of recognizing the other the power of Eros is received. One becomes what one is potentially in the moral act and *only* in the moral act because what one is essentially is a function of Eros: life encountering other life. The essence of life, and of man specifically, then, is not to be derived in isolation or by abstraction, but in relationship. Isolation is a specific denial of the nature of life for it activates the autonomous death instinct.

Not only, then, may we suggest with Ricoeur "that Eros might be another name for the Johannine God," but we are also able to suggest that Eros is the foundation for ethics and the ethical community, which is, in turn, an inescapable imperative for human well-being. If the therapeutic persists in the pursuit of his own personal well-being to the exclusion of the other he simply will not find it, for it cannot be found in isolation, only in relationship with the other. In short, if man will not live in community he will not live, in any viable sense of the word. Tillich's words are again appropriate:

> The moral imperative demands that one self participate in the center of the other self and consequently accept his particularities even if there is no convergence between the two individuals as

> individuals. This acceptance of the other self by participating in his personal center is the core of love in the sense of *agape*, the New Testament term. The preliminary formal answer, that the unconditional character of the moral imperative is experienced in the encounter of person with person, has now become embodied in the material answer, that it is *agape* which gives concreteness to the categorical imperative, centeredness to the person and the foundation of the life of the spirit.[53]

The growth community has been suggested as a potential vehicle by which the pursuit of self-realization could become a part of the community of Eros where the recognition of the self by others provides the best available support for self-realization to occur. Thus far, there is nothing to indicate that there exists within the concept of a growth community an effective means for enabling its members to transcend their rather self-indulgent concern for their own growth, perhaps at best broadened somewhat to concern for the growth of members of the community. This is why we have so emphasized the role of faith in the future that the growth community could have as an agent of the renewal of life in contemporary society. The religious vision relates directly to, indeed it begins, as a quest for the salvation of the self, but it is led, while it remains true to itself, beyond the self, for it discovers that the boundary between the self and the other is a function of one's essential unity or identity with the other, and is, in no sense, absolute. Only such a realization will save the pursuit of self-realization from an individualism that, in the last analysis, can only defeat it, for the belief that the self ends at the boundaries of the conscious ego is the beginning, as Freud has so convincingly shown, of all man's illusions and illnesses.[54]

Freud showed us that what we are conscious of is only a small part of the self. [illegible], however, [illegible] to realize that the part of the self. Thanks to him, however, we are beginning to realize that the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious self is only the beginning of a ~~tendeney~~ to fix boundaries in all that man does, the better to exclude the death that never ceases to pursue him--not as his enemy, as he fears, but as his friend. The overcoming of boundaries in the pursuit of self-realization cannot end merely between the conscious and the unconscious, but must seek the identity between self and other and between "ourselves" and "theirselves," at the very time, it must be remembered, that it accepts the separation between the self and the other, and "ourselves" and "theirselves." It is this dialectic, between identity and otherness, which is both an ethical and a religious relation of the self to other life, that makes it possible for the self-seeker to realize both the limits of his desire and his responsibility toward the other person. The limits of desire let him know that self-realization really has little to do with the fulfillment of desire, but rather with an open and recognizing relationship with the other. Responsibility toward the other, in turn, is a function of the realization of the essential identity in shared humanity and in the shared struggle for recognition between the self and the other, or between "us" and "them."

If there is a single area in which the pursuit of self-realization is most lacking in either concern or consequences, it is in the political. Political in this instance refers, not to electoral politics necessarily, but to an active regard for what it is in the public sphere that interferes with the self-realization or recognition of both the self and the other person, however anonymous the latter. We have maintained throughout the present work that it is all-important for the well-being of the individual that he experience himself as being recognized, and have indicated that this best occurs in the family, and next best--the analytic relationship aside--hopefully as an ongoing confirmation of each person's recognition in his primary reference groups. Yet, if the larger public institutions of the society, in the meantime, fail to--indeed, as presently structured, are incapable--recognize the person then whatever recognition is given in the private spheres is negated in the influential public sphere, and, perhaps most importantly, where the individual fails to obtain recognition in the family and in his groups, his incomplete sense of himself is merely further confirmed by the disregard with which he is dealt with in the anonymous public sphere. A commitment to self-realization that is, at the same time, a realization of the continuity between the self and others, cannot remain indifferent, if it is at all serious, to the lack of recognition that obtains in the larger society. A withdrawal into the privatism of one's own growth community becomes a confession of disregard for the other who is outside "our" community. In doing so, however, it further insures the long-term impotence of anyone's pursuit of self-realization beyond his own private realm. Luckmann points out: "Because the individual's performances are controlled by the primary public institutions, he soon recognizes the limits of his 'autonomy' and learns to confine the quest for self-realization to the 'private sphere.'[55] He adds further:

> The primary social institutions have 'emigrated' from the sacred cosmos. Their functional rationality is not part of a system

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> that could be of 'ultimate' significance to the individuals in the society . . . . The increasing autonomy of the primary public institutions, however, has consequences for the relation of the individual to the social order--and thus, ultimately, to himself. Reviewing some of these consequences one is equally justified in describing this process as a process of dehumanization of the basic structural components of the social order. The functional rationality of the primary social institutions seems to reinforce the isolation of the individual from his society, contributing thereby to the precariousness inherent in all social orders. Autonomy of the primary institutions, 'subjective' autonomy and *anomie* of the social order are dialectically related.[56]

Luckmann goes on to wonder whether the opportunity for everyone to live a private personal life will result in "motivating mass withdrawal into the 'private sphere' while 'Rome burns.'"[57] The growth community is in need of not abandoning the public sphere, but instead of considering the public implications of the pursuit of self-realization. This ought not to be so difficult considering that part of the genius of the human potential movement has been its ability to present activities for every taste and every dimension of self-realization--all, that is, but the political. Surely it is time to begin considering the public dimension of what it could mean to be recognized as a self within the public sphere--and what it does mean for all too many not to be so recognized. Zimbardo's findings confirm our intuitive judgements that what he calls "deindividuation," which would seem to correspond to the failure to be recognized, permits the "overt expression of antisocial behavior, characterized as selfish, greedy, power-seeking, hostile, lustful, and destructive."[58]

In the meantime we perhaps ought not to be too critical of the privatism of the quest for self-realization and the emerging realization through the human potential movement that personal growth best occurs in the midst of supportive and recognizing relationships with others. Through such relationships, moreover, the self may come to learn of both the identity and the separateness of the other, and of the latter as presenting a limit to the mode of pure desire which is otherwise so easily confused with the pursuit of self-realization. It now begins to appear as if the inherent shortcomings of the growth center as a resource for the pursuit of self-realization are giving way before a better understanding of the need for ongoing communities where the growth of the self may be sought. Such growth communities are still very imperfect--they are, after all, only in their infancy. Their infancy, moreover, is yet too much influenced by the therapeutic's failure, thus far, to realize that the gratification of his desires is not self-realization but its antithesis: the repression of the death instinct. Freud can yet teach the therapeutic many things. He can, as Rieff holds, teach us much concerning the courage to remain an individual bereft of illusions in a time when there is little to support him in his community or in his larger society. But Freud also teaches us, we have seen, that it is only as the self meets and recognizes the other, both in his separateness from and his identity with the self, that Eros is strengthened. Thus can life be lived and death accepted in life. Only thus, too, can the therapeutic prevail, as he looks for others who are, in their individualized ways looking for themselves, and joins with them in communities of commitment, not to "their" truth but to the truth of Eros behind all private and public symbols of the truth of selfhood--which is that all things are one in their separateness, and separate in their oneness.

Conclusions of this Study

1. An examination of the analytic relationship and the Freudian concept of Eros suggests that it is through the recognition of the other person that the individual is educated from the mode of pure desire which pertains from birth. This, in turn, enables him to recognize in the other the limits of pure desire.

2. It is as the subject is recognized by and able to recognize the other in turn that he learns to accept the otherness or separateness of the object-of-desire, thus, his own separateness as a self. To the extent that this separateness is accepted, the unrepressed death instinct enables the self to accept the risk and possibility of death-in-life, which also involves an acceptance of the right of the other to be different and hold different beliefs from the self. The failure to tolerate such separateness is the source of the repression of the death instinct, and the maintenance of the archaic mode of pure desire, which deals with the other by incorporating him into a possessive union, thereby forming a false self or ego, Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" of "pure self-division," and the Freudian topography.

3. A relationship of identity through shared purposes with a group or community of others enables the individual to accept both the separateness and the identity of others, the twin marks of an integrated response to life. In the mode of pure desire, however, the formation of a group means that the love of the members for each other develops in exchange for which hostility becomes directed toward those outside who are "different." Only a group that was founded on the recognition of the other could join together yet refrain from aggression toward the

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outsider. For the therapeutic, whose primary link to others is his emotions, encounter groups and the human potential movement represent a means for the rediscovery of identity with others as well as a recognition of their separateness. The recent emergence of growth communities where self-realization might be sought in a context that does justice to the life-long nature of the quest suggests a vehicle by which the sense of community could emerge in a manner appropriate to the inner search of the therapeutic.

4. In order to overcome the self-indulgence that is endemic to the quest for self-realization, it is important to seek means by which the narrow self might be transcended, and a concern for others outside one's own community develop. It is suggested that the private world view or personal symbolic of Luckmann's 'invisible religion' encourages a tolerance for the right of the other to his private vision, but that both be realized to symbolize the larger unity of the self with the world that is the final outcome of any *serious* pursuit of self-realization. Thus the community of Eros, of members linked together by their openness to each other's commitments, and a joint commitment to the union of all life in Eros, is suggested as the means by which the therapeutic may rediscover the sense of communal purposes which he too requires in order to be educated from the mode of pure desire into a recognition of the other as both the object and the modification of desire.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

[1] L. Trilling, "Authenticity and the Modern Unconscious," Commentary (September, 1971), p. 45.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] S. Freud, The Future on an Illusion (1927), trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957), pp. 96-97.

[5] Cf., S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1960),

[6] P. Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 164.

[7] P. Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961),

[8] Freud, 1927, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

[9] Roazen, op. cit., pp. 198 ff.

[10] P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay on interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 550.

[11] Allen Wheelis, The Quest for Identity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958).

[12] Peter Homans, Theology after Freud (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

[13] Cf., Freud, 1921, op. cit., p. 44, "And in the development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it brings about a change from egoism to altruism."

[14] Ibid., p. 39. [15] Ibid.

[16] S. Freud, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," (1915a), Collected Papers, 4, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), p. 78.

[17] N. O. Brown, Love's Body (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 143.

[18] C. Rycroft, "Introduction: Causes and Meaning," Psychoanalysis Observed, ed. C. Rycroft (London: Pelican Books, 1968), p. 20.

[19] T. Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 115-116.

[20] Ibid., p. 99. [21] Ibid., p. 117.

[22] Ibid., p. 110.

[23] P. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of faith after Freud (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), cf., for instance his statement: "Because we have no real churches, we can have no reformations," p. 231.

[24] W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902 (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), pp. 368-69.

[25] Cf., J. Needleman, The New Religions (rev. ed.) (New York: Simon and Schuster Pocket Books, 1972), pp. 128-42.

[26] Brown, op. cit., p. 196. [27] Ibid., p. 253.

[28] "The distinction between self and not-self is made by the childish decision to claim all that the ego likes as 'mine,' and to repudiate all that the ego dislikes as 'not-mine.'" Ibid., p. 142.

[29] Ibid., p. 227. [30] Ibid., p. 84.

[31] Ibid., p. 161.

[32] R. N. Bellah, "Review of Love's Body, by Norman O. Brown," Beyond Belief (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 233.

[33] Luckmann, op. cit., p. 109.

[34] Brown, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

[35] Ibid., p. 144.

[36] Freud, 1915a, op. cit., p. 78.

[37] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 535.

[38] Rieff, op. cit., pp. 73 ff.

[39] Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958) pp. 136-37.

[40] Ibid., pp. 134-35.

[41] Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine II: The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), p. 408.

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[42] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 497.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 499.

[45] Ibid., p. 521.

[46] Ibid., p. 522.

[47] Ibid.

[48] S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), trans. James Strachey (London, Hogart Press, 1950), p. 68.

[49] Peter Homans, "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By way of Freud and Tillich," The Dialogue Between Psychology and Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 65.

[50] Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 536.

[51] Peter Homans, Theology After Freud (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

[52] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 40.

[53] Ibid., pp. 45-46.

[54] Cf., S. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), Collected Papers, 4, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 354-355.

[55] Luckmann, op. cit., p. 110.

[56] Ibid., pp. 115-16.

[57] Ibid., p. 117.

[58] P. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order vs. Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos," working draft for Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1969, p. 13.

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